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Much of our knowledge of the world depends on the testimony of experts. Experts sometimes 
change their minds and disagree with each other. What ought a novice do when an expert 
changes their mind? This dissertation provides an account of when expert conversion is 
epistemically significant and how the novice ought to rationally defer to expert conversion. In 
answering when expert conversion is epistemically significant, I provide a diagnostic tool that 
emphasizes that epistemically significant expert conversion seems to be evidence-based and that 
there is an absence of cognitive biases on the part of the converting expert. In answering how the 
novice ought to rationally defer to a converting expert I give two principles. First, I give a 
principle for determining when an expert is trustworthy. Second, I answer under what further 
conditions a novice rationally or legitimately trusts in a converting expert.  
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Much of our knowledge depends on what others tell us. From concerns about the climate 
to medical diagnoses, often, we take ourselves to know things beyond our expertise because we 
trust those who do have the expertise. Another uncontroversial fact about our epistemic situation 
is that people change their minds. For example, a conservative becomes a liberal, an atheist 
comes to believe in God, or a geocentrist becomes a heliocentrist.  
This project investigates the intersection of these two epistemic phenomena: our 
dependency on the testimony of experts and the fact that people, including experts, change their 
minds. The project is generally exploratory but argues for a contested claim that sometimes when 
a person trusts an expert and that expert changes their mind, the person ought defer to the 
converting expert, even sometimes when the converting expert is going against the current 
consensus.  
One reason why this project is important is because there has not been much discussion 
in the current literature in social epistemology concerning the role of expert conversion. There is 
a rich discussion of expert testimony in the literature and the nature and role of belief in a social 
context, but there has not been much exploration in the area of expert testimony and expert 
conversion. There are unique questions that arise at the intersection of expert testimony and 
expert conversion. Some of the questions that this project addresses are the following: What is 
the nature and significance of expert conversion in general? Are there ever instances of 
epistemically significant expert conversions and if so, under what conditions? Further, if there 
are instances of epistemically significant expert conversions and we can specify under what 
conditions they obtain, do novices, or people whose knowledge depends on the testimony of the 
expert, have any epistemic responsibilities with respect to the expert’s conversion? If they do, 
what are those responsibilities? Additionally, do all expert conversion testimonies carry the same 






epistemic weight or are some expert conversions more epistemically significant than others? 
Last, are epistemically significant expert conversions limited to a specific domain of knowledge? 
If they are, then why do some domains of knowledge permit epistemically significant expert 
conversions while other domains do not? Let us consider some of these questions in more detail 
and discuss how my project seeks to answer some of them.  
What is the nature and significance of expert conversion in general?  
 Is there something special epistemically about expert conversion? Why focus on 
conversion? Isn’t conversion just an instance of expert testimony that does not add any additional 
epistemic weight to the testimony of the expert? I do not think so. There are cases in which the 
fact that an expert converted provides more epistemic weight to the testimony of the expert over 
and above the testimony of an expert who has not converted. Something that is important to 
emphasize is that conversion per se is not sufficient to render greater epistemic weight to the 
expert’s testimony, but, as we will see in this dissertation, under certain conditions, there are 
cases in which the fact that an expert has converted from one position to another provides 
additional epistemic weight to their testimony that they might not have had otherwise.1 
 If I can demonstrate the claim that in some instances, expert conversion confers 
additional epistemic weight to the testimony of an individual that they may not have otherwise 
had would be an important piece of data in our epistemic theory. If expert conversion can be 
epistemically significant in ways that is over and above mere expert testimony, at least 
 
1 I am not claiming that expert conversion is the only way in which the epistemic weight of an 
expert’s testimony might increase. Rather, I am merely making the claim that under certain 
conditions, the fact that an expert has converted adds an epistemic boost to the testimony of the 
expert that might not (although it could) have obtained.  






sometimes, this is an important discovery that would need to be accounted for in any 
epistemology.  
Under what conditions is expert testimony epistemically significant? 
 Answering this question is important for the following reason: reflecting on the possible 
conditions in which expert conversion is significant allows us to consider in a unique way the 
reasons why expert testimony in general is significant. The phenomenon of expert conversion 
and the conditions in which it obtains allows us to consider the ways in which testimony can be 
affected by bias and other non-rational factors. There is much discussion concerning the 
influence of non-rational factors and the way in which this effects our beliefs and even the 
beliefs of experts, but there is not much exploration in the area of the non-rational influences (or 
lack of non-rational influences) and the effect this has on the epistemic weight of a person’s 
testimony in the context of a person changing one’s mind. For example, there is plenty of 
discussion of how bias can influence whether an individual person or even a group of people can 
reason poorly or for non-rational reasons, but there is less discussion about the role bias plays in 
the epistemic lives of experts and the people who epistemically depend on them — especially at 
the intersection of expert testimony, bias, and expert conversion. For example, C. Thi Nguyen 
discusses the notion of cognitive islands and echo chambers, which are instances of expert 
testimony and bias, but not much is said concerning the role experts play, specifically when they 
change their minds, in regards to the knowledge of the novices who depend on them.2 Take for 
example a real world case, physicist Richard Muller, a former climate change skeptic, who now 
believes that climate change is real, the rate of warming is accurate, and that humans are the 
 
2 See C. Thi Nguyen (2020), “Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: problems for 
epistemic dependence on experts,” Synthese, 197, 2803-2821.  






primary cause.3 Here is a real world example of an expert changing their mind that is likely to be 
epistemically significant.  
 Another important feature about studying the epistemic significance of expert conversion 
is that it may shed light on the nature and significance of the conversion of non-experts. We can 
compare the ways in which expert conversion might be similar to as well as different from lay 
conversion and what this means epistemically. For example, suppose the empirical data suggests 
that experts in a particular field are less likely to succumb the base-rate fallacy compared to non-
experts. Further suppose that an epistemically significant conversion crucially depends on not 
succumbing to the base-rate fallacy. It would be helpful to know what allows an expert to resist 
committing the fallacy compared to the non-expert and what this might mean epistemically.  
 Our reflecting on the nature of expert conversion might demonstrate that experts are no 
less immune from biased thinking or motivated reasoning than non-experts. For example, 
consider the case of Harvard astronomer, Avi Loeb, who claims that a piece of an extraterrestrial 
aircraft may be orbiting Jupiter.4 What would cause one of the world’s top scientists to come to 
believe such an improbable theory?5 Loeb says that he is open to evidence yet fails to see a better 
explanation of the data than the alien hypothesis. Some of the things we will discuss in chapter 
 
3 See Richard A. Muller (2012), “The Conversion of a Climate Change Skeptic”, The New York 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-
skeptic.html.  
4 See Avi Selk (2019), “Harvard’s top astronomer says an alien ship may be among us — and he 
doesn’t care what his colleagues think,” The Washington Post, 
www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/harvards-top-astronomer-says-an-alien-ship-may-be-
among-us--and-he-doesnt-care-what-his-colleagues-think/2019/02/04/a5d70bb0-24d5-11e9-
90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html. Thanks to Tom Senor for directing me toward this article.  
5 It is not clear from the article if Loeb always thought that extra-terrestrial life was possible or 
how strongly he believes that it is possible, so it makes it a little less clear whether he is a 
genuine or full-blown convert to believing in E.T. Nevertheless, given that I take conversion to 
come in a matter of degrees, I do not think this undermines his case a useful example for my 
project.   






three will delve into some of the details of this case. For example, Loeb holds a position that is 
contrary to the scientific consensus. He is putting his reputation on the line and receiving 
criticism because of his views. Sometimes this means that he might have quite good evidence if 
he is willing to suffer for his views. But other times, motivated reasoning might better explain 
why someone, even an expert, is willing to suffer for his or her beliefs. For example, it is 
possible that someone is consumed with praise and fame to such an extent that they will go 
beyond the evidence to endorse a radical theory that receives a lot of attention in both academia 
and the media. The fact that Loeb might demonstrate some of the characteristics of someone who 
is motivated by attention and fame, could provide a defeater for the weight of his testimony and 
conversion with respect to belief in extraterrestrial life. If a top research scientist endorses a 
certain theory, this could lead to practical consequences such as government funded research 
programs searching for more evidence of extraterrestrial life which might be a waste of 
resources. This is just one example of how philosophical reflection on the nature of expert 
conversion can provide a substantial contribution to epistemology generally, and social 
epistemology.   
 In addition to shedding light on the nature of biased reasoning in experts and lay persons, 
reflecting on the differences between expert conversion and the knowledge of the lay persons 
who depend on the expert’s testimony can also help bridge the gap between experts and lay 
persons. As we shall see in chapter four, there is an epistemic asymmetry between experts and 
lay persons. By reflecting on the nature and significance of both expert conversion and the 
knowledge of lay persons who depend on their testimony, we may make headway in bridging 
that epistemic gap, or, more precisely, mitigating some of the negative epistemic consequences 






of the epistemic asymmetry. For example, an unfounded distrust in the testimony of experts by 
lay persons may lead the lay person to hold unjustified beliefs.  
How ought novices respond to epistemically significant expert conversion?  
 Another reason for focusing on the nature and significance of the epistemic conversion of 
experts is what it might mean for the epistemic responsibilities of both experts and the laity they 
testify to. There is already literature that discusses the epistemic responsibilities experts have 
when communicating information to lay persons, something we shall look at in greater detail in 
chapter four, but there is not much literature on the epistemic responsibilities of experts who 
change their mind on a given subject and how to properly and effectively communicate their 
change of mind to a lay audience without being misleading. We can understand this aspect of 
expert conversion as the ethical implications of epistemically (in)significant expert conversion. 
Philosophers should reflect on these ethical implications of epistemically (in)significant expert 
conversion for at least two reasons: one theoretical, one practical.  
 The theoretical reason for philosophers to reflect on the ethical implications of 
epistemically (in)significant expert conversion is that it provides another way of thinking about 
how our epistemology and moral theory are related. If we are dependent on the testimony of 
others for our knowledge of the world, then those who are in positions of authority have certain 
responsibilities towards those who epistemically depend on them. Moreover, those who 
epistemically depend on the testimony of others have different sorts of epistemic responsibilities 
such as developing their own set of critical thinking abilities, being receptive to the message of 
experts, developing a healthy skepticism, and cultivating intellectual virtues. This epistemic 
give-and-take between expert and novice starts to cut at the intersection of the epistemic and the 
ethical. Greater reflection from a philosophical point of view between the epistemic phenomena 






of expert testimony in general and expert conversion will provide us with a better sense of both 
our epistemic and moral responsibilities surrounding expert conversion.  
Are some expert conversions more epistemically significant than others?  
 There is discussion in the social epistemology literature concerning the number of experts 
and the credentials of experts and how this bears on the kind of epistemic weight their testimony 
carries, but something unique about my project is that it looks at another reason why expert 
testimony may carry more epistemic weight than others. Ceteris peribus, when an expert changes 
their mind on an issue in their domain of expertise, this should add more epistemic weight to 
their testimony than if a non-expert changes their mind.6 Later, we shall see that ceteris peribus, 
some expert conversion adds more epistemic weight than their non-converting expert peer. 
Consider the example of the Harvard physicist Avi Loeb discussed earlier. The fact that he came 
to believe much more strongly (or at least that is what the story seems to suggest) that extra-
terrestrial life is possible carries much more epistemic weight than if I or some other random Joe 
came to believe in the possibility of extraterrestrial life.7 The reason Loeb’s conversion carries 
more epistemic weight than my potential conversion in believing in the possibility of extra-
terrestrial life is because Loeb is an expert in the relevant domain while I am not.  
 A philosophically interesting point here is exploring the domain of expertise and the 
relationship it has in distinguishing experts from non-experts. Experts have many true beliefs 
about a specific domain of truths that are only accessible to the experts. For example, Dr. Loeb is 
 
6 See Alvin Goldman (2001), “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 63: 85–110. 
7 It is not exactly clear what ‘may’ or ‘possibly’ means in this context as it pertains to the 
possibility of extra-terrestrial life. Based on the context I take it to mean something stronger than 
logical possibility and maybe even naturally possible. It seems reasonable to me that Loeb thinks 
that there is a greater than zero probability that there is extra-terrestrial life.  






an expert in astronomy, and I am not. But there are other cases in which I think deferring to an 
expert is not as clear. Or it is at least not as clear who is the expert with respect to the disputed 
question. One example I have in mind is the testimony of the disciples of Jesus. Philosophers, 
like Hume, argue that the probability that a miracle occurring is always less likely than a natural 
explanation of the putative miracle. Hume is the expert, and the disciples are ignorant and prone 
to superstition. We can run the same sort of argument using a scientific expert who holds to some 
version of physicalism. Science tells us that miracles are not possible or are at least very 
unlikely. So, the testimony of the disciples is trumped by the expertise of the philosophers and 
scientists. But, in the case of the testimony of the disciples that Jesus is raised from the dead, are 
they not experts? Aren’t the senses of the disciples just as reliable as the sense of the experts? 
Don’t the disciples know that dead people stay dead, yet claimed to have seen the risen Christ? 
In this case, it is not as clear who is the expert with respect to the relevant question and data. I 
think reflecting on the conversion of experts and how the knowledge of lay persons depends on 
their testimony can be philosophically illuminating but also more complex than it first seems.  
Does epistemically significant conversions only apply to certain domains of knowledge?  
 The last item I would like to discuss in this introductory chapter on why this project 
matters is whether epistemically significant expert conversion applies only to certain domains of 
knowledge. First, to answer this question, it depends on whether you think there are experts in 
varying domains of inquiry. For example, most people probably think that there are experts in 
science, but it becomes less clear what expertise amounts to in disciplines like philosophy, 
politics, and religious studies. For instance, some people think that because there is not 
consensus or progress in politics, philosophy, or religion, that there aren’t any experts in those 
domains, or at least experts in a robust sense of the term. To conclude from this fact of 






disagreement, or lack of progress, that there are no experts in philosophy, politics, and religion 
would be unfounded. While experts in philosophy, politics, and religion may not enjoy the same 
level of expertise as scientists, they do enjoy some degree of expertise. The sorts of things that 
philosophers, political scientists, and religious studies experts are experts in include which 
thinkers held which views, what the arguments those thinkers put forth for their positions are, 
what the current trends are in the discipline, and who the better-known thinkers are.  
 This sort of expertise has value even if it is not as robust as the expertise of a physicist or 
a medical doctor. Where there is significant disagreement concerning the nature of certain 
philosophical, political, or religious questions, deference to experts in these fields may be less 
warranted.8  
 If there are not experts in other realms of inquiry besides science, can my project 
elucidate anything in those other fields? I think it can. First, I find the claim that there is not 
consensus or progress in politics, philosophy, or religion suspect. It may not be the same degree 
of consensus or progress in the former than in science, but I do not think that it means that there 
is no consensus or progress at all. It’s possible that consensus comes, and progress comes in 
degrees. And if that is the case, then maybe what my account says about the epistemic 
significance of expert conversion in science can be applied, although maybe not identically, to 
other domains of inquiry. It might be the case that because the degree of consensus and progress 
is less in politics, philosophy, and religion, and hence, the testimony of those domains’ experts 
carries less weight, it does not necessarily follow that the testimony of experts in politics, 
philosophy, and religion carries no epistemic weight at all. But if the testimony of experts in 
politics, philosophy, and religions does carry some epistemic weight, particularly more weight 
 
8 Thanks to Tom Senor for helping me with this point.  






than their non-expert counterparts, then it seems that the conditions I outline in my account of 
epistemically significant expert conversion can in fact be applied to other domains of inquiry.  
Conclusion 
To sum, I have given a number of reasons why I think my project matters. Giving an 
account of epistemically significant expert conversion is philosophically worthwhile for the 
following reasons: First, there is something philosophically and epistemically unique about 
conversion. So, reflecting on the nature and significance of conversion in general and expert 
conversion is philosophically fruitful. Second, reflecting on instances of epistemically significant 
conversion allows us to discover more about how bias can influence our justification for holding 
certain beliefs. One way we will explore this idea is looking at studies that suggest that experts 
are often just as biased as non-experts when forming judgements. This pushes against the idea 
that experts are de facto more rational than non-experts. Third, looking at the nature and 
significance of expert conversion may shed light on the nature and significance of lay 
conversion. Fourth, an account of expert conversion allows us to think about and develop a 
theory of why some conversion carry more weight than others. It also helps us to think about 
how the conversion of a non-expert or group of non-experts might carry enough weight to 
override the counter-testimony of an expert. Fifth, I argue that my account of epistemically 
significant expert conversion can be applied not only to the conversion of scientific experts but 
also to experts in other fields. Additionally, my reasons for thinking this is possible also sheds 
light on the nature of expertise, consensus, and progress in each domain of inquiry.  
 It is for these reasons that I take my project to be one that is philosophically interesting 
and important. Having given an apologia for my project, let us now turn to chapter one: the 
nature and significance of conversions and scientific revolutions. 






On the nature of conversion and its epistemic significance 
1   Introduction  
In this chapter, I seek to explain the nature and significance of conversion and scientific 
revolutions. My purpose for doing this is to provide the background and context for my account 
of epistemically significant expert conversion and the proper epistemic response of lay persons 
who depend on the converting expert’s testimony for knowledge of the world. The structure of 
this chapter is as follows. First, I will explain Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. 
Next, I will develop an account of conversion which is modeled after the structure of a scientific 
revolution in order to explain the nature of conversion. Last, I will discuss in a general way, why 
conversion is epistemically significant.  
2 The structure of scientific revolutions 
 
In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (henceforth, Structure), Thomas 
Kuhn, among many other things, outlines the structure of scientific revolutions.9 According to 
Kuhn, the structure of a scientific revolution goes as follows: normal science, puzzle-solving, 
paradigm, anomaly, crisis, revolution.10 Let us look at each of these steps in turn.  
Kuhn understands normal science as something that essentially involves puzzle-solving 
within a paradigm and does not aim at novelty. Concerning problem-solving, Kuhn writes, 
“...perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research problem we have just encountered is 
how little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal.”11 Something 
important to keep in mind, which is stressed by Ian Hacking, is that just because Kuhn thought 
 
9 See Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012), Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 50th anniversary edition, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
10 For a helpful summary of Structure, see Ian Hacking (2012), Introductory essay, in Thomas 
Kuhn (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
11 Kuhn, Structure, 35.  






that normal science didn’t aim at novelty, it doesn’t follow that Kuhn didn’t think the practice of 
normal science and puzzle-solving isn’t important. On this point, Hacking elaborates as follows:  
Normal science is characterized by a paradigm, which legitimates puzzles and problems 
on which the community works. All is well until the methods legitimated by the 
paradigm cannot cope with a cluster of anomalies; crisis results and persists until a new 
achievement redirects research and serves as a new paradigm. That is a paradigm shift.12  
 
Paradigms, according to Kuhn, share the following two characteristics. First, paradigms are 
“...sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing 
modes of scientific activity.” Second, paradigms are, “...sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts 
of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.”13  
There are at least two ways of understanding a paradigm according to Kuhn. The first 
way of understanding a paradigm is in the global sense. The global sense of a paradigm is that 
which binds the scientific community together. This includes shared practices and commitments, 
symbolic generalizations, models, and exemplars.14 The second sense of a paradigm, according 
to Kuhn, is the local sense of a paradigm. A local sense of a paradigm concerns a particular kind 
of exemplar, where an exemplar is the best and most instructive kind of example. Exemplars 
were used as particular examples in analogical arguments. Hacking writes the following about 
exemplars and their use in analogical reasoning:  
In general: Something is in dispute. One states a compelling example about which almost 
everyone in the audience will agree - a paradigm. The implication is that what is in 
dispute “is just like that.”15  
 
 
12 Hacking, Intro, xxiii 
13 Kuhn, Structure, 10-11.  
14 In later chapters, I will discuss a particular condition called the social calibration condition 
which is very similar to Kuhn’s global sense of a shared paradigm.  
15 Hacking, Intro, xix-xx.  






To better grasp what Hacking is saying here, let us consider the following example. Consider 
how a given type of physics problem can be solved in a certain way. The way this physics 
problem is solved is to compute the notion of Newtonian physics by using the law of gravitation 
which involves using the notion of gravitational force. This is an exemplar of doing physics. 
First, identify and discover the kinds of forces that are relevant to that kind of system (e.g., 
electrostatic, magnetic, etc.) and the associated force law. Second, use Newton’s second law to 
compute the behaviors determined by those forces. So, the paradigm of computing planetary 
motion sets the stage for the physics of solids, liquids, and geophysics: discover the relevant 
forces and force laws in each case.16  
The next feature in the structure of a scientific revolution is an anomaly. An anomaly is a 
particularly worrisome puzzle within a paradigm that is resistant to being solved.17 There is a 
disagreement between Kuhn and Karl Popper about the falsification of scientific theories and 
worrisome puzzles. Kuhn, unlike Popper, thought that scientific theories were very rarely 
falsified.  
 In contrast to Popper, who understood the philosophy of science as a process of 
conjectures and refutations, Kuhn thought that anomalies within a paradigm were to be expected. 
It is not until the anomalies become intractable that they cause a crisis within a paradigm.18  A 
crisis, according to Kuhn, occurs when an anomaly becomes intractable. Concerning the nature 
of a crisis within a paradigm, Kuhn understands a crisis to involve ‘extraordinary’ rather than 
 
16 Thanks to Barry Ward for providing this helpful example of a paradigm and exemplar. 
17 See Alexander Bird (2018), “Thomas Kuhn,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/.  
18 See Karl Popper (1963), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 
London: Routledge. Cf. Stephen Thorton (2018), “Karl Popper,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/.  






ordinary (normal) research with a “proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try 
anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over 
fundamentals.”19  
 Once a paradigm is in crisis, a revolution occurs. Before the revolution occurs, Kuhn 
thinks that a crucial decision between competing paradigms must be made. Concerning this 
crucial decision between competing paradigms, He writes:  
 The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept.  
another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both 
paradigms with nature and with each other.20 
 
What Kuhn seems to be saying is that when a subject makes a judgement concerning two 
competing paradigms, the acceptance of one paradigm entails the psychological rejection of the 
other. One reason for thinking Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is psychological rather than 
logical in nature is because if two paradigms are incommensurable then it is not clear that the 
two paradigms share a common language in which a logical contradiction between the two can 
be derived.21 When changing from one paradigm to another you are adopting a new form of life. 
 
19 Kuhn, Structure, 91. Cf. Hacking, Intro, xxvii.  
20 Kuhn, Structure, 78. In my account of the nature of conversion, I do think there is a difference 
from positively believing P to suspending judgment about P. While I do not want to say that 
moving from believing P to suspending judgment that P is a kind of conversion, I do want to 
distinguish between believing P and then suspending judgment that P. I think we should call this 
loss of belief rather than conversion. For conversion to take place, I think you must move from 
believing P to believing that not-P. If this is how we are understanding conversion, then Kuhn’s 
idea that moving from one paradigm to another involves a simultaneous decision to accept one 
paradigm and reject another. For example, a theist might suspend judgment concerning the 
existence of God and become an agnostic. I do not want to say that they converted from theism 
to agnosticism. I do think it is correct to say that once a theist moves from theism to atheism, 
even with an agnostic stage in between, that the theist has converted and when they become an 
atheist have, simultaneously rejected theism, and accepted atheism. Thanks to Tom Senor for 
helpful discussion concerning this point.  
21 Thanks to Barry Ward for pointing out this argument to me.  






The problems, questions, and methodologies you employ involve a completely different 
worldview.  
Once the decision to reject the old paradigm and accept the new paradigm has been made, 
a revolution has occurred. Kuhn understands a change in paradigms — a revolution — as a 
change in worldviews. A change in worldview, according to Kuhn, is not merely metaphorical. 
So, when he writes that “...after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world”, he was not 
speaking entirely in metaphor.22 A question that arises from Kuhn’s understanding of a scientific 
revolution as a change of worldview, or of seeing the world in a particular way, is whether the 
old and new paradigms have anything in common. This is where Kuhn discusses his 
incommensurability thesis.  
 Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis can be captured in the following argument. First, 
Newton thought mass was f = ma and Einstein thought mass was E = mc2. Mass understood in 
Newtonian terms makes no sense in an Einsteinian system and vice versa. If neither sense of 
mass makes sense in either of the theories, then there is no way to compare the two theories. But 
if there is no way to compare the two theories, then there is no rational basis for favoring one 
theory over the other.23  
 Considering this argument for incommensurability, two tensions arise. First, if 
incommensurability is true, then progress in scientific knowledge seems to be undermined. If 
you cannot compare the different paradigms of Newtonian versus Einsteinian physics, how can 
you make a judgement concerning whether one is better than the other? This seems to conflict 
with scientific realism in which science gives a true description of reality.  
 
22 Structure, 117. Cf. Hacking, “Introduction,” xxviii.  
23 Hacking, “Introduction,” xxx-xxxi.  






 Second, incommensurability seems to be in tension with metaphysical realism, the view 
that there is a mind-independent world and philosophy, and science is in the business of 
describing it. If the scientific enterprise cannot be thought of as providing a true mind-
independent description of reality, then it seems that one of our best ways of knowing reality is 
not in fact mind dependent. So, Kuhn could be charged with a form of idealism.24  
In his paper, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice”, Kuhn states that 
incommensurability means that there are “...significant limits to what the proponents of different 
theories can communicate to one another.” Additionally, “...an individual’s transfer of allegiance 
is often better described as conversion than as choice.”25  
Kuhn seems to think that just because there are significant limits in communication 
between paradigms, it does not necessarily follow that there is no communication whatsoever. It 
seems to me that for a paradigm shift to occur there must be at least a minimal shared amount of 
content and communication between the two paradigms, otherwise, there would be no possibility 
of comparing the two theories at all which would conflict with Kuhn’s understanding of crisis 
mentioned above. A crisis in paradigms only seems possible if there is some meaningful 
connection between one scientific theory and another.  
Now that we have a basic understanding of Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions, let 
us turn to the structure of conversions.  
3 An account of the structure of conversion 
 
 I understand conversion to be a change of one’s mind concerning some position. More 
precisely, a conversion occurs when a subject goes from believing P to believing not-P (or vice 
 
24 Barry Ward explained to me these two tensions in Kuhn’s view of incommensurability.  
25 See Hacking, “Introduction,” quoting Kuhn, “Objectivity,” in The Essential Tension.  






versa). On my view, ceasing to believe P is necessary, but not sufficient for conversion. Not all 
changes of mind count as instances of conversion. Let us distinguish between ordinary changes 
of mind and conversion.26 An ordinary change of mind occurs when someone believes P but then 
the subject ceases to believe P and no longer has those associated desires that come with 
believing P. Additionally, the subject does not necessarily disbelieve P. For example, consider a 
case where an avid sports fan believes that their team will win. As the game progresses and their 
team performs terribly, the person ceases to believe that their team is going to win, and they no 
longer believe that their team will win. They do not necessarily believe that their team will lose 
but they have ceased to believe that their team will win.27  
 In contrast, conversion is stronger than ordinary changes of mind. An ordinary change of 
mind is necessary for conversion, but not sufficient. In addition to an ordinary change of mind, 
someone converts when they also go from ceasing to believe P to believing not-P. In addition to 
shifting from believing P to believing not-P, the convert shifts in the associated desires that come 
along with believing that not-P. Religious conversion is the kind of thing I have in mind when I 
discuss the nature of conversion more generally. When a person goes through a religious 
conversion, they do not merely have an ordinary change of mind.  
For example, when a person goes from believing that God does not exist to believing that 
God does exist, and acquires the associated desires with those beliefs, then the individual has 
converted.28 What seems to distinguish mere changes of mind from conversion is the centrality 
 
26 I owe this distinction to Tom Senor.  
27 I owe this example to Tom Senor.  
28 Having the associated desires that normally come with the beliefs are not necessary, but 
indicative that a conversion has taken place. For example, I think it is possible to believe that 
God does not exist yet hope that He does exists even if typical theistic belief usually involves 
hoping that God exists. I also think it is possible to believe that God exists without hoping that 
 






of the belief that has changed within the noetic structure of the convert. We can distinguish 
between central beliefs within a noetic structure and peripheral beliefs within a noetic structure. 
Central believes have more beliefs depend on them than do peripheral beliefs. For example, my 
belief that I know that there is an external world (and that I am not a victim of a Cartesian 
demon) is more central to my noetic structure than my belief that it will rain today (given that it’s 
cloudy outside). If I were to withhold belief in the external world compared to withholding belief 
about the chance of rain my noetic structure in the former case would radically change compared 
to how my noetic structure would change in the latter case. In the former case, all my beliefs 
about the external world would be called into question whereas in the latter case my belief that I 
am a reliable predictor of the weather may change a little. The difference between mere change 
of mind and conversion is that in conversion we change a (or many) central belief whereas in 
mere change of mind, the beliefs that change are less central. The cognitive restructuring is much 
more significant in cases of conversion than in cases of mere changes of mind.  
In a later chapter, I will use this definition as it applies to expert conversion: where an 
expert conversion entails an expert going from believing P to believing that not-P (or vice 
versa).29 My account of the structure of conversion will find analogues in the various steps of 
Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions. Let us look at each of the analogous steps for the 
structure of conversion to gain a better understanding of the nature of conversion.   
 First, we have normal beliefs, emotions, and behaviors within the context of a person’s 
paradigm, or worldview by which they solve puzzles. Let us develop the notion of a non-
scientific paradigm further. Non-scientific paradigms or worldviews are like a scientific 
 
He exists. Although, it seems to me that the two (believing that God exists and hoping that God 
exists) normally are associated.  
29 See chapter three of this dissertation for my discussion of expert conversion.  






paradigm. A person has a non-scientific paradigm by which they interpret the world and solve 
various puzzles they experience. Examples of these everyday puzzles that people solve via their 
paradigms include things such as answering why certain actions are morally wrong versus 
morally right, or whether life has meaning and if so, what makes life meaningful. Additional 
puzzles people use their paradigms or worldviews to solve is answering questions of origin and 
questions about the nature of human suffering and evil. Metaphysical questions such as the 
existence and nature of reality or the nature of the human person are also existential puzzles 
solved in different ways by differing paradigms.   
One way in which an individual’s paradigm may differ from that of a scientific paradigm 
is that usually an individual’s paradigm, and the problems one solves involve more than just 
empirical phenomena. An individual's paradigm, and the problems that one solves within this 
framework, can encompass other phenomena such as sensory experiences, philosophy, 
psychology, morality, religion, and politics. Let us consider two examples of what this might 
look like in practice.  
Puzzles: Let us use the puzzles mentioned above. What is the nature of morally right or 
wrong actions? What is the meaning or purpose of my life and the lives of others? What 
is the nature of reality? Who or what am I? Where did I come from? Where am I headed?  
 
Individual 1: Suppose that individual-1 is a naturalist. Individual-1 can answer these 
puzzles in the following way: The nature of morality depends on one’s moral theory, but 
God is not the source and grounding of morality. The meaning of life can be objective or 
subjective, but God is not the one who confers meaning to life. The nature of reality 
excludes the existence of God. Human persons are less likely to be composed of 
immaterial substances. Science provides an adequate explanation of the origins of life 
and most likely there is no life after death.  
 
Individual 2: Suppose that individual-2 is a traditional theist. They might answer the 
puzzles in the following way: Generally, morality is objective and can be known. God is 
the metaphysical ground and source of morality. The meaning of our lives is also 
grounded in the existence of God and His will for our lives. The nature of reality at least 
includes the existence of God. It is possible that human persons are composed of 






immaterial substances. Science does not necessarily provide a complete or ultimate 
explanation of the origin of humanity and possibly there is life after death.  
 
Here we have an example of two different paradigms. These two different paradigms, or 
worldviews, are ways in which individuals seek to solve the puzzles of existence. Moreover, 
these puzzles, unlike the puzzles in scientific paradigms, are not dealing with exclusively 
empirical data points. Nevertheless, both scientific paradigms, and theistic/atheistic worldviews 
try to best explain the data at hand.  
 Next, there is an analogue between anomalies in a scientific revolution and the 
conversion of an individual. One way in which there is a similarity between anomalies in a 
scientific revolution and the conversion of an individual is that there are certain puzzles that 
begin to generate worries or become intractable in a scientific paradigm just as there are 
anomalies in an individual’s paradigm that might become worrisome or intractable. For example, 
a moral skeptic might begin to recognize that the tension between what seems like common 
sense concerning morality and what their view entails is a puzzle that cannot be solved. Or 
maybe a reductive physicalist about mental phenomena begins to recognize the intractability of 
the mind-body problem in purely reductive terms.  
 Additionally, there is an analogue between the structure of scientific revolutions and the 
structure of an individual’s conversion with respect to the notion of crisis. Just as a crisis occurs 
in a scientific revolution when the anomalies become too worrisome, so too do crises occur 
within an individual’s paradigm or worldview. The explanatory problems caused by severe 
anomalies within a person’s worldview reach such a degree of crisis that the individual can no 






longer hold to their position without some degree of cognitive dissonance or sacrifice of 
rationality.30  
 Finally, once the revolution has occurred for an individual, and one converts, there will 
be an element of incommensurability between the convert and the group of people whose beliefs 
they previously shared. The group of people to whom the convert previously belonged will not 
be able to understand or communicate to the same degree with the convert as they previously 
did. The convert, in a way like a change in a scientific revolution will “see” the world in a new 
way. This is not to say that there is no communication or understanding between the convert and 
their previous group.  
 Consider the following example. Aristotle and Galileo describe a pendulum in the same 
way, at one level. A pendulum is a rock, tied to a string, hanging from a hook. Nevertheless, 
Aristotle and Galileo explained the motion of the rock in very different terms. Aristotle describes 
the motion of a rock by stating that the rock is trying to reach its natural place but is constrained 
by the string. On the other hand, Galileo explains the motion of the rock as an oscillatory motion 
that could go on forever if not for friction.31  
Following Timothy McGrew, I take a more moderate account of Kuhn in which it is not 
that Aristotle or Galileo could not in principle “see” the other position. Rather, it can be very 
difficult to “see” the other viewpoint. I think the example generalizes to the case of the convert. It 
is not that those who have not converted cannot in principle have access to the evidence a 
convert enjoys in virtue of having believed both positions. Rather, it can be very difficult to 
 
30 This does not entail that all experiences of a crisis and their ultimate resolution are de facto 
rational. I am merely claiming that from a psychological point of view, it seems to me that this is 
what is going on phenomenologically.  
31 I owe this example to Timothy McGrew from personal communication.  






“see” a different position from your own. I think the convert has privileged access to certain 
evidence in the sense that it is easier for them to access, all things considered, than their non-
converting peer.  
4   Why is conversion epistemically significant?   
 
4.1. An Argument for the Epistemic Significance of Conversion  
One reason for thinking that conversion in general is epistemically significant is due to 
the fact that the convert has understood both sides of a position. It is important to keep in mind 
that conversion is not always epistemically significant. Often, people change their minds for bad 
reasons and do not adequately understand the position they converted from. But sometimes, 
having once held a position, and then later rejecting that position and adopting a new one will 
provide added insight into both positions that someone who has not held both positions does not 
have access to.  
For example, Antony Flew is widely published within the philosophy of religion. In “The 
presumption of atheism,” Flew (1972) argues that atheism should be the default rational position 
and that the theist has the burden of proof in establishing that God exists.32 Plausibly, Flew 
understood the arguments in favor of belief in God. Later in his career, Flew changed his mind 
and came to believe that God did in fact exist. Flew became convinced of Aristotelian arguments 
in favor of God’s existence.33 A further plausible assumption is that Flew also understood the 
 
32 See Antony Flew (1972), “The Presumption of Atheism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy,  
 Vol. 2, No. 1. 29-46.  
33 For a full explanation of why Flew changed his mind concerning the existence of God, see 
Antony Flew and Roy Abraham Varghese (2007), There is a God: How the World’s Most 
Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind, New York: HarperOne. There is controversy concerning 
the accuracy of the book, given that it was written primarily by Varghese but there are also 
multiple papers published in Philosophia Christi in which Gary Habermas interviews Flew about 
his conversion and Flew affirms it. See Antony Flew and Gary Habermas (2004), “My 
 






arguments in favor of belief that God exists. Plausibly, given that at different points in time 
endorsed both positions, and understood those positions well, Flew possessed evidence and 
insight into the debate that others, who had not held both positions, did not. Additionally, 
converts are not as vulnerable to motivational biases as non-converts.34  
  Sometimes those who convert possess an additional epistemic boost, in virtue of their 
conversion, over those who have not converted. To support this claim, consider William Alston’s 
thoughts on the nature of privileged access when he writes the following:  
To say that a person has privileged access to his current mental states is to say that his 
epistemic position vis-à-vis propositions ascribing current mental states to himself is 
favorable in a way no one else's position is. The simplest standard formula for a 
privileged access claim would be: Each person enjoys _____- vis-à-vis 
propositions ascribing current mental states to himself, while no one else enjoys ____ vis-
à-vis such propositions.35  
 
Alston goes on to discuss several concepts that fill in the blank of his definition. They include 
concepts like infallibility, omniscience, indubitability, and incorrigibility.36 For our purposes, 
what is more important is Alston’s idea that privileged access is something an individual enjoys 
while no one else enjoys. In what follows, I will develop an analogue with respect to the 
privileged access converts enjoy with Alston’s account of privileged access with respect to a 
subject’s mental states.  
 There seems to be an analogue of some degree of privileged access to understanding both 
positions when one converts. One reason we might think that a convert enjoys a privileged 
access in understanding both positions is that they have an insider’s perspective into both 
 
Pilgrimage from Atheism to Theism: A Discussion between Antony Flew and Gary R. 
Habermas,” Philosophia Christi, 6 (2):197-212.   
34 I owe this point to Eric Funkhouser.  
35 See William Alston (1971), “Varieties of Privileged Access,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, 230.  
36 Ibid., 230.  






positions. Many times, there are aspects of a position or worldview that cannot be fully 
understood unless one adopts that position or sees the view from the perspective of a believer.  
Examples of this line of thinking can be traced back to St. Anselm, who paraphrases St. 
Augustine, when he says, “I believe so that I may understand.”37 There is a kind of evidence that 
is available only to those who believe which can lead to a kind of understanding. Other concrete 
examples of believing that leads to understanding includes a person who goes from believing that 
women don’t have anything additional to add to a discussion qua being a woman to believing 
that a woman does contribute more evidence about certain things about reality in virtue of being 
a woman.38 
In this context, to understand something, or to understand something better or worse 
involves at least two things. First, it involves possessing more evidence that the proposition in 
question is true. So, for example, I better understand general relativity when I possess more 
evidence that general relativity is true. Second, I better understand something when I grasp how 
the evidence support the truth of the proposition. So, for example, not only do I better understand 
general relativity when I possess more evidence that general relativity is true but that I also see 
or grasp how the evidence I possess supports or confirms the truth of general relativity.  
Daniel Wilkenfield offers an account of understanding that I find plausible.39 He takes 
understanding to encompass the following two claims:  
 
37 See Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogium, Chapter 1, Medieval Sourcebook, Fordham 
University, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/anselm-proslogium.asp.  
38 For a more complete treatment of the epistemic and moral issues surrounding women and 
other minority groups see Miranda Fricker (2007), Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of 
Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
39 See Daniel Wilkenfield (2013), “Understanding as representation manipulability,” Synthese, 
Vol. 190, No. 6, 997-1016.  
 






(1) Understanding is the possession of the right sort of mental representations of that 
which is understood.”40  
and, 
(2) A mental representation counts as being ‘of the right sort’ in virtue of the fact that 
possession of it enables someone to perform intellectual feats relevant in that 
context.41 
 
Wilkenfield thinks that understanding is a cognitive achievement42 and the critical 
component of understanding is that it provides an empowering role to the one who understands.43 
The empowering role provided to the one who understands is the ability to utilize what is 
understood effectively.44 Wilkenfield thinks that understanding comes in degrees and is also 
context-sensitive.45  
Considering this notion of what it means to understand some proposition, a convert may 
enjoy an epistemic boost in virtue of their conversion because there is evidence that is only 
available to the believer. Consequently, if there is evidence that is only available to the believer, 
then possibly, the convert, in virtue of their conversion, possesses evidence that can only be had 
in virtue of having believed both propositions. An example of this might be where a person can 
only have a religious experience if they first believe that religious phenomena are possible. A 
person who does not believe that religious experiences are possible may not have access to the 
possible evidence conferring experiences that someone who does believe that religious 
 
40 Wilkenfield (2013), 1000.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 997.  
43 Ibid.,1002.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.,1007.  
 






experiences are possible. It is in this sense that certain kinds of evidence are only available to 
believers.46  
 Another reason for thinking that there’s an analogue between the privileged access an 
individual has with respect to their mental states and the privileged access a convert has with 
respect to understanding both positions (the original position they converted from and the new 
position they converted to) is that there are certain parts of a worldview or paradigm, which are 
important for understanding the worldview, that can only be had if one adopts the particular 
beliefs in question.  
 One example of the kind of privileged access a convert enjoys is someone who has had a 
putative religious experience. I have two cases in mind. First, consider a case in which someone 
is a committed naturalist and does not believe that there is a God. Later, they have a religious 
experience and convert. There seems to be certain experiences and evidence salient to 
understanding naturalism which a person who had never been a naturalist does not enjoy – to 
experience what it’s like to be a naturalist.47 Because they have converted based on a religious 
experience, the convert also has the experience of what it’s like to believe in God. To support 
this notion, consider what Paul Moser says with respect to belief in God:  
First-hand volitional evidence and knowledge of God's reality involve a directness in 
evidence and knowledge of divine reality that entails their being irreducible to mere 
propositional knowledge or evidence that God exists. The directness involves evidence of 
an "I-You" volitional interaction between humans and God that is absent from traditional 
arguments for God's existence… . My talk of (first-hand) evidence and knowledge of 
 
46 I am using the term ‘believers’ is a general sense. I do not mean only religious believers, but 
anyone who believes that a certain proposition is true. I use religious belief because I think it is a 
helpful example.  
47 One way in which it is like to be a naturalist includes seeing or viewing the world as a closed 
causal system in which no supernatural activity occurs. Someone who has always been a theist 
may not have ever had this experience.  
 






"God's reality" (or of "God") should be understood accordingly, as irreducible to mere 
propositional evidence or knowledge.48 
 
Moser argues that first-hand knowledge of God is irreducible to propositional evidence or 
knowledge of God. In a similar way, I argue that first-hand experience of believing a position 
and then converting to another position provides some reason to think that the convert is in an 
epistemically privileged position over the non-convert at least in some instances. It is not 
necessarily the case that the non-convert cannot possess the kind of evidence that may be 
enjoyed by a convert, but that it may be very difficult for the non-convert to see both positions in 
the way a convert sees. The ability of being able to see or have privileged access to evidence in 
comparing positions is comparative in nature and comes in degrees.  
 Having experienced what it’s like to be a naturalist can confer certain experiences and 
evidence that isn’t available to someone who has never endorsed the position themselves in the 
following ways. First, the way we experience certain things differs. When you hold a certain 
position, there is a qualitative sense in which things seem to you that cannot necessarily be 
captured by merely entertaining the position in one’s mind. This difference in experience can 
confer a degree of evidence that isn’t available to the person who does not have that experience. 
For example, two people can literally see the same mountain-top view. Yet, for person the first 
person, they experience an overwhelming sense that God exists when at the mountain top while 
the other person, who literally sees the same thing, has a different, non-theistic experience of the 
mountaintop.  
 
48 See Paul Moser (2008), The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 63. Cf. Bruce Russell (2009), “Review of Paul K. Moser’s The 
Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-elusive-god-reorienting-religious-epistemology/.  
 






Second, the way we feel about certain things change. The degree to which one can feel a 
certain way with respect to something cannot be fully experienced unless one adopts the position 
in question. For example, if I don’t feel concerned about the threat of global warming because I 
am someone who denies anthropogenic climate change, then my lack of feeling might tend 
toward me not analyzing the evidence sufficiently. And this has epistemic significance.  
Third, the way we think about things changes. If our perceptions and feelings change 
when we change our minds or convert, then it seems natural to think that our thinking about the 
world changes. Consider what Joanne Lovesey says when she writes:  
In the life of [a] religious convert to the results will be far-reaching: as will become 
clearer in subsequent chapters, even something as simple as a change in one single belief, 
will have implications for emotions, behaviours, and other beliefs too (among other 
things) and these changes in turn trigger further changes, and this may continue until the 
resemblance to the starting position is faint.49 
 
For example, when I come to believe that a certain individual is a morally corrupt person, I will 
begin to see that person as morally corrupt. Moreover, I may even begin to develop negative 
feelings toward that person, and in turn, my behavior around them may change.  This line of 
reasoning may be applied to a convert. The convert will have access to a set of perceptions, 
feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that the non-convert does not.  
If this is true, then believing P places you in a better epistemic position to understand O 
than merely entertaining P. Moreover, this type of understanding is a privileged kind of access 
that a person who has not converted has greater difficulty enjoying. The kind of privileged access 
enjoyed by a convert is weaker than the kind of privileged access enjoyed by an individual with 
respect to their own mental states because there is more room for misunderstanding a position or 
 
49 See Joanne Lovesey (2016), Religious Conversion: A Philosophical Account, Ph.D 
dissertation, Heythrop College, University of London, 22. 






being mistaken with respect to adopting an entire worldview than there is in being aware of one’s 
own mental states. Nevertheless, there is a kind of privileged access enjoyed by a convert with 
respect to understanding both positions.  
The argument made above can be stated as follows: 
1. If there are experiences that a convert is more likely to enjoy in virtue of their conversion 
and those experiences have positive evidential import, then the experiences are 
epistemically significant.  
2. There are experiences that a convert is more likely to enjoy (in virtue of their 
conversion), and those experiences have positive evidential import.  
Therefore,  
3. The experiences are epistemically significant. (MP 1,2)  
 
Defense of premise 1  
 
The conditional statement is plausible. If there are experiences that have evidential 
import that are more likely to be available to the convert qua their conversion, then it seems that 
this is epistemically significant. On my view, for something to have evidential import is an 
essential feature of epistemic significance. The crux of this argument is premise (2): whether 
there are in fact such evidence conferring experiences that can be had only in virtue of being a 
convert. Let us turn to the defense of premise (2).  
Defense of premise 2  
 
 One reason for thinking that if the experiences had by a convert are of a privileged kind 
and those experiences have evidential import is because the convert is in a unique position to 
compare the competing experiences of both paradigms. The convert has more data, based on the 
experiences of having held both positions, to properly compare the relevant explanatory merits of 
both positions (the one converted to and the one converted from). For this reason, the convert is 
in a position, or is more likely to be in a better position, than a non-convert who merely analyzes 
the argument from an outsider’s perspective. But if a convert has access to evidence that a non-






convert doesn’t have access to in virtue of having endorsed both positions, then it seems like the 
judgment made by the convert, who is in a privileged position in comparing and contrasting 
available experiences and evidence, is in a position to testify to their judgement (which possibly 
renders epistemically significant information to non-converts) and are possibly in a better 
position than a non-convert for having sifted through more evidence by having had those 
particular experiences.    
What reason do we have for thinking that there are certain experiences that render it more 
likely that a convert (in virtue of their conversion) is in a better epistemic position to understand 
that a non-convert does not have? I have given some of the reasons in the previous section. The 
convert has certain qualitative experiences, or experiences of what it is like to believe, feel, and 
behave as someone who holds a certain position. In virtue of having these experiences of what it 
is like to believe, feel, and behave as someone who holds a certain position, the convert is in a 
very good position to understand the position.50  
Additionally, why should we think that these qualitative experiences had only by 
converts has evidential import? Take the case of having a religious experience. First, let us 
consider person one. 
Person one (P1) 
P1 is a theist and believes that religious experiences are possible. Examples of a religious 
experience includes the experience that God is speaking to you.51 There are certain 
 
50 This is not to say that the convert is always in a good position to understand the position that 
they endorse. It is simply to say that ceteris peribus, those who endorse a position are in a good 
position to understand that position and that they enjoy certain access to what it is like to think, 
feel, perceive, and behave from the point of view of someone who endorse that position.  
51 By speaking to you, I do not necessarily mean that God speaks to the individual audibly. Many 
times, when people report that God has spoken to them, they claim that there was no audible 
words spoken, yet they claim that the content of what was said was very clear. Concerning this 
point, Mark Webb (2011) writes: 
 






religious experiences that P1 enjoys because of her religious belief. For example, her 
belief that God exists and that he communicates with people provides the appropriate 
context for her to have the experience that God is speaking to her. Moreover, she is often 
able to distinguish between God speaking to her and her own thoughts.  
 
Person two (P2) 
P2 has a similar experience to the experience had by P1, but P2 is an atheist and does not 
think that God speaks to people. Her belief that there is no God, and that God doesn’t 
speak with people rules out the possibility of, or at least makes unlikely, her having ‘God 
is speaking to me’ experiences. For the most part, these similar experiences had by P2 are 
understood as merely her own thoughts.   
 
Person three (P3)  
 
P3 differs from both P1 and P2 in virtue of having converted from atheism to theism. 
Once an atheist, P3 did not believe that God spoke to people (there’s no God to do the 
speaking). He did not think he had any religious experiences, rather what he thought he 
was experiencing were his own thoughts instead of God speaking to him. Later, P3 
becomes convinced by the arguments from natural theology and begins to believe that 
God exists. He converts from atheism to theism. Through the process of his conversion, 
P3 notices how the way he saw the world as an atheist differs from the way in which he 
sees the world as a theist. One example of this includes the fact that he is having religious 
experiences. He senses that God is speaking to him, listening to his prayers, etc. P3 seems 
to have, in virtue of his conversion, experiences that neither P1 nor P2 have had given 
that they have never converted from the current position they hold.  
 
These three examples lead to another reason for thinking that premise (2) is true. 
Converts have the experience of going through the process of converting which provides for 
them a unique experience of seeing the world from both points of view. This is another 
 
Reports of religious experiences reveal a variety of different kinds. Perhaps most are 
visual or auditory presentations (visions and auditions), but not through the physical eyes 
or ears. Subject’s report “seeing” or “hearing,” but quickly disavow any claim to seeing 
or hearing with bodily sense organs. Such experiences are easy to dismiss as 
hallucinations, but the subjects of the experience frequently claim that though it is 
entirely internal, like a hallucination or imagination, it is nevertheless a veridical 
experience, through some spiritual analog of the eye or ear. 
 
See Mark Webb (2011), “Religious Experience,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/.  
 






experience that can only be had if one has in fact converted. Moreover, the experience of having 
gone through the process of conversion can have evidential import. This is possible because 
having experienced the world from both perspectives (which includes having experiences that 
are possible only if you believe the position), the convert can possess more evidence than the 
non-convert which would allow them to make a more reliable judgment between the two 
positions.    
4.2 The structure of conversion and its epistemic significance 
 
In what ways do the structure of conversion inform us about the epistemic significance of 
conversion? One way that understanding the general structure of conversion can inform us about 
the epistemic significance of conversion is that by delineating the different stages of conversion, 
we can more accurately determine where a person went wrong in one’s reasoning process. For 
example, by giving a more detailed account of the process of conversion (i.e., normal belief –
anomalies/cognitive dissonance – crisis – conversion) we are more likely to be able to pinpoint 
exactly where the individual went wrong with respect to one’s conversion (if we think he or she 
did go wrong). To determine whether a conversion was epistemically significant, we need to 
determine conditions for legitimate and illegitimate belief formation. For example, if we come to 
find out that a person converted to a particular religion based on psychological manipulation, 
then we have reason to think that this conversion was not epistemically significant.    
The ability to determine where an individual went wrong with respect to changing his or 
her beliefs is something that is epistemically significant. It is epistemically significant because it 
tells us how an old belief was rejected or how a new belief was formed and given our theory 
concerning the justification of belief formation, this will play a crucial role in our determining 






whether the individual was justified in rejecting the old belief and justified in adopting the new 
belief.  
4.3. An Objection: Entertaining versus believing a proposition.  
 
 Let us now consider another objection to my argument that sometimes there are 
experiences had by a convert in virtue of his or her conversion, which place them in a better 
epistemic position compared to their non-converting peer, and those experiences have evidential 
import which renders the experiences epistemically significant. The objection challenges a 
principle of my position. Let us call it the conversion principle, (CP). CP is the following:  
(CP) A subject, S, is more likely to enjoy privileged access to evidence e than S’s non-
converting peer, R, if S has experienced a conversion in which they previously believed P 
and now believe not-P. 
 
The objection is that CP is false because R can have access to evidence e in virtue of merely 
entertaining a proposition p rather than fully believing p. Hence, conversion does not place the S 
in a better epistemic position than R with respect to the evidence for P. Merely entertaining the 
position is sufficient for accessing the evidence for P.   
Reply: Some evidence is only captured by having the experience, so it is possible that 
entertaining is as significant as believing, but not always. Unless you believe, you do not 
see in some cases. My view is that it is true that merely entertaining a position may 
sometimes be sufficient for accessing the evidence, but this is not always the case. The 
burden of proof is on the objector to demonstrate that it is always the case that merely 
entertaining a position can provide you with the same degree and kind of evidence that 
believing a position gives you. Until they can do that, I don’t think the objection 
succeeds.  
 
5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have discussed the structure of scientific revolutions and seen how the 
conversion of an individual has an analogous structure. Additionally, we have discussed reasons 
for thinking that conversion is epistemically significant. We considered the argument that the 
convert understands both sides of the debate. Understanding both sides allows the convert to be 






in a position to make a better assessment as to which position is superior. Second, we discussed a 
similar argument to the both-sides argument which looked at how the convert has unique 
experiences and is in a better position to have evidence that the person who hasn’t converted 
doesn’t. This evidence allows the convert to be in a privileged position in adjudicating between 










Chapter 2: On the Nature and Significance of Expertise and Goldman’s Novice/2-Expert 
Problem 
1   Accounts of expertise  
In this chapter, I seek to elaborate on the nature and significance of expertise. In the last 
chapter, we looked at the epistemic nature and significance of conversion generally. In this 
chapter, I’ll focus on the epistemic nature and significance of expertise in a general way. 
Drawing from the conclusions of the first two chapters, I will develop an account of the 
epistemic nature and significance of expert conversion in chapter three. 
 The structure of this chapter goes as follows: First, I will look at the different views 
about the nature of expertise. I will consider the views of Alvin Goldman, Scott Brewer, and 
Elizabeth Fricker.  Next, I will discuss the significance of expertise, particularly how it relates to 
our theory of knowledge. Last, I will discuss a particular problem in the literature on the 
epistemology of expertise; Goldman’s novice/2-expert problem.  
1.1 Goldman’s Account of Expertise 
 
In his paper, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, Alvin Goldman (2001) gives an 
account of expertise that involves at least three possible features.52 Experts have more true 
beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs within the E-domain compared to others, the capacity or 
disposition to use that information to form beliefs in true answers to new questions in the E-
domain, and they have an extensive body of knowledge with respect to primary and secondary 
questions within the E-domain. Let’s turn to each of these three features in greater detail.  
1.1.1 Cognitive Expertise is Veritistic (truth-linked)   
 
52 See Goldman (2001).  






First, Goldman makes a distinction between skill-expertise and cognitive expertise. Goldman 
understands skill-expertise as follows:  
Some kinds of experts are unusually accomplished at certain skills, including violinists, 
billiards players, textile designers, and so forth. These are not the kinds of 
experts with which epistemology is most naturally concerned.53 
 
Skill-expertise is a kind of knowledge-how rather than a knowledge-that, although the boundary 
between the two is imprecise.54 In contrast, Goldman understands cognitive expertise, or a 
cognitive expert, as someone who has a “…superior quantity or level of knowledge in some 
domain and an ability to generate new knowledge in answer to questions within the domain.”55 
 Goldman proceeds by asking what distinguishes a cognitive expert from a cognitive 
novice or layperson. In order to answer the question, he first distinguishes between two senses of 
cognitive expertise: objective expertise and reputational expertise. According to Goldman, 
objective expertise is what it is to be an expert. This is distinguished from what Goldman calls 
reputational expertise, or merely having the reputation of being an expert. Although, in 
Goldman’s view, reputational expertise naturally follows from objective expertise, the two 
senses can come apart, and therefore, must be distinguished.56 
 Returning to the initial question of what distinguishes a cognitive expert from a novice, 
Goldman defines a cognitive expert (in the objective sense) in veritistic or truth-linked terms.57 
He writes: 
 
53 Ibid., 91.  
54 Certainly, knowledge-how, or skill expertise, will involve some knowledge-that, or cognitive 
expertise, and certainly knowledge-that, or cognitive expertise will involve some knowledge-
how, or skill-expertise. The difference is a matter of emphasis or degree.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Goldman (2001), 91.  
57 Ibid.  






As a first pass, experts in a given domain (the E-domain) have more beliefs (or high 
degrees of belief) in true propositions and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within 
that domain than most people do (or better: than the vast majority of people do).58 
 
So, what Goldman means when he says that he understands cognitive expertise in a veritistic or 
truth-linked sense, is that an expert has more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs relative to the 
lay person when it comes to the beliefs in the E-domain. An epidemiologist has more true beliefs 
about epidemiology and/or fewer false beliefs when compared to a novice. The E-domain, 
according to Goldman, are the truths that are only available to experts.59 Moreover, the notion of 
a cognitive expert, is one which is comparative in nature. This seems to suggest at least two 
things. First, if cognitive expertise is comparative in nature, then cognitive expertise comes in 
degrees. Second, if cognitive expertise is comparative in nature, and hence, comes in degrees, 
then the distinction between an expert and a novice is probably not a sharp one.60  
 Goldman admits that the distinction between a cognitive expert and a novice is not a 
sharp one, yet he doesn’t think that cognitive expertise is entirely comparative. What this means 
is that there is a certain degree of expertise that must be reached to count as an expert, and this is 
not completely determined by comparing one person with another. He writes that:  
 To qualify as a cognitive expert, a person must possess a substantial body of truths in the 
target domain. Being an expert is not simply a matter of veritistic superiority to most of 
the community. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be 
reached, though there is great vagueness in setting this threshold.61 
 
This allows Goldman to avoid the charge that cognitive expertise is simply a matter of being the 
best of a bad lot. Although Goldman thinks that what it is to be an expert certainly is 
 
58 Goldman (2001), 91.  
59 Ibid., 106. 
60 Thanks to Tom Senor for pointing out that the distinction between the expert and the non-
expert is not a sharp distinction.  
61 Ibid., 91.  






comparative in nature, it isn’t entirely comparative, because if it were, then as long as someone 
had more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs than everyone else, then he would count as an 
expert. This would be the case even if the putative expert only believed one true proposition in 
the E-domain compared to everyone else who did not believe any true propositions in the E-
domain. Goldman rightly points out that this can’t be correct, and that the person isn’t truly an 
expert.  
1.1.2 Cognitive expertise involves a capacity to use expert information to form new beliefs 
 There are other features mentioned by Goldman of what it is to be a cognitive expert. In 
addition to having more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs within the E-domain compared to 
others, Goldman also thinks that cognitive experts have what he calls “a capacity or disposition” 
to deploy the true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs in forming new beliefs in true answers to new 
questions.62  
 Goldman understands this capacity or disposition as a kind of skill set which he calls 
cognitive know-how. Cognitive know-how is a set of skills or techniques that constitutes part of 
what it is to be an expert. The kinds of skills or techniques include the ability to “go to the right 
sectors of his [the expert’s] information-bank” and use that information to “perform appropriate 
operations on this information.” Expertise, in Goldman’s view, involves both a propensity 
element as well as an actual attainment element.63 
1.1.3 Cognitive expertise involves an extensive knowledge of primary and secondary questions   
 In addition to an expert possessing more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs in the 
relevant E-domain compared to others, as well as having a propensity or disposition to deploy 
 
62 Ibid.  
63 Goldman (2001), 91-92.  






that information in forming new beliefs in true answers to new question, Goldman says that an 
expert has an extensive knowledge (a weak sense of knowledge as mere true belief)64 of both 
primary and secondary questions in the relevant E-domain.65 
 Goldman distinguishes between primary and secondary questions in an E-domain. 
Primary questions are principal questions of interest to researchers and students. Secondary 
questions are the existing evidence and arguments that bear on the primary questions as well as 
knowledge of what other relevant experts think about the state of the evidence.66 Here’s an 
example of this distinction. A primary question that concerns physicists is explaining how the 
universe originated. An example of a secondary question is what scientific theory best explains 
the data we observe from physics, e.g., big bang, steady state, etc. Secondary questions also 
concern which scientists endorse those various positions and what their reasons are for holding to 
those positions. For example, one may point to the observed background radiation waves as 
evidence of an expanding universe and evidence for an initial big bang at the beginning of the 
universe.  
 Next, Goldman distinguishes between two senses of an expert: strong expertise and weak 
expertise. Strong expertise is knowledge of (or mere true belief) both primary and secondary 
questions. Weak expertise is only knowledge of secondary questions, or knowledge of the state 
of the evidence and what relevant experts think about the state of the evidence. This distinction 
between strong and weak expertise allows Goldman to distinguish between two putative experts, 
both of which diverge on answers to the primary questions but only one of them holds mostly 
true beliefs with respect to the primary questions. Yet both experts have extensive knowledge of 
 
64 Ibid., 92.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  






secondary questions such that both are experts in the weaker sense, but only one is an expert in 
the strong sense.67  
 An example of a person who possesses strong expertise is a physicist at a top research 
university. The physicist possesses strong expertise because not only does the physicist 
understand the current state of evidence concerning the discipline of physics, i.e., is 
knowledgeable of secondary questions, but the physicist also is engaged in cutting-edge research 
concerning the primary questions of physics. In contrast, an example of a weak expert may be a 
physics teacher at a high school. They possess knowledge of secondary questions about the 
current state of the evidence in the discipline, but they aren’t engaging in research or know much 
about the current research projects taking place within the discipline. Another example of a weak 
expert is a journalist who has a degree in physics and reports on developments in the scientific 
community, but they aren’t engaging in direct research projects like the physics professors.   
1.1.4 Summary of Goldman’s account   
 
Goldman summarizes what he’s said concerning the nature of expertise when he writes 
the following:  
[W]e can say that an expert (in the strong sense) in domain D is someone who possesses 
an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and 
successful deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain. Anyone 
purporting to be a (cognitive) expert in a given domain will claim to have such a fund and 
set of methods, and will claim to have true answers to the question(s) under dispute 
because he has applied his fund and his methods to the question(s).68 
 
To conclude, Goldman argues that a cognitive expert is one who (1) possesses more true beliefs 
and/or fewer false beliefs within the E-domain compared to others. (2) has a capacity to deploy 
knowledge of that information in forming new beliefs in true answers to new questions and (3) 
 
67 Goldman (2001), 92.  
68 Ibid.  






possesses extensive knowledge of both primary and secondary questions and the answers to 
those questions within the E-domain.  
1.2 Brewer’s account of expertise   
 
 Let’s now consider Scott Brewer’s account of expertise. In his paper, “Scientific expert 
testimony and intellectual due process,” Scott Brewer (1997-98) gives the following account of 
expertise.69 
An expert is a person who has or is regarded as having specialized training that yields 
sufficient epistemic competence to understand the aims, methods, and results of an expert 
discipline. An expert discipline is a discipline that in fact requires specialized training in 
order for a person to attain sufficient epistemic competence to understand its aims and 
methods, and to be able critically to deploy those methods, in service of these aims, to 
produce the judgments that issue from its distinctive point of view.70 
 
Brewer says that an expert is a person who has or is regarded as having specialized training. Here 
we notice a similar distinction that Goldman makes between actually being an expert (in the 
objective) sense and merely having the reputation of expertise (in Goldman’s reputational sense 
of expertise). So, Goldman and Brewer both make a distinction between actually being an expert 
and having the reputation of being an expert.  
 Next, Brewer says that an expert is a person who has specialized training. Specialized 
training involves an ability to attain sufficient epistemic competence in understanding the aims, 
methods, and results of an expert discipline. I think we can find analogues for each of these 
concepts in Goldman’s understanding of expertise. For example, we can understand Brewer’s 
notion of specialized training to be analogous to Goldman’s notion of cognitive know-how. Just 
as cognitive know-how involves knowledge of a significant number of truths within the E-
 
69 See Scott Brewer (1997-1998), “Scientific expert testimony and intellectual due process”, Yale 
Law Journal, 107:1589 -1681.  
70
 Ibid., 1589.  






domain, so too does having specialized training involve knowledge or sufficient epistemic 
competence to understand the aims, methods, and results of an expert discipline.  
 It is possible that the specialized training doesn’t necessarily take. For example, it’s 
feasible that someone makes it all the way through medical school, or a Ph.D. in physics, yet 
isn’t truly an expert. This could be because they cheated, are overcome by a very strong 
emotional bias, or made it through the training for some reason other than actual demonstration 
of competence concerning the discipline. Specialized training is necessary, but not sufficient for 
expertise. What is needed in addition to specialized training is that the capacity to exercise this 
set of knowledge and skills is really produced in an individual and the individual is able to 
exercise this disposition in a reliable way.   
 The notion of an expert discipline also finds its analogue in Goldman’s account: the E-
domain. Again, the E-domain, and in this case, Brewer’s notion of an expert discipline, involves 
the set of truths that are accessible only to those with the relevant specialized training.  
 Last, in addition to possessing sufficient epistemic competence in attaining an 
understanding of the aims, methods, and results of an expert discipline, Brewer’s account 
incorporates a Goldmanian notion of deploying the knowledge of expert information to arrive at 
new beliefs and new judgments from the point of view of the expert.  
Brewer defines a non-expert as follows:  
A nonexpert is a person who does not in fact have the specialized training required to  
yield sufficient epistemic competence to understand the aims, methods, and 
judgments of an expert discipline, or to be able critically to deploy those methods, in 
service of the discipline's aims, to produce the judgments that issue from the discipline's 
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Here we see that a non-expert is one who isn’t an expert. What this means is that a non-expert is 
simply someone who doesn’t possess the specialized training necessary in order to yield 
sufficient epistemic competence to understand the aims, methods, and judgments of an expert 
discipline. This seems to suggest that, for Brewer, the notion of expertise is not as fine-grained a 
notion as Goldman’s account. Recall that Goldman makes a distinction between strong expertise 
and weak expertise. Brewer’s account doesn’t seem to include any reference to strong or weak 
notions of expertise.  
 Although Brewer’s account expertise doesn’t seem to make a distinction between strong 
and weak expertise like Goldman’s account does, Brewer does mention that the kind of 
understanding, or epistemic competence, that he thinks experts have and non-experts do not have 
does comes in degrees. Concerning this point, Brewer writes:  
Epistemic competence in an expert discipline comes in degrees; it is not an all-or-nothing 
"switch." This is perhaps not surprising. Is it not a familiar fact that some 
mathematicians, logicians, physicists, economists, geneticists, and so forth are more 
skilled at grasping and manipulating the aims, methods, and factual judgments of their 
respective expert disciplines than are other experts in the same disciplines? Surely Isaac 
Newton was a more epistemically competent physicist than Isaac Asimov. By the same 
token, we should recognize that there is no bright line separating expertise from 
nonexpertise — just as there is no bright timeline or light line separating night from day, 
even though there is clearly a difference between night and day. Not all experts are 
equally epistemically competent in their disciplines, nor are all nonexperts equally 
incompetent with regard to a given expert discipline.72 
 
The idea that expertise comes in degrees will be crucial to my argument in chapter four in which 
I discuss exactly how a non-expert ought to respond to the conversion of an expert.  
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1.3 Fricker’s account of expertise   
Now that we have looked at both Goldman’s and Brewer’s account of the nature of 
expertise, let’s turn to Elizabeth Fricker’s account of expertise.73 In her paper, “Testimony and 
Epistemic Autonomy,” Fricker (2006) offers the following definition of an expert. 
 S is an expert about P relative to H at t just if at t, S is epistemically well enough placed  
with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form a conscious 
belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge, and she is 
better epistemically placed than H to determine whether P.74 
 
First, Fricker’s account of expertise is comparative in nature. An expert is someone who is in a 
better epistemic position to know P than other knowers. The idea that expertise is a comparative 
notion is consistent with Goldman and Brewer’s accounts of expertise.  
 Second, Fricker claims that the expert is in a better epistemic position to know that P 
compared to a person with less expertise or a novice. Additionally, the kind of better epistemic 
position that the expert is in seems like a dispositional position, or a property intrinsic to the 
epistemic agent. Consider what Fricker says when she writes the following:  
An expertise is, in this lenient sense, a superior epistemic power possessed by a person 
due to her specific differentiating characteristics, such as superior perceptual skills, or 
specialized field of training and knowledge. Her expertises are relatively stable 
properties of a person, since they are not owed to mere accidents of spatio-temporal 
location, but are more deep-seated properties of that person; some owed to genetic 
endowment, but many acquired through special training or education.75  
 
The expert is more disposed to know P, if the expert believes or makes a judgment about P, than 
other epistemic agents because of a deep-seated property intrinsic to the expert. Fricker’s idea 
that if an expert were to believe P, then the expert is in a better position to know P than other 
 
73 See Elizabeth Fricker (2006), “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy”, in The Epistemology of 
Testimony, eds Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 225-250. 
74
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epistemic agents corresponds with Goldman’s second condition concerning the capacity of the 
expert to deploy his specialized information to form new beliefs in true answers to new 
questions.  
1.4 Similarities and differences between the three accounts of expertise 
 The similarities between the three accounts are the following: Experts possess 
information and possibly knowledge of a set of truths that non-experts do not possess. 
Additionally, experts have the capacity or cognitive know-how to use this knowledge to discover 
and learn new truths. Last, there’s an asymmetric comparative epistemic notion between experts 
and non-experts in which experts are more likely to possess or be able to possess more 
knowledge than their non-expert counterparts.  
The three accounts of expertise don’t have, in my mind, significant differences, but the 
differences that do exist are worth pointing out. First, neither Fricker nor Brewer seem to make 
mention of Goldman’s distinction between primary and secondary questions. I don’t think their 
accounts necessarily exclude this distinction, but I do think it’s a helpful distinction to make. All 
three accounts think that expertise would come in degrees, but it’s less clear how Brewer and 
Fricker can explain how this is the case. Goldman has offered us a way to understand how 
expertise comes in degrees by making the distinction between knowledge of primary and 
secondary questions.   
1.5 My account of expertise   
 My account of expertise is broadly Goldmanian with an additional emphasis on the 
dispositional nature of expert cognitive know-how. I think Goldman is correct in noting that 
expertise consists in the following three things. (1) An expert has more true beliefs and/or fewer 
false beliefs within the E-domain compared to others. (2) Cognitive ability to deploy that 






information to form new beliefs in true answers to new questions. For this second condition, my 
account draws from Fricker’s account of expertise in thinking that this cognitive capacity is a 
relatively stable property of the expert. Last, (3) the distinction between knowledge of primary 
and secondary questions. The distinction provides a principle which we can refer to when 
demarcating the degrees of expertise. An example of this kind of expertise is similar to the 
example given earlier concerning the physicist from a research university and the high school 
physics teacher or science news journalist. The former possesses both knowledge of primary and 
secondary questions in a reliable sort of way and can generate answers to form new true beliefs 
to new questions in a generally reliable way. The latter can only do this for secondary questions 
and cannot really develop new true beliefs to new questions given the information they currently 
possess. With an account of expertise in hand, let’s now turn to discuss the epistemic 
significance of expertise.  
2 Why is expert testimony epistemically significant?  
 
Expert testimony matters because we take ourselves to know things about the world in 
which we trust the testimony of experts for this knowledge. We take this deference to expert 
testimony to be legitimate in many instances. Moreover, if we didn’t defer to the testimony of 
experts, we would not actually know many things that we take ourselves to know. 
 Much of what we believe is based on what others, especially experts, have told us. For 
example, our knowledge of history, science, and medicine, is almost completely dependent on 
what experts have told us is the case.76 Elizabeth Fricker (2006), writes the following when it 
comes to our epistemic dependence on the testimony of others:  
 It is at any rate certain that, in order to live up to the ideal of individual epistemic   
 
76 See Jack Lyons and Barry Ward (2018), The New Critical Thinking: An Empirically Informed 
Introduction, New York: Routledge, 246.  






autonomy, a very great deal of what is believed by a normal member of a modern society, 
with its extended division of epistemic labour, would have to be bracketed, given up - 
most of geography, history, the natural and social sciences including medicine, and so 
forth.77 
 
It’s clear that expert testimony is important. Without the testimony of experts, we would lose a 
great deal of our knowledge of the world. Does our epistemic dependence on experts require 
blind and uncritical trust in them? Some philosophers answer in the affirmative, others answer in 
the negative. John Hardwig (1991) represents the former and Fricker (2006) represents the latter.   
2.1 Hardwig’s blind trust view  
 In his paper, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, John Hardwig (1991) argues that our 
knowledge of many things depends on trust in the testimony of others. This trust in the testimony 
of others, which includes trust in the testimony of experts, is blind.78 Hardwig asks us to consider 
the following strong epistemological principle of testimony:  
(T') If A knows that B knows P, then A knows P.79 
Let’s use an example to illustrate how Hardwig’s strong principle of testimony works. Suppose 
A is a well-educated businessman who wants to stay informed about the most cutting-edge 
climate science. B is a well-respected climate scientist and friend of A. She tells A about her 
current research and the implications it has for possible effects on the environment. In this 
scenario, A knows that B knows P, some specialized piece of information only trained climate 
scientists has access to, and because B testifies to A that P, A knows P, in virtue of basing his 
belief that P on B’s testimony.    
 
77 Fricker (2006), 227.  
78 See John Hardwig (1991), “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 
12, 693-708.  
79 Ibid., 699. Cf. Hardwig (1988), "Evidence, Testimony, and the Problem of Individualism-A 
Response to Schmitt," Social Epistemology, 2, 309-21. The principle of testimony was coined by 
Frederick Schmitt.  






 Hardwig goes on to explain a particular worry about this view of trust in the testimony of 
others. He writes:  
[I]n order for testimony to be useful, A cannot already have B's reasons. So, if A accepts p 
on B's say-so, those reasons (B's reasons) which are necessary to justify A's belief are 
reasons which A does not have. Sometimes it is feasible for B to share with A all the 
evidence necessary to justify the claim that p. But usually not.80  
 
One problem that is related to what Hardwig is stating above is the novice/expert problem. The 
problem is that it seems like the novice must blindly trust the expert when the expert testifies that 
P, but this sort of blind trust is epistemically suspect. Hardwig thinks that the only way 
knowledge in these cases can be preserved is if there is at least some trust in the testimony of 
experts that is blind. Let’s call Hardwig’s position the blind trust position:  
Thus, the blindness of A's knowledge that p: those reasons which are necessary to justify 
p (and A's belief that p) are reasons which A does not have. Obviously, since she lacks 
part of the evidence that justifies the claim that p, A is limited in the extent to which she 
can effectively scrutinize or challenge B's claim about p. And yet we are to say that A 
knows that p, despite this blindness, this lack of the evidence necessary to justify p, this 
inability to evaluate the case for p ?81 
 
The novice must blindly trust the testimony of the expert because the reasons the expert has for 
testifying that P are not available to the novice. If these reasons were available to the novice, 
then the novice would cease to be a novice and would be an expert. While it’s not impossible for 
the novice to learn the reasons for P from the expert, it usually doesn’t happen. Moreover, even if 
the novice was able to learn the reasons for P from the expert, they would, at least in some sense 
of expertise, also be an expert. So, it seems like the only options available to this problem is to 
either: (1) Have all novices become experts, (2) deny that there is any knowledge via expert 
testimony, (3) argue that a novice can know P only by ignoring the best evidence for P, that is, 
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ignoring the testimony of an expert who believes P or (4) argue that knowledge belongs to 
groups of novices but not an individual novice or (5) adopt a blind trust view. The position 
Hardwig argues for is the blind trust position.  
 Why are the other solutions unlikely? The first option of novices becoming experts, 
according to Hardwig, is rare. It’s not impossible for it to occur, but the idea that every time you 
don’t know something an expert must share with you all of the reasons they have for believing P 
seems impractical. Additionally, it would require the time and capacity for the novice to 
understand those reasons the expert has which also seems unlikely and impractical.   
 Compared to number (1), solution (2) seems more likely. It’s the dissolution option 
which claims that if it is necessary for a novice to possess the same kind of reasons for knowing 
P that an expert has for knowing P, then there are many things novices don’t actually know. 
Maybe it’s possible for the novice to become an expert and then they can know P, but as long as 
they remain a novice, they cannot merely rely on the testimony of the expert in order to know P. 
This skeptical option is a viable possibility, but I don’t think we should adopt it until there is no 
other viable solution to the problem.  
 The third option does not seem plausible either. The best evidence available for knowing 
P is generally had by the experts in that field of knowledge. Remember our understanding of the 
nature of expertise. Experts are the epistemic agents who have more true beliefs and/or fewer 
false beliefs within the E-domain compared to others. The odds are in favor of the expert being 
the one who possesses the best reasons for knowing that P. Option three is that there is 
knowledge of P for other reasons than the best reasons or evidence in favor of P. This seems 
highly unlikely.  






Consider, for example, a novice with respect to human anatomy, physiology, and 
epidemiology, who does not know the reasons experts have for knowing that ‘smoking causes 
cancer’.82 According to option (3), the novice can only know that smoking causes cancer if she 
ignores the reasons of the experts and comes to knowledge that smoking causes cancer for 
different reasons. This seems highly implausible. We should not ignore the best reasons for 
thinking something is true and the best evidence the novice has for believing P is that the expert 
testifies that P.  
 The fourth option is the idea that individual novices do not actually know anything via 
expert testimony, but possibly a group of novices possess shared knowledge. The idea is that an 
aggregate of novices can combine their knowledge so that they can count as an expert. For 
example, maybe a sufficient number of undergraduates in biology can pool their collective 
knowledge concerning the discipline of biology such that a hundred undergraduate biology 
students can count as an expert in biology.  
There are at least two problems with this option. First, the number of novices necessary 
for knowledge via testimony to occur is vague. How many novices are enough for knowledge via 
expert testimony to occur? Second, even if there was a principle for determining when a group of 
novices was large enough for knowledge via expert testimony to occur, option (4) seems to 
reduce to either option (1) or option (2). If the group of novices becomes large enough to permit 
the transmission of knowledge via expert testimony, then in a sense, the group has become an 
 
82 Eric Funkhouser raises an objection by arguing that the novice does not need to know the 
specific reasons why smoking causes cancer when knowing the differential rate of cancer to 
deaths is sufficient to know that smoking causes cancer. I think this is true generally, but often 
causes in medicine are more complicated and so there are likely cases in which general 
knowledge of something will not be sufficient for knowing P independent of the testimony of the 
expert.  






expert. You might think that a group of novices could never become large enough to permit the 
transmission of knowledge via expert testimony such that (2) is true, and no novices actually 
know anything the experts know.  
 Hardwig thinks the most plausible option that is not skepticism (option 2) is that the 
novice knows P via the transmission of knowledge of the expert’s testimony through trust in the 
expert. Hardwig explains what it means for the novice to trust in the expert as follows: First, the 
novice must know that the expert is honest. This means that the novice knows that the expert 
intends to be telling the truth and believes what she is testifying to. Second, the novice must 
know that the expert is competent. This means that the novice recognizes that the expert 
“knowledgeable about what constitutes good reasons in the domain of her expertise, and she 
must have kept herself up to date with those reasons”83 Third, the novice must know that the 
expert is conscientious. This means that the novice recognizes that the expert has been diligent in 
developing her reasons for believing P. Fourth, the novice must recognize that the expert has an 
adequate epistemic self-assessment, which is to say, the expert is likely not deceiving herself 
about the extent of her expertise, the reliability of her expertise, or the applicability of her 
expertise to whether P is true.84 This is necessary because it will determine the trustworthiness of 
the expert’s testimony. If the expert begins to pontificate in areas in which she is not an expert, 
then the expert is less trustworthy. To sum, Hardwig’s view is the following:  
A must TRUST B, or A will not believe that B's testimony gives her good reasons to 
believe p. And B must be TRUSTWORTHY, or B's testimony will not in fact give A 
good reasons to believe p, regardless of what she might believe about B.85 
 
 
83 Hardwig, 700.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid.  






According to Hardwig, for transmission of knowledge via expert testimony to occur between 
expert and novice, it is necessary for the novice to trust the expert and this trust must be blind 
with respect to the reasons the expert has for believing P. Recall from the passage quoted earlier 
that Hardwig understands epistemic blindness as such. A is the novice and B is the expert. A 
novice is blind with respect to knowledge that P when the novice does not have access to the 
reasons that justify P. Nevertheless, the novice possesses knowledge that P based on the 
testimony of the expert who does have access to the reasons for justifying P.  
2.2 Fricker’s critical dependence account of expert testimony 
 Let us now turn to the view of the transmission of knowledge via expert testimony 
offered by Elizabeth Fricker, what she calls critical dependence. Fricker acknowledges that we 
are epistemically dependent concerning a great deal of our knowledge of the world, yet she 
argues that we should not accept the testimony of others (experts included) uncritically. She 
writes:  
One cannot live in a modern scientifically and technologically sophisticated society, nor  
have any social life at all, without trusting others in almost one’s every action. But this is  
not to say that one’s trust in the vast heritage of knowledge and know-how built up from  
others’ investigations, expertise, and experience must be blind - uncritical and  
undiscriminating.86 
 
Notice that Fricker agrees with Hardwig that in order for us to know many things that we take 
ourselves to know, we must trust others who are more knowledgeable than us. Yet, Fricker does 
not think that this trust must be blind. What does she mean by this? Fricker offers the following 
epistemic principle to help explain her view. She calls the principle the testimonial deferential 
acceptance principle 2 or TDAP2. TDAP2 is both necessary and sufficient for a novice to defer 
to and accept the testimony of an expert. The principle can be stated as follows:  
 
86 Fricker (2006), 228.  






TDAP 2: One properly accepts that P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P 
— her word that P — just if she speaks sincerely, and she is epistemically well enough 
placed with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form, a 
conscious belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; 
and she is better epistemically placed with respect to P than oneself; and one recognizes 
all these things to be so; and one is not aware of significant contrary testimony regarding 
P.87 
 
Unpacking this principle, we can see that Fricker has similar conditions to Hardwig for novices 
appropriately trusting experts. A novice may defer to an expert just if the novice judges the 
expert to be honest or sincere, in an epistemic position to know P, and in a better epistemic 
position than the novice in knowing P.88 These last conditions seem to roughly correspond with 
Hardwig’s conditions that the novice must believe that the expert is competent, conscientious, 
and exhibits an adequate epistemic self-assessment.  
 Something that is unique to Fricker’s view is the addition of the condition that the novice 
is not aware of any conflicting testimonial expertise. This builds on Hardwig’s view and will 
become relevant later in this chapter when we discuss a problem related to the novice/expert 
problem.  
 
87 Ibid., 232. Fricker gives an initial testimonial deferential acceptance principle (TDAP 1) which 
claims that a necessary condition for epistemically proper deference occurs when the testifier is 
in a better epistemic position than oneself with respect to knowing P, and that one recognizes 
that the person testifying is in a better position. Fricker goes on to say that TDAP 1 is not 
sufficient for epistemically proper acceptance of testimony for at least two reasons. The one 
accepting testimony must recognize the testifier as being sincere and the one accepting the 
testimony of the testifier is not aware of any contrary testimony (which includes cumulative non-
expert testimony). If these two additional conditions are met, then according to Fricker, we do 
have necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemically proper acceptance of testimony.  
88 Fricker says that her position is not entirely externalist. She thinks that there are both internal 
and external components to epistemically proper deference to experts. The external conditions 
are (1) the speaker testifies according to her expert generated knowledge and (2) is sincere. The 
internal condition is that the one accepting the testimony is not aware of reasons for doubting the 
expertise or sincerity of the expert testifying. See Fricker (2006), 232.  






 After giving her TDAP-2 principle, Fricker makes an important distinction between two 
kinds of deferential acceptance. Deferential acceptance is the novice accepting the testimony of 
the expert. The distinction Fricker makes concerning the notion of deferential acceptance is weak 
versus strong deferential acceptance. First, Fricker defines weak deferential acceptance as 
follows:  
Weak Deferential Acceptance: occurs when I form belief that P on the basis of trust in 
another’s testimony that P, when I myself have no firm pre-existing belief regarding P; 
nor would I form any firm belief regarding P, were I to consider the question whether P 
using only my current epistemic resources, apart from the current testimony to P.89 
 
The crucial aspect of weak deferential acceptance is that the novice defers to the testifying expert 
when the novice has no firm pre-existing belief regarding P. For example, I do not have a firm 
belief about the solution to a complex mathematical proof. If a mathematician were to tell what 
the answer to the proof is, I would weakly defer to them.  
 In contrast with weak deferential acceptance, Fricker defines strong deferential 
acceptance as follows:  
Strong Deferential Acceptance: occurs when I let another’s trusted testimony regarding 
P override my own previous firm belief, or disposition to form a firm belief, regarding 
P.90  
 
The crucial feature that distinguishes strong deferential acceptance from weak deferential 
acceptance is that in cases of strong deferential acceptance, the novice does have a firm belief or 
firm disposition to form a firm belief concerning P and the novice allows the contrary testimony 
of the expert to override that previously held firm belief. An example of strong deferential 
acceptance occurs when a novice who holds to a geocentric model of the universe is told by an 
expert like Copernicus that contrary to his firm belief that the sun orbits the earth, that what is in 
 
89 Fricker (2006), 233.  
90 Ibid. 






fact the case is that the earth orbits the sun. The novice has a firm belief that the sun orbits the 
earth (possibly based on previous Ptolemaic theorizing, particular interpretations of the Bible, 
and a common-sense belief that the earth is not moving), yet strongly defers to the testimony of 
the expert an allows the previous belief to be overridden.  
 To sum, I think Fricker’s position concerning when novices ought to defer to the 
testimony of experts improves Hardwig’s position. Fricker’s view includes what Hardwig’s view 
offers by outlining what is necessary and sufficient for trusting experts. Trusting experts involves 
recognizing or believing that the experts are trustworthy. Experts are trustworthy when they are 
sincere, competent, conscientious, and make accurate epistemic self-assessments. Fricker’s view 
improves on Hardwig’s view, in my estimation, because it provides a more nuanced account. Her 
account is more nuanced in at least two ways. First, she includes within her principle of 
testimony the idea that the novice must be unaware of any contrary expert testimony. Second, by 
distinguishing between weak and strong deference, Fricker has provided a principled way we can 
say trust in experts is not entirely blind. On Fricker’s view, trust in experts is not completely 
blind, but rather, the trust in experts is critically dependent. It is critically dependent because 
whether one defers to an expert might depend on how firmly one holds a previous belief and it’s 
possible that some firmly held beliefs may not be overridden by expert testimony.  
3   A problem in the epistemology of expertise: Goldman’s novice/2-expert problem  
Now that we have looked at what expertise is and why it’s significant, let’s look at a 
particular problem in the epistemology of expertise. The problem is Alvin Goldman’s novice/2-
expert problem.  
  






3.1 Goldman’s novice/2-expert problem 
The problem can be understood in the following way: First, suppose that there is a 
putative disagreement between two experts: expert-1 and expert-2. Next, there is a novice who 
depends on the testimony of the experts in order to know or be justified in believing propositions 
within a target domain of information. The target domain of relevant propositions that only 
experts can adjudicate between is the E-domain. Goldman understands the central question 
concerning the novice/2-expert problem to be this: can a novice justifiably decide, in a case of 
two disagreeing experts, which expert is superior in their knowledge of the given domain and the 
deployment of their knowledge in the domain? Relatedly, on what epistemic basis can the novice 
do this?  
3.2 Possible solutions to the novice/2-expert problem  
Goldman offers five possible solutions to the novice/2-expert problem. I will explain 
each possible solution and briefly discuss why Goldman believes each fails except the last 
solution. The five possible solutions are the following: the arguments solution, the consensus 
from other experts solution, the credentials solution, the biases solution, and the past “track-
records” solution.  
3.2.1 Arguments solution  
The arguments solution tries to solve the novice/2-expert problem by having the novice 
assess the arguments from each of the disagreeing experts. Each expert presents their best case 
for their position in either a debate format or in a journal. The novice then judges which of the 
two experts presents the most persuasive case. The problem with this solution, according to 






Goldman, is that sometimes novices are able to evaluate the evidence but often the novice is not 
in the position to adequately evaluate the evidence presented.91  
3.2.2 Consensus solution 
 The second solution Goldman considers is the consensus solution.92 The consensus 
solution solves the problem by having the novice count the numbers on each side of the two 
disagreeing experts. Whichever expert has the most experts on their side is the position the 
novice should adopt.  
 Goldman’s objection to this solution is the guru with slavish followers objection. It is 
possible that either a single guru or a small elite group of experts is slavishly followed by the 
other experts. If the followers of these leaders more or less uncritically accept the position of the 
leader, then it seems like counting the number of experts who agree is not as epistemically 
weighty than it might initially seem. In order to get around the objection, Goldman argues that an 
additional expert’s agreement adds epistemic weight only if the additional expert’s agreement is 
 
91 Goldman, 94. Goldman offers several helpful distinctions in this section. First, he 
distinguishes between esoteric versus exoteric statements. Esoteric statements are statements that 
belong to the expert’s area of expertise and the truth-value of the statements are inaccessible to 
novices. Exoteric statements are statements that are outside the domain of expertise and may be 
accessible to novices. Second, Goldman distinguishes between semantically esoteric statements 
and epistemically esoteric statements. Semantically esoteric statements are those which are 
inaccessible to the novice because the novice does not understand the technical terminology. 
Epistemically esoteric statements are those which are inaccessible to the novice in virtue of the 
novice’s inability to assess the truth-value of the statements even if they understand the 
terminology. Last, Goldman distinguishes between direct and indirect argumentative 
justification. Direct argumentative justification occurs when a hearer becomes “justified in 
believing an argument’s conclusion by becoming justified in believing the argument’s premises 
and their (strong) support relation to the conclusion” (Goldman, 94). Indirect argumentative 
justification occurs when a hearer is indirectly justified in believing the position of someone who 
is dialectically superior to their opposing interlocutor. Dialectal superiority is not superior debate 
skill, but the ability to present a putative rebuttal or defeater to the counterevidence provided by 
their opponent.  
92 Goldman does not use these names to refer to the putative solutions. They are mine.  






formed causally independent from the guru/group of leaders. A belief is formed in a causally 
independent way according to Goldman in at least two ways. The first way is when the expert X 
forms their belief in a way that is causally independent of the way expert Y formed their belief. 
Goldman calls this first way the bypass route. An example of the bypass route is when two 
individuals are direct eyewitnesses to an event. Another example given by Goldman is when two 
scientists perform independent experiments that bear on some hypothesis.  
 The second way Goldman thinks an additional expert can form their belief about some 
hypothesis H in a causally independent way from another expert and thereby provide an 
evidential boost to the novice based on consensus is the going-partly-though route. When an 
additional expert’s belief depends in part on the original experts testimony, but the new expert 
does not base their belief in H entirely and uncritically on the testimony of original expert, then 
this route can also count as being causally independent and does in fact provide an additional 
evidential boost based on the consensus of experts.93 An example of this kind of causally 
independent route is when an expert E1 posits some hypothesis H and expert E2 listens to E1’s 
reasons for H, considers a variety of defeaters for the reasons for H, and judges that there are 
more convincing rebuttals to the defeaters, and thereby concurs with E1 in believing H. In the 
going-partly-through route for belief formation, E2’s belief in H partly depends on E1’s belief in 
H, but E2’s belief is not entirely blind, rather, it is at least in part, causally autonomous.94       
 Goldman’s criticism of the consensus solution is the following. First, he thinks that it is 
possible for the novice, N, to be justified in believing the testimony of experts based on 
consensus when the consensus heavily favors on position over the other. For example, Goldman 
 
93 Goldman, 102.  
94 Ibid.  






would probably believe that the novice is justified in believing the scientific consensus that 
anthropomorphic climate change actually occurs based on the overwhelming consensus of 
climate scientists (approximately 97 percent) on the issue. Goldman’s worry concerning the 
solution is that expert disagreement is not always this one-sided. An example of a more divided 
expert consensus is mammography screenings for women ages 40-49. Miriam Solomon 
discusses this more nuanced and complicated case of expert disagreement in which some experts 
suggest that women ages 40-49 should be screened for breast cancer annually while other experts 
argue that women ages 40-49 should not receive screenings annually.95 
 Cases like the disagreement about mammography screening are the kind that Goldman 
thinks the consensus view does not solve with respect to the novice/2-expert problem. Which 
group of scientific experts ought the novice defer to in the case of screening mammography? It is 
not clear, argues Goldman, so the novice is not justified in believing one position over the based 
on the testimony of some of the experts in the relevant field. 
3.2.3 Credentials solution 
 Goldman also considers the credentials solution to the novice/2-expert problem. Roughly, 
the credentials solution appeals to other experts, in this case “meta-experts”, who score the 
expertise of the competing experts. Examples of these kinds of “meta-experts” that evaluate 
experts are academic degrees, the particular academic institutions, professional accreditations, 
and so on.96 Goldman understands these criteria for evaluating experts as a kind of agreement or 
consensus with other experts because the academic degrees, institution, professional 
 
95 See Miriam Solomon (2015), “Expert Disagreement and Medical Authority”, in Philosophical 
Issues in Psychiatry III: the nature and sources of historical change, eds. Kenneth S. Kendler 
and Josef Parnas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 64-65.  
96 Goldman, 97.  






accreditations all reflect certifications given to the experts based on the agreement of other 
experts. If Goldman is correct that the credentials solution is just a specific kind of consensus 
solution, then the credentials solution is subject to the same problems as the consensus solution. 
For example, consider again the mammography screening controversy. It is very likely that both 
sides of the expert disagreement have experts with the highest kinds of credentials on either side. 
If so, then the novice would not be justified in deferring to one side or the other.97  
3.2.4 Biases solution  
 The next solution Goldman considers is what I call the biases solution. The biases 
solution seeks to solve the novice/2-expert problem by looking for biases in the experts and 
trusting the expert who is less biased. Goldman outlines the following conditional statements as a 
guiding principle for novices to use when evaluating experts. I will call this the least biased 
expert principle (LBE).  
(LBE)  (1) If N has excellent evidence for a bias in one expert E1 and no evidence of bias in the  
expert’s rival E2 and (2) if N has no other reason to trust E1 over E2, then N is justified  
in placing greater trust in E2.98  
 
Goldman walks through a variety of biases that could seriously compromise the testimony of one 
expert over the other. He considers lying, economic interests, sexism, excluding minority groups, 
or exaggerating the significance of the evidence in their research in order to receive funding for 
grants or political agendas.99  
 The problem with this solution is that while some biases are more transparent to the 
novice such as particular cases of lying or particular cases of economic interests biasing the 
testimony of the expert, the more subtle forms of bias such as underrepresentation of certain 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., 104. 
99 Ibid., 105.  






experts, inflating the significance of the evidence, and entire disciplines subject to bias might be 
more difficult for the novice to weed out and navigate without becoming an expert.  
3.3 Goldman’s favored solution: past “track-records”  
 The fifth solution is Goldman’s favored solution. He calls it the past “track-records” 
solution. The track-records solution to the novice/2-expert problem looks to the expert’s track 
records of cognitive success in order to assess the likelihood of the expert having correct answers 
to the current issue at hand.100 In order to defend his favored solution, Goldman considers the 
following objection:  
(1) A novice can assess the track records of a putative expert only if the novice has 
epistemic access to the E-domain.  
(2) A novice by definition does not have epistemic access to the E-domain. 
So,  
(3) A novice cannot assess the track records of a putative expert.101  
 
Goldman responds to this objection to the track records solution as follows: he appeals to the 
exoteric/esoteric distinction made earlier in the paper in order to reject premise (2). Goldman 
argues that possibly, not every statement in the E-domain is esoteric (epistemically inaccessible) 
to the novice. His reason for thinking that possibly some statements in the E-domain are exoteric 
rather than esoteric, i.e., epistemically accessible rather than epistemically inaccessible, to the 
novice is to sharpen the exoteric/esoteric distinction by relativizing it to an epistemic standpoint 
or position.102  
 What Goldman means by sharpening the exoteric/esoteric distinction by relativizing it to 
an epistemic position is that certain esoteric statements in an E-domain might be esoteric only for 
a certain period of time and might later become exoteric to the novice. An example Goldman 
 
100 Goldman, 106.  
101 This is my own formulation of the objection Goldman considers.  
102 Goldman, 106.  






gives is the following: The statement “There will be an eclipse of the sun on April 22, 2130 in 
Santa Fe New Mexico.” Relative to novices in the year 2019 this statement is probably esoteric. 
Possibly, in 2019, this statement is exoteric to scientists. But, relative to novices on April 22, 
2130, the statement “There will be an eclipse of the sun on April 22, 2130” is no longer esoteric 
and the novice can check to see that a certain scientist or scientific position accurately predicted 
certain truths and then base their beliefs on the scientist or community of scientists who have the 
better track record.  
 Goldman notes that there are limits to his solution given that a successful track record 
may not always be available to the novice at a certain time. For example, in the eclipse 
prediction given above only those novices who were able to directly observe for themselves the 
vindication of the scientist’s prediction were able to use the track record solution to resolve the 
novice/2-expert problem. But suppose that between the years 2019 and 2130 scientists were split 
with respect to the proposition, “There will be an eclipse in Santa Fe in 2130.” Goldman’s track 
records would not help any of the novices living in the time between 2019-2130.  
3.4 A version of the novice/2-expert problem: Expert conversion  
 Now that we have seen Goldman’s assessment of the various solutions to the novice/2-
expert problem, let’s look at how expert conversion can provide a unique kind of novice/2-expert 
problem that I believe can shed light on an interesting application of Goldman’s track record 
solution.   
 In chapter one I stated that an expert converts or changes their mind when the expert goes 
from believing P to believing not-P. Consider the following scenario of expert disagreement:  
E1 disagrees with E2 in regard to H. The novice knows that E1 used to believe  
H but now believes not-H and E2 has always believed H. Further, assume that the 
relevant statements given by E1 and E2 are both esoteric to the novice. Later, the 
statement becomes exoteric for the novice and vindicates the position of E2. 






One may argue that the novice, based on Goldman’s track record solution, should always place 
more trust in E2 than in E1. One may think this for the following reason: When you change your 
mind you with respect to P you are admitting that you were previously mistaken concerning 
about P. This would seem, prima facie, to undercut your reliability in getting the correct answer 
with respect to P and other related propositions. Your change of mind may provide a defeater for 
your testimony that P for the following reason: if you were wrong in the past concerning P why 
think you will not be wrong in future, or at least less reliable than someone who never flipped on 
their belief and remained steadfast?103  
 It’s possible that the fact that an expert E1 was wrong with respect to P and therefore the 
novice has some reason for thinking that E1’s testimony that P is unreliable, I argue that E1’s 
testimony is not unreliable if a number of conditions are met. While it might be correct that all 
things being equal changing your mind decreases your reliability, this is not always the case. 
Sometimes, when certain conditions are met, the defeater is overridden by more powerful 
evidence to the contrary. We will look at some of these conditions in the next chapter that can 
provide overriding evidence to defeaters when someone changes their mind. 
 I think the case of expert conversion and the objection of an expert being unreliable in 
virtue of changing one’s mind provides an interesting development of Goldman’s track record 
solution to the novice/2-expert problem. The phenomenon of expert conversion requires a more 
nuanced development of Goldman’s track record solution by highlighting that certain social 
epistemological problems are not as straight forward as one expert is reliable and the other is not. 
But rather, using the track record solution is nuanced in such a way that the novice must consider 
 
103 Thanks to Jack Lyons and Timothy McGrew for helpful discussions in developing this point.  






the multi-dimensional analysis of track record analysis by taking into consideration defeaters, 
rebuttals to those defeaters, and sensitivity to evidence. 
4 Conclusion  
 
 Now that we have surveyed the nature and epistemic significance of expert testimony, 
let’s turn to the next chapter in which I discuss the nature and epistemic significance of expert 
conversion. I will focus on detailing a useful diagnostic for a novice to use when trying to 
determine whether an expert conversion is epistemically significant while taking into 
consideration what has already been discussed in the previous two chapters about the nature and 
epistemic significance of conversion and expert testimony.  
  






Chapter 3: On the epistemic significance of expert conversion 
1   Introduction  
In this chapter, my task is the following: First, I will ask a central question concerning 
expert conversion: under what conditions should a novice take the conversion of an expert to be 
epistemically significant? In chapter one, it was noted that much of what we take ourselves to 
know about the world depends on the testimony of experts. Another common feature of the 
world is that people, including experts, change their minds. In addition to changing their minds, 
experts also disagree with each other. All of these phenomena raise interesting epistemic 
questions about how we know the things we take ourselves to in fact know. My project is to 
focus on the particular epistemic questions surrounding the conversion of experts and the effect 
this has on those who epistemically depend on them for knowledge of the world.  
My thesis for this chapter is the following: when experts convert on the basis of 
evidential reasons, the novice has, under some conditions, defeasible reasons for thinking the 
converted expert is correct. The reasons the novice has, due to the conversion of an expert, 
provides the novice with some evidence for believing a proposition. Moreover, the novice need 
not be aware of their propositional justification in order to have it. But, in order to be justified in 
believing that p, or to have doxastic justification, the novice does need to be aware that the 
expert has converted for evidential reasons.  
Next, I will give an account of epistemically significant expert conversion. My account 
provides a useful diagnostic for novices to use when determining whether an expert who has 
changed their mind should be trusted and to what extent the expert should be trusted. I will 
provide a list of possible defeaters for the putative epistemic significance of expert conversion. I 
will address the various empirical contingencies that would undermine the idea that the expert is 






converting based on evidential reasons. Last, I will give an example of what I call positively 
epistemically significant expert conversion and examples of negatively significant expert 
conversion. These examples will be used to demonstrate how my account can be used in 
practice. 
2 A central question 
A central question for my project is the following: When should a novice take the 
conversion of an expert to be epistemically significant? To clarify possible confusion, when I 
refer to ‘an account of the epistemic significance of conversion’ what I am focused on is this 
question. My account concerns this particular question — not the more general question 
concerning any kind of epistemically significant expert conversion.  
In order to properly answer the question, the concepts of expert consensus and expert 
conversion, should be defined. Following Boaz Miller (2013), I take expert consensus to be the 
following:  
Expert Consensus: Expert consensus occurs when a proposition p is collectively accepted 
as true by a majority of experts in a relevant domain of expertise.  
 
Expert consensus occurs at the level of the belief of a group.104 Moreover, following Margaret 
Gilbert (2002), I will adopt a non-summative account of group belief in which a group g believes 
p just in case the members of g are jointly committed to believing that p as a body.105 Each 
member of the group need not explicitly believe p in order for them to count as a member within 
the consensus. A consensus can be understood in terms of the beliefs of a community. 
Concerning the beliefs of a community, Linda Zagzebski (2012) writes:  
 
104 See Boaz Miller, Boaz (2013), “When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared 
knowledge from mere agreement”, Synthese, 190: 1296.  
105 See Margaret Gilbert (2002), “Belief and acceptance as features of groups”, Protosociology, 
16, 42.  






 The beliefs of a community cannot be identified with the beliefs of any one individual  
member, and the goal of truth for the community is not the same as the goal each member 
of the community has to get truth for herself. The community sometimes expresses these 
beliefs as assertions. We see this in scientific communities (“We teach evolution”), 
communities of historians (“We know very little about the early life of Charlemagne”) 
...106 
 
Miller gives the following definition of joint commitment: The experts in the relevant group are 
jointly committed to p when (1) they let p stand as the position of the group, (2) they endorse p 
when participating in group activities, and (3) publicly defend p when acting as a representative 
of the group.107  
Any particular member of the group may simply accept P, rather than believe P. Miller 
offers a number of differences between accepting P and believing P. First, “taking it [p] for 
granted in one’s reasoning” which can occur without believing P. Another difference is that 
acceptance involves considering one’s goals whereas beliefs do not always take the agent’s goals 
into consideration. Third, acceptance is voluntary, whereas beliefs are usually not. Fourth, there 
are feelings associated with believing something is true whereas accepting that something is true 
does not always have the same associated feelings.108 For the purposes of my argument, in order 
for an expert’s conversion to count as epistemically significant, the expert must actually believe, 
and not merely accept P. The distinction between belonging to a community of experts and 
merely accepting P and belonging to a community of experts and believing P will be important 
later on when discussing the epistemic significance of particular expert’s conversion.  
Bradley Monton (2008), explaining the views of Bas van Fraassen, writes the following 
about acceptance:  
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Acceptance has both an epistemic and a pragmatic component. When one accepts a 
theory, one has a belief, and also a commitment. The belief is that the theory is 
empirically adequate. The commitment is “a commitment to the further confrontation of 
new phenomena within the framework of that theory, a commitment to a research 
programme, and a wager that all relevant phenomena can be accounted for without giving 
up that theory” (1980, 88). According to the constructive empiricist, this commitment is 
made at least in part on pragmatic grounds: there is an important role for non-epistemic 
values in theory choice (van Fraassen 2007, 340).109 
 
What are some of the non-epistemic, or pragmatic reasons, that inform theory choice? They 
include reasons such as: (1) an agent may lack a better theory or (2) an agent may find a certain 
theory is easier to work with or (3) the theory helps to further the goals of the group.  
 Concerning the idea of the majority of experts accepting a proposition, consensus is 
possible without complete agreement. I don’t know where the cut-off would be for something to 
no longer count as a consensus, but it seems like there are instances of consensus in science, 
even if they are not endorsed by one hundred percent of the scientific community. For example, 
approximately ninety-seven percent of publishing climate scientists endorse the thesis that 
humans are causing global warming.110 I take this to be an example of scientific consensus. 
Having discussed expert consensus, let us turn to expert conversion. I take expert conversion to 
at least entail the following:  
Expert Conversion: Expert conversion occurs when an expert goes from believing/ 




 See Bradley Monton (2008), “Constructive Empiricism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/#EmpiAdeq. Thanks to 
Eric Barnes for pointing out how Miller’s understanding of acceptance is very similar to van 
Fraassen’s. See Bas van Fraassen (1980), The Scientific Image, The Scientific Image, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press and “From a View of Science to a New Empiricism” in Bradley Monton 
(ed.) (2007), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. 
van Fraassen, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
110 See John Cook et al (2016), “Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on 
human-caused global warming”, Environmental Research Letters, 11, 048002, 1.  






The expert is a member of an expert group in which the group believes p and qua member of the 
group, the expert accepts that p, even if they do not believe p.111 For an expert to count as a 
member of an expert community, they must be recognized by other members of the community 
as a legitimate member of the group. With expert consensus and expert conversion defined, let us 
turn to my account of the epistemic significance of expert conversion for a novice. 
3   When should the novice take the conversion of an expert to be epistemically significant?  
A novice should take the conversion of an expert to be epistemically significant when they 
think the following conditions obtain. The best explanation of the expert’s conversion is that the 
expert is responding to evidence. The expert is responding to evidence when four conditions 
obtain. The expert is committed to the same schema and frameworks of other experts and the 
conversion seems based on evidential reasons. Additionally, the expert seems unbiased, and the 
expert continues to be reliably making successful predictions. We shall look at each of the 
conditions in more detail later in this chapter.  
My account is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions of when expert conversion is 
and is not epistemically significant but should be understood as more of a rough diagnostic for 
the novice to use when making epistemic judgments.112 I model my account of the epistemic 
significance of expert conversion after Boaz Miller’s account of knowledge-based consensus. I 
will present Miller’s account first and then present my account. After presenting my account, I 
will discuss how my account is similar to Miller’s as well as how my account differs from his.  
Miller’s account of knowledge-based consensus  
 
111 I think that by accepting p an expert does not believe not-p. I don’t see how this acceptance 
that p and believing not-p are compatible.  
112 Tom Senor helped me make this point clearer.  






Boaz Miller (2013) gives an account of knowledge-based consensus of experts. Miller’s 
account helps to distinguish between shared knowledge from mere agreement. Miller argues that 
we may legitimately defer to the testimony of expert consensus when the expert consensus is 
likely to be knowledge-based. According to Miller, expert consensus is likely knowledge-based 
when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus. Knowledge is the best explanation of 
the consensus when the following conditions obtain.   
a. The social calibration condition – all parties to the consensus are committed to 
using the same evidential standards, formalisms, and ontological schemes.  
b. The apparent consilience of evidence condition – the consensus is based on varied 
lines of evidence that all seem to agree with each other.  
c. The social diversity condition – the consensus is socially diverse.113  
 
Miller argues that if all of these conditions obtain then we may legitimately epistemically defer 
to the testimony of the expert consensus.114 Let us look in more detail concerning what Miller 
says about each of the three conditions. After discussing Miller’s three conditions, I’d like to add 
a fourth condition based on the predictive power of the consensus. 
The social calibration condition115  
Miller cites Kuhn (1970) when explaining what he means by the social calibration 
condition. Miller argues that for this condition, all of the experts need to “...share the same 
fundamental background assumptions.”116 Kuhn has three types of objects necessary for genuine 
 
113 Miller (2013), 1294. The experts come from different backgrounds.  
114 Miller does not explicitly address the question of whether his account provides a sufficient 
condition of rational deference or whether his account merely provides a condition of when we 
may rationally defer but remain rational if we didn’t defer. I think he takes his account to be the 
latter.  
115
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for satisfying the conditions on successful transmission of knowledge through testimony.” See 
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agreement or consensus to occur.117 The reason a shared commitment to background 
assumptions is a condition for knowledge-based consensus is because in order for there to be 
substantial consensus and not superficial agreement there must be a shared minimal content. The 
social calibration condition seeks to provide this shared minimal content.118 
The three conditions necessary for consensual meta-agreement are shared formalisms, 
ontological schemes, and evidential standards.119  
Shared formalisms include things such as f = ma in Newtonian physics or P V = nrT for 
the ideal gas law. This means that there needs to be at least a minimum threshold of shared 
formalisms between experts such that there can be some sense in which it can be said that they 
agree with each other. If the formalisms used by different experts are so radically different from 
each other that they cannot be compared to each other, then it is difficult to see how one could 
argue that there is a consensus among experts. Ontological schemes include descriptions or 
models of the world such as matter is composed of particles.120 Evidential standards are model 
solutions that show how to apply the formalisms and how to solve specific problems and define 
what solutions are acceptable.121  
Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner (1981) also argue that a shared commitment to a similar 
methodology is necessary for scientists to reach a rational consensus. Lehrer and Wagner write:  
Our contention is...that scientists must also be consensually committed to a method. If 
they are not so committed, then, no matter what the intrinsic merits of the method, 
agreement is not to be expected. Again, if one is not rationally committed to a method, 
then one is not committed to the results obtained, no matter how constant and consistent 
 
117 See Thomas Kuhn (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition), Chicago: 
The University of Chicago. 182-191. Cf. Miller 1301.  
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119 Kuhn refers to shared formalisms, ontological schemes, and evidential standards as symbolic 
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those results might be. History bears this out. When others looked through Galileo’s 
telescope, they did not by any means agree that the moons of Jupiter were there to be 
seen...When we claim that the results of science are rational, when we prefer those results 
to prejudice and superstition, the rationality of our claim rests ultimately upon our 
agreement, our consensus, that those methods lead us to truth or at least expose error in a 
reliable way. The application of method may itself produce agreement, but such 
agreement presupposes a prior consensual commitment to the methodology itself.122 
 
Here we see that Miller, Lehrer and Wagner agree that a shared commitment to formalisms, 
methodology, ontological schemas, and evidential standards are important features for expert 
consensus to obtain. 
 Miller goes on to make an important distinction when discussing shared formalisms. He 
distinguishes between essential consensus and accidental consensus. Essential consensus occurs 
when “...a group forms a collective decision for the same thing using shared standards of 
evidence and a sense of relevance.” On the other hand, an accidental consensus occurs when 
“...each individual forms the same belief on her own and for her own reasons.”123 He thinks that 
only essential consensus can be knowledge-based. Later in this chapter, when discussing my 
view of expert conversion, I’ll offer an analogue to Miller’s essential versus accidental 
distinction.  
The apparent consilience of evidence condition  
Miller offers the following criticism of Goldman. Goldman argues that for an expert’s 
opinion to provide more weight than the weight given to the opinion of the consensus the 
opinions must have been arrived at in a causally independent way. Goldman’s thought is that if a 
group blindly follows a guru, then the fact that many people believe p gives us no more reason to 
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believe p is true than our reasons for thinking p is true on the testimony of the guru alone.124  
Goldman thinks that an additional person, X, only confers additional weight for believing p, in 
addition to the expert, call them Y, believing p, if X and Y form their beliefs in causally 
independent ways. An example of forming the same beliefs in causally independent ways would 
be if X formed their belief based on different experiments or eyewitness testimony apart from the 
testimony of Y. 
Miller offers the following criticism of Goldman’s causal independence thesis. While 
Goldman’s idea that beliefs must be formed in causally independent ways in order for them to 
confer additional warrant on top of the testimony of an expert,  Goldman’s thesis runs contrary to 
the common practice of drafting expert consensus statements and ignores the evidence that 
suggests groups, because they divide cognitive labor, can more effectively reach more warranted 
results than individuals.125 A third criticism offered by Miller against Goldman’s view is that 
‘causally isolated agents’ may reach the same conclusion for different and incoherent reasons 
which would violate the social calibration condition.126  
Miller’s account of the second condition, the apparent consilience of evidence, is based 
on the robustness principle. Robustness, according to Jacob Stegenga (2009), is the idea that 
“hypotheses are better supported with plenty of evidence generated by multiple techniques that 
rely on different background assumptions.”127 Miller applies the robustness principle to the 
social context arguing that “when a consensus is built on an array of evidence drawn from a 
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variety of techniques and methods, it is less likely to be an accidental by-product of one 
technique - and all the more likely to be knowledge based.”128 
Miller’s reason for only requiring apparent consilience of evidence over actual 
consilience of evidence is because the latter is too demanding. Miller gives a number of reasons 
for thinking that actual consilience of evidence is too demanding, and that apparent consilience 
of evidence is the best that we can hope for. These reasons include: first, “different methods [for 
combining and weighing different lines of evidence] and different implementations of the same 
method may give different outcomes for the same body of evidence.”129 Second, supposing that 
there was only one way of combining and measuring evidence, it would be question-begging to 
think that consensus is knowledge-based because the one method enjoys wide consensus. Third, 
some of the best theories of evidential support, e.g., Bayesianism or IBE, leave at least some 
room for an element of subjectivity. Hence, at least part of our informed judgements are going to 
be determined by an agent's social-situatedness.130  
The social diversity condition  
 The last condition for knowledge-based consensus to obtain is the social diversity 
condition. Miller understands the social diversity condition in the following way: first, he asks us 
to recall the robustness principle mentioned for the apparent consilience of evidence condition. 
When robustness, that is, “the notion that hypotheses are better supported with plenty of 
evidence generated by multiple techniques that rely on different background assumptions” is 
applied to the social context, the multiple background conditions in the robustness principle are 
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usually understood as social diversity.131 Concerning a diversity of perspectives, Longino writes 
that a “diversity of perspectives is necessary for a vigorous and epistemically effective critical 
discourse… When consensus exists, it must be the result … of critical dialogue in which all 
relevant perspectives are represented.”132  
 Let’s distinguish between epistemically significant social diversity and epistemically 
insignificant social diversity. In cases of epistemically insignificant social diversity, what unites 
a group of people does not, or could not, confer additional evidential import. For example, the 
fact that a group of scientists lack a person with red hair in their community is epistemically 
insignificant when it comes to scientific research. There’s nothing about having red hair that 
provides an epistemic agent with any additional evidence in scientific inquiry. In contrast, 
epistemically significant social diversity occurs when what unites a group of people does, or 
could, confer evidential import. An example of epistemically significant social diversity could be 
including women within the scientific community. There is, or could possibly be, something 
about the fact of being a woman that provides the scientist with additional evidential import not 
available to her male colleagues. This doesn’t mean that if a consensus is not socially diverse it 
cannot in principle be knowledge-based. Rather, a consensus is less likely to be knowledge-
based when it isn’t socially diverse.  
My account of epistemically significant expert conversion  
Before offering my account of when expert conversion is likely to be epistemically 
significant, I’ll offer an argument for thinking that expert conversion in general is epistemically 
significant. Consider the following argument.  
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(1) If some expert consensus is likely to be knowledge-based, then some expert 
consensus is likely to be epistemically significant. [Premise] 
(2)  Some expert consensus is likely to be knowledge-based. [Premise] 
(3) Therefore, some expert consensus is likely to be significant. [MP 1,2] 
(4) If some expert consensus is likely to be significant, then some expert conversion is 
likely to be significant. [Premise] 
(5) Therefore, some expert conversion is likely to be epistemically significant.133 [MP 
3,4]  
 
 Let’s consider reasons for thinking (1), (2), and (4) are true. Concerning the truth of (1), 
if something is known, then it is sometimes epistemically significant. If an expert knows that P, 
then the expert’s belief satisfies whatever is epistemically necessary and sufficient for 
knowledge. Knowledge is one feature that makes a belief epistemically significant. So, if an 
expert does in fact know P, then their belief is epistemically significant.134 (2) depends on 
whether expert consensus can be knowledge-based in an epistemic sense. It’s intuitive to think 
that expert consensus can be knowledge-based even if we are still working out how it’s 
knowledge-based. One reason for thinking consensus is knowledge-based is because if it’s not 
then there is probably a lot less knowledge in the world then we seem to think.135 Last, the claim 
that some experts who change their minds disagree with the consensus is simply a descriptive 
claim. Hence, it seems like this is a good argument for thinking that expert conversion can be 
epistemically significant. An expert conversion is epistemically significant when the following 
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conditions are satisfied and epistemically insignificant when the conditions are not satisfied. The 
conditions are the following:    
Let EC stand for an expert conversion, ES stand for epistemically significant, and EB 
stand for evidence based.  
An EC is ES iff:  
(1) The EC is EB.  
An EC is EB if: 
(2a) Social calibration condition – when the expert converts, they are committed to using 
the same evidential standards, formalisms, and ontological schemes as the other experts 
in the debate.136 
(2b) Appearance of evidence – the expert seems to be converting on the basis of 
evidence.  
(2c) Absence of cognitive biases – the expert doesn’t seem to have any cognitive biases 
that would better explain the conversion. 
(2d) The expert makes reliably successful predictions and successful track-record- the 
converting expert makes successful novel predictions based on their new view and has 
been reliable in the past.  
 
Differences between Miller’s account and my account  
My account is similar to Miller’s account in that both of our accounts are inferences to 
the best explanation. My account differs from Miller’s in that my account concerns expert 
conversion whereas Miller discusses expert consensus. Second, my account focuses more on the 
individual expert who changes their mind, rather than the group of experts. In discussing the 
epistemic significance of the conversion of an expert, I must discuss the context in which they 
are converting, but my account focuses more on the individual than Miller’s account does.    
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4   Defeaters for epistemically significant expert conversion  
In this section, I’ll consider ways in which conversion based on evidential reasons could 
be defeated. Specifically, I will consider ways in which empirical contingent factors can 
undermine the evidential significance of an expert’s conversion.  
In order to outline possible defeaters for the epistemic significance of expert conversion, I 
think it’s helpful to discuss the distinctive attributes of experts. What attributes distinguishes 
experts from non-experts? Consider the following.  
 Experts are influential. Experts enjoy a certain level of influence and prestige in virtue of 
their role as an expert. It seems possible that experts might be more susceptible to particular 
biases of overconfidence in virtue of their influence and prestige. The primary way in which 
experts are influential is that their testimony carries more epistemic weight than the non-
expert.137   
Experts’ jobs depend on their views.  Experts are vulnerable to motivated reasoning 
because often their jobs depend on whether they publish. It is possible that experts can be 
tempted toward exaggerating results or fudging numbers in order to keep their jobs. It would be 
significant if an expert changed their mind when they didn’t have much to gain but much to lose.  
 Experts receive their status and influence based on their cognitive abilities. Given that 
expert’s prestige and job security depend at least in part on their cognitive abilities, the 
credibility and reliability of those cognitive faculties carry more weight for experts than a novice. 
If an expert were to demonstrate that they are not cognitively credible or reliable, then it seems, 
ceteris paribus, the expert has more to lose than a novice.  
 
137 These conditions are not necessary for being an expert but are a loose characterization of 
contingencies associated with being an expert. Thanks to Tom Senor for helping me clarify this 
point.  






Kinds of biases in which experts are susceptible138   
First, experts can succumb to hypothesis myopia. Hypothesis myopia occurs when 
experts fixate on a particular hypothesis, don’t consider evidence against the hypothesis, and 
don’t consider alternative hypotheses.  
Second, experts can succumb to the bias of the Texas sharpshooter. This bias is akin to a 
‘sharpshooter’ who fires random bullets and then draws his target around the shots. In a similar 
way, researchers can selectively report the hypotheses that worked or to hypothesize after the 
results are known. It is not intrinsically biased to develop a hypothesis after the data has come in 
but there are instances in which it is biased to do so.  For example, Ruzzo cites a study about p-
hacking in psychological research. Researchers will, either consciously or unconsciously, select 
biased hypotheses and data that render statistically significant p-values, i.e., p < 0.05.  
P-hacking occurs when researchers will either only report studies that “worked” and not 
report the studies that didn’t work, will peek at the results and decide whether they should collect 
more data, or throw out data only after checking its impact on the p-value.139 
Third, experts can exhibit asymmetric attention. This bias is also known as the 
disconfirmation bias and occurs when experts rigorously analyze unintuitive results but give a 
‘free-pass’ to expected results. An example of this kind of bias that scientists can succumb to is 
exemplified in a 2004 study cited by Ruzzo in which eighty-eight percent of a sample of 
molecular-biology labs reported that when an experiment yielded an unexpected conclusion the 
researchers explained the unexpected results on inconsistencies with how the experiments were 
 
138 See Regina Nuzzo (2015), “How scientists fool themselves – and how they can stop”, Nature, 
https://www.nature.com/news/how-scientists-fool-themselves-and-how-they-can-stop-1.18517.  
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conducted rather than on their theory. When a result was consistent with their theory, the 
scientists didn’t question the experimental methodology.140  
Fourth, experts can fall prey to just-so story telling. Just-so story telling are instances of 
fallacious post hoc rationalizations that scientists can engage in in order to reach the sort of 
explanations and interpretations that they want. The problem with just-so story telling is that it 
can be used to justify or rationalize any explanation which are often contradictory 
explanations.141  
Fifth, experts, who are generally very intelligent, may be more susceptible to certain 
cognitive biases.142 In their paper, Keith Stanovich, Richard West, and Russell Meserve (2012) 
show that cognitive sophistication, something presumably had by many experts, does not 
attenuate the bias blind spot. Stanovich et al. write the following: 
 [M]ore cognitively sophisticated participants showed larger bias blind spots... a 
conservative way to characterize the findings here is to say that cognitive ability provides 
no inoculation at all from the bias blind spot—the tendency to believe that biased 
thinking is more prevalent in others than in ourselves. In our data, cognitive ability did 
not attenuate the tendency toward a blind spot at all. Thus, the bias blind spot 
joins a small group of other effects such as myside bias and noncausal base-rate neglect 
(Stanovich & West, 2008b; Toplak &Stanovich, 2003) in being unmitigated by increases 
in intelligence (emphasis added).143 
 
What Stanovich et al. conclude from their study is that contrary to what might be expected, more 
intelligent people were not less biased. They offer a variety of explanations for why this might be 
the case. What is interesting for our purposes is that experts, in particular, scientific experts, are 
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probably on the whole, intelligent, nevertheless, they are just as susceptible to certain biases like 
everyone else.  
J.D. Sterman (2011) also support the claim that experts are no less susceptible to biases 
than others. He writes the following:  
 We violate basic rules of probability and do not update our beliefs according to Bayes’  
rule. We underestimate uncertainty (overconfidence bias), assess desirable outcomes as  
more likely than undesirable outcomes (wishful thinking) and believe we can influence 
the outcome of random events (the illusion of control). We make different decisions 
based on the way the data are presented (framing) and when exposed to irrelevant 
information (anchoring). We credit our personal experience and salient information too 
highly and underweight more reliable but less visceral data such as scientific studies 
(availability bias, base rate fallacy). We are swayed by a host of persuasion techniques 
that exploit our emotions and our desire to avoid cognitive dissonance, to be liked, and to 
go with the crowd… Scientists and professionals, not only “ordinary” people, 
suffer from many of these judgmental biases (emphasis added).144 
 
It’s well supported that experts are not free from bias. Nevertheless, I don’t think this should 
necessarily lead us to skepticism. It means novices must become more epistemically discerning 
when it comes to trusting experts. For now, I’ll leave the rest of that discussion for the next 
chapter.  
5   An example of epistemically significant expert conversion  
The example I’ll use from the history of science is the shift from the Ptolemaic model of 
the universe to the Copernican model of the universe. Within the history of science, this shift is 
often referred to as the “scientific revolution.”145 In order to explain why I use this case as an 
example of expert conversion, let me give a brief background about the debate.  
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 The scientific revolution occurs between 1543 with the writing of Copernicus’ On the 
Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres and 1687 with the writing of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica.146 The revolution occurred with a shift in models of the universe from Ptolemy’s 
geocentric model to Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the universe.  
 In his work, Almagest, Ptolemy argues that the earth is spherical, that the size of the earth 
in relation to its distance to the stars is negligible, and most famously, that the earth does not 
move.147 Ptolemy builds his model of the universe with little circles called epicycles that ride on 
other circles called deferents. With this model, Ptolemy is able to predict the locations of the 
planets very accurately in the night sky and is also able to account for the phenomena of 
retrograde planetary motion.148 Retrograde planetary motion is an optical illusion in which a 
planet will seem to be moving backwards against the stars.149 Ptolemy’s model can account for 
the phenomena of retrograde motion, but not in a non-arbitrary manner. The sizes of the radii of 
the circles within Ptolemy’s model could have been a different size, and in some cases, the sizes 
of the radii he uses for the moon are different for different purposes.150 On Ptolemy’s model, you 
can build pieces of his system, but you cannot build the entire model because one model would 
contain incompatible parts.  
 Copernicus found the predictive success of Ptolemy’s model commendable, but the fact 
that Ptolemy’s system contained arbitrary orbital distances and contained incompatible pieces to 
the model, led Copernicus to reject Ptolemy’s model, and to develop his heliocentric model. 
 
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid., 18.  
148 McGrew, Kelly, Allhoff (2009), 18. 
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Copernicus began the development of his heliocentric model with the assumption that the Earth 
is just like all of the other planets. On Copernicus’ heliocentric model, retrograde motion can be 
explained in a non-arbitrary way. By supposing that the earth is just like all of the other planets 
and that all of the planet orbit around the sun, Copernicus can both explain retrograde motion 
and do so in a principled way.  
 Copernicus can account for the phenomena of retrograde motion as follows. On a 
heliocentric model, the earth is on a shorter orbit (on the inside track) with respect to the inside 
planets (Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn). Because of this, Earth, given that it’s on the inside track, will 
‘lap’ Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. A result of this lapping will cause Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn to 
seem to be moving backwards with respect to the stars. The seeming backwards motion is 
illusory. This is explained by Copernicus geometrically. According to his model, the further 
away a superior planet (Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune) is, the smaller its retrograde 
motion will be.151 Copernicus was able to do with his heliocentric model what Ptolemy could 
not, that is, provide a non-arbitrary explanation of the phenomena of retrograde motion.  
The Case of Georg Rheticus 
 Georg Rheticus (1514-1574) was an Austrian born mathematician and astronomer. 
Rheticus studied under his teacher Schoner who also held to the Ptolemaic model. In 1539, 
Rheticus travelled to Poland in order to determine if the new Copernican model of the solar 
system had any plausibility. Within four months, Rheticus was a complete convert to the 
Copernican view.152  
 
151 McGrew, Kelley, Allhoff (2009), 96.  
152 Ibid., 108.  






A few quotations from Rheticus will help provide insight into his reason for converting. 
He writes:  
For all these phenomena appear to be linked most nobly together, as by a golden chain; 
and each of the planets, by its position and order and every inequality of its motion, bears 
witness that the earth moves and that we who dwell upon the globe of the earth, believe 
that the planets wonder in all sorts of motions of their own.153  
 
Rheticus is addressing his former teacher, Schoner, explaining that the Copernican model 
provides an explanatorily powerful account of the motion of planets. Still writing to his teacher, 
Schoner, Rheticus remarks that:  
I [Rheticus] sincerely cherish Ptolemy and his followers equally my teacher, since I have 
in mind and memory that sacred precept of Aristotle, “We must esteem both parties but 
follow the more accurate.”154 
 
In his work, The Nature and Grounds of the Copernican System, Rheticus is painstaking in 
explaining to his teacher Schroner his reasons for converting to the Copernican view.  
The response to Copernicus’ View 
 The response to Copernicus’ view was not immediate acceptance. For at least two 
generations, scientists wrestled with Copernicus’ idea. The reception of Copernicus’ view was 
mixed.155 One reason why Copernicus’ view wasn’t immediately received is that Copernicus’ 
view was not as parsimonious as Ptolemy’s. Copernicus’ view posited two centers for celestial 
motion (planets orbit the sun and the moon orbits the earth). Whereas Ptolemy’s account only 
posited one center for celestial motion (everything orbits the earth).156  
 While Copernicus’ view is a more unified account of celestial motion, some scientists 
were not convinced because Ptolemy’s account was simpler. This made it difficult for one side to 
 
153 Ibid.  
154 McGrew, Kelly, and Allhoff (2009), 109.  
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fully convince the other. McGrew, Kelly, and Allhoff (2009) comment on the lack of immediate 
reception of the Copernican view by stating that “…the decision to accept or reject the 
Copernican view was difficult and required weighing up the significance of multiple factors that 
are not easily compared.”157  
  Another difficulty for the reception of Copernicus’ view is that it was contrary to our 
commonsense observation of the world. In light of our commons sense observation that the Earth 
doesn’t seem to be moving it makes sense why some scientists would have been reluctant to 
immediately accept the Copernican position.158  
 Let’s see how the Rheticus’ case satisfies the four conditions for a case of epistemically 
significant expert conversion. 
 First, it seems straightforward that Rheticus’ is using the same definitions and formalisms 
as the other experts in the field. One reason for thinking this is because there doesn’t seem to be 
any evidence from his peers that Rheticus had done so. If Rheticus’ reasons for changing his 
mind could be explained by radically diverging from the shared assumptions of his peers, it 
seems like they would have pointed this out to him.159  
 Another reason for thinking that the Rheticus case satisfies the first condition is that 
dissenters, e.g., Blunderville, didn’t object to the Copernican model by arguing that Copernicus 
 
157 Ibid. 97-98.  
158 McGrew, Kelly, Allhoff (2009), 97-98. One example of a scientist who did not accept 
Copernicus’ view was Thomas Blunderville. Blunderville in 1594 wrote “Copernicus…affirmeth 
that the earth turneth about and that the sun standeth still in the midst of the heavens, by help of 
which false assumption he hath made truer demonstrations of the motions and revolutions of the 
celestial spheres, then were ever made before.” in McGrew, Kelly, Allhoff (2009), 106.  
159
 It may be argued that Rheticus did radically diverge from his peers on the assumption that 
earth rotated around the sun and hence there was not a shared minimal content. I do not think this 
is correct. Rheticus has enough shared formalisms, ontological schemas, and evidential standards 
to make the radically divergent background assumption objection dubious.  






changed the meaning of the terms or formalisms, but objected based on the belief that 
Copernicus made a false assumption about the earth’s rotation around the sun. Although not 
responding to Rheticus’ directly, Blunderville is objecting to the Copernican model, who 
Rheticus, a student of Copernicus, is defending.   
 Earlier in the chapter, I mentioned Miller’s distinction between essential versus 
accidental consensus. I argue that there is an analogue to Miller’s distinction between essential 
and accidental consensus and my own account of expert conversion. I think that when it comes 
to an epistemically significant expert conversion, the conversion is something that could not have 
been easily manipulated. Put another way, Rheticus’ conversion is epistemically sensitive. I do 
not intend to get into the debate concerning sensitivity, I simply want to make the point that 
Rheticus, and any instance of epistemically significant conversion, would not have easily 
believed something false.160 The sensitivity condition also holds with respect to those scientists 
who continued to hold to a Ptolemaic model. The degree of insensitivity to the evidence will 
depend on the extent to which the new evidence presented by Rheticus is available to those 
scientists who continued to hold the Ptolemaic position.   
 Rheticus also satisfies the second condition of apparent consilience of evidence. There 
are at least two lines of evidence that Rheticus would have been aware of. First, he had the 
evidence explaining retrograde motion in a non-arbitrary way (the different planets were on 
different orbital tracks, and hence the smaller ones lapping the larger ones caused an optical 
illusion).   
 
160 The reasons Rheticus would not have easily believed something false is because he seemed 
epistemically sensitive to the putative evidence. Therefore, I have the last condition in my 
account of successful novel predictions and reliable track-record. Both requirements make it 
likely that the convert is changing their minds in an evidentially sensitive way.  






Second, Rheticus had the evidence of being able to build a complete model of his system 
that Ptolemy couldn’t, thus satisfying the Aristotelian ideal of scientia, or knowledge. A 
complete model means that it was possible to build a replica of the Copernican system. 
Ptolemy’s model was incomplete because you could not make a replica of his system. If you 
tried to build one part of the system, you necessarily couldn’t build another part. Ptolemy’s 
model was geometrically inconsistent. For example, one Ptolemaic construction will tell you 
where to look for the moon on a given night while another construction will tell you how large 
the moon appears on any given night. But you cannot superimpose both of the models. If you use 
the model to find the moon, it will give you the wrong size of the appearance of the moon. 
Conversely, if you use the model to try to find the apparent size of the moon, then you will get 
the wrong answer to the location of the moon. Ptolemy’s model is fundamentally not unified 
which a negative feature of a scientific model.161 
For those persuaded by scientific realism, if your theory cannot be made into a complete 
model this seems to count against your theory. Since the Copernican system could be modeled, 
this provides an additional line of evidence because systems that can be modeled in the actual 
world are ceteris paribus preferable to systems that cannot be modeled in reality.  
 The last condition is that there is a diversity of opinion between the converting expert and 
the possibly influential opinion of the expert’s mentors and colleagues. Rheticus’ seems to also 
satisfy this condition. His mentor, Schoner, was not a heliocentrist and there was also a diversity 
of opinion of experts in the field. In addition, there are social and psychological reasons that 
would seem to bolster the force of the evidence for Rheticus. In order to overcome the 
 
161 Thanks to Tim McGrew for giving me this example of what it means for Ptolemy’s model to 
not be constructible. McGrew mentions that these kinds of geometric inconsisties occur 
throughout Ptolemy’s Almagest.  






temptation to agree with his influential mentor and colleagues, in order to maintain prestige or 
reputation, it seems like the evidence must be quite strong to overcome these temptations toward 
bias. So, we have a case of epistemically significant expert conversion with the case of Rheticus.  
 An objection to this last point that Rheticus satisfies the social diversity condition is that 
it can conflict with the first condition of having a shared commitment to the same formalisms.162 
The objection goes as follows: The first condition requires a minimal shared content and 
commitment to similar background assumptions, but the third condition requires a level of 
diversity in opinions. Don’t these two conditions conflict with each other? Not necessarily. Both 
conditions can be true, and I think for instances of epistemically significant conversion they must 
be. The reason for thinking this is because there needs to be enough continuity between the 
converting expert and the consensus that they aren’t talking past each other, but there also needs 
to be enough diversity of opinion for legitimate development and progress in science to occur. 
 Additionally, I think the fourth condition, that the converting expert reliably make 
successful predictions can assuage any worries about the first and third conditions being 
fundamentally opposed to each other. The fourth condition can rule out cases of rogue scientists 
who seem to share the same formalisms as their peers but offers a radically different opinion. If 
that converting expert doesn’t make reliably successful predictions in the future, then the 
expert’s conversion probably wasn’t significant.  
 In the case of Rheticus, he and the other heliocentrists were reliably producing successful 
novel predictions, and hence, avoid this charge of internal inconsistency. Having given an 
example of epistemically significant expert conversion with the Rheticus case, let’s turn to a case 
of expert conversion that is not epistemically significant.  
 
162
 Eric Barnes raises this objection in comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.  






6   Cases of expert conversion that are epistemically insignificant  
 There are a number of ways in which an expert can change their mind concerning a 
controversial proposition. I’ll consider examples that fail different conditions in my account.  
Biased reasoning  
 One example of expert conversion that isn’t epistemically significant is the case of 
scientist C.C. Little. The reason this case isn’t epistemically significant is because it is an 
instance of biased reasoning.  
 In his book, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for 
Abolition, Robert N. Proctor (2011) details the allegiance between C.C. Little and the tobacco 
industry which sought to create doubt in the minds of the public concerning the health safety of 
tobacco use.163 
 The tobacco industry wanted to gain scientific credibility to help ward off criticisms from 
the scientific community. Not wanting the idea that tobacco consumption caused cancer and was 
dangerous for one’s health, the tobacco industry created the Tobacco Industry Research 
Committee (TIRC). The scientist C.C. Little was made the first scientific director of the TIRC. 
Proctor recounts the conversion of Little from thinking that smoking causes cancer to thinking 
that smoking didn’t cause detrimental health effects. Proctor writes the following:  
Little’s own views changed revealingly overtime, following his employment by the 
tobacco industry. In 1944 in a booklet titled Cancer: A Study for laymen published by the 
American Cancer Society, Little had stated that it was surely “unwise to fill the lungs 
repeatedly with the suspension of fine particles of tobacco products of which smoke 
consists.”51 In 1960, however, when asked whether he still thought this unwise he replied, 
“No, as a general answer.”52 Key for Little was a kind of constitutional cop-out: so while 
some people might be “irritated” by tobacco smoke, the majority escaped with no 
apparent harm. Or at least no reliable evidence of harm. Which for him meant it was 
 
163 See Robert N. Proctor (2011), Golden Holocaust: Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette 
Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press.  






wrong to say that smoking “caused” cancer…Here is how [Little] put it when testifying 
for the defense in Green v. American Tobacco, one of the first tobacco trials.  
 
Q: Doctor, do you know of any one specific statistical study that shows that there is no 
relationship between smoking and lung cancer, any original study? 
A: That’s a hard question to answer, in a way… I would say that isn’t a question of 
statistics. It is just a question of fact, that the living people who smoke prove that there is 
no relationship in their base between cancer and smoking because they haven’t got 
cancer.164 
 
What are some things that we can take away from the case of Little and the Tobacco industry? 
First, it doesn’t seem like Little’s view changed because of new evidence but rather because he 
started working for the Tobacco industry. Little doesn’t appear to have changed his mind on the 
basis of evidence and we have positive evidence in thinking that he changed his mind for biased 
or motivated reasons, i.e., he was working for the Tobacco industry. 
 Second, Proctor points out that Little fails the first condition for epistemically significant 
conversion with his very limited notion of what counts as a “cause.” When he says that smoking 
doesn’t cause cancer because there are people who smoke and do not get cancer, he is working 
with such a narrow notion of cause that it arguably doesn’t mean the same thing as when other 
scientists use the term. Although Little doesn’t state it explicitly, when he says that smoking 
doesn’t cause cancer because there are people who smoke who don’t get cancer, he is implicitly 
affirming a notion of causality in which A causes B only if B necessarily follows from A. Yet, 
this is hardly what scientists means when they claim that A causes B. Hence, Little’s conversion 
fails to be epistemically significant for a second reason: he doesn’t use the same scientific 
concepts or schemas.165 
 
164 Proctor (2011), 274-275.  
165 Ibid.,, 275.  






 We’ve now looked at examples of expert conversions that are epistemically significant 
and those which are not. Let’s address objections to my account.  
7   Objections  
Objection 1  
Your position argues that there is something special about expert conversion per se that 
confers epistemic significance over and above expert testimony simpliciter. But it doesn’t seem 
like simply changing one’s mind provides additional evidence for believing an expert. What 
work is conversion doing in providing additional reason for believing P that expert testimony 
simpliciter isn’t already doing?  
Reply to objection 1  
 I agree that an expert changing their mind doesn’t always provide additional reason for 
the novice to believe P, but I do think it does sometimes. In particular, I think that when an 
expert seems to have converted for evidential reasons, as outlined by my account of significant 
conversion, the novice does in fact have additional reason, on top of mere expert testimony, for 
trusting the expert.166 The reason I think this is that for an expert to testify that P, after having 
believed not-P, and avoiding the biases discussed in my account, the novice has good reason, 
 
166 Tom Senor raises a good question in which he asks whether the novice has stronger reasons 
for believing an expert who converts from not-P to testifying that P than an expert who does not 
convert and merely testifies that P. Jack Lyons raised a similar question in discussion. My 
answer is sometimes. Whether the testimony of an expert who converts provides stronger reasons 
for the novice compared to the testimony of a non-converting experts depends on several factors 
in which a yes or no answers cannot be provided in the abstract. Recall that the strength of the 
epistemic significance comes in degrees. This means that the strength of the epistemic 
significance will depend on who the expert is (is he/she a highly respected expert in the field), on 
the nature of the content testified (is it regarding a primary question or a secondary question?), 
and the weight of the counter testimony from the other experts. All these factors need to be 
considered in or to answer the question whether converting expert testimony provides stronger 
reasons to believe than non-converting expert testimony.  






reason above just expert testimony, that the evidence is very strong. Hence, I think a plausible 
case can be made that conversion can in some cases provide additional reason for thinking that P 
is true that goes beyond mere expert testimony. What I am not arguing for is that the novice is 
always justified in believing P solely based on the conversion of the expert. Additionally, the 
novice must consider the defeaters for P, in particular, the testimony of other experts. Whether a 
novice is justified in believing P on the basis of an expert conversion and other reasons will 
depend on the strength of the expert consensus against the converting expert’s testimony, the 
extent to which the novice is informed on the issue, and whether there is a trend of experts who 
are converting from P to not-P rather than from not-P to P.167 Generally speaking, when an 
expert converts from a majority position to a minority position the strength/degree of epistemic 
significance of their testimony will be less. Nevertheless, I do not think that this generalization 
holds necessarily. I think there needs to be room for cases like Rheticus in which a very credible 
expert changes their mind and it may give an extra epistemic boost to the novice. I do think cases 
like the Rheticus one in which a novice would receive an additional epistemic boost are rare. 
Objection 2  
 
167 An example that I am thinking about that illustrates this sort of trend of experts is the 
conversion of several experts from a variety of disciplines from some form of Protestant 
Christianity to Catholic Christianity. This trend has occurred several times in history. Two recent 
trends include the Oxford Movement which occurred in mid-eighteenth-century England. There 
were several notable Oxford academics who converted from Anglicanism to Catholicism. A 
chief representative of this movement and a convert himself was Saint John Henry Newman. 
There has been another wave of conversions from Protestantism to Catholicism in North 
American academic circles. See the following works that include details of these conversions, 
R.J. Snell and Robert P. George, eds., (2018), Mind, Heart, and Soul: Intellectuals and the Path 
to Rome, Charlotte: Tan Books; Brian Besong and Jonathan Fuqua (2019), Faith and Reason: 
Philosophers Explain Their Turn to Catholicism, San Francisco: Ignatius Press; Douglas M. 
Beaumont (2016), Evangelical Exodus: Evangelical Seminarians and Their Paths to Rome, San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press.  






 Your example of Rheticus is not convincing. The reason why it seems to us that 
Rheticus’ conversion is evidence-based and thereby epistemically significant is because we 
know that Rheticus ended up being correct. Isn’t this just an instance of a hind-sight bias? The 
Rheticus case does not provide convincing reasons for thinking that your conditions are useful 
for determining whether an expert conversion is epistemically significant. 
Reply to objection 2  
The claim that the only reason we find Rheticus’ case convincing is because we know 
that he ended up being correct doesn’t seem to me to do justice to the historical evidence we 
have from Rheticus’ life. First, Rheticus was a well-respected academic. He held a position 
teaching mathematics and astronomy both at the University of Wittenberg and the University of 
Leipzig.168 1This occurred both before and after he began his conversion to the Copernican 
system. Moreover, Rheticus was well received, not only by his colleagues such as Joachim 
Camerarius, who was head of the University of Tübingen, his teacher Johannes Schoner, but also 
novices like the mayor of Danzig, the printer Johannes Petreius, and Duke Albert of Prussia. All 
of these individuals, experts, and laity, received the work of Rheticus with enthusiasm.169  
 Concerning Rheticus’ character and what his contemporaries thought about him, Robert 
S. Westman writes:  
 If indeed one were to point to the single most prominent trait in Rheticus' personality,   
based upon the tone of his writings, the testimonies of his contemporaries, and his own 
life activities, one would have to seize upon his great energy and intensity-whether in the 
vitality of his work, in his widespread travels, or in his evident pursuit to lay to rest 
something inside himself.170 
 
168 See John J. O'Connor and Edmund F. Robertson (1998), "Georg Joachim Rheticus", 




 See Robert S. Westmann (1975), “The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg 
Interpretation of the Copernican Theory”, Isis, Vol. 66, No. 2, 182.  






Here we have evidence that Rheticus was passionate, well-respected, and zealous for what he 
thinks is true. Rheticus seems like a clear case of epistemically significant expert conversion 
because he was competent in his ability to make an expert judgment based on his knowledge of 
Copernicus’ work. Moreover, Rheticus arguable knew more about Copernicus’ work than 
anyone else and offered great reasons for his conversion.171  
Objection 3  
It might be objected that Rheticus’ was too enthusiastic and suffered from convert zeal 
and an overconfidence bias. Doesn’t this undermine the Rheticus case as positively epistemically 
significant? 
Reply to Objection 3  
 While it’s possible that convert zeal which I take to be a kind of overconfidence bias, can 
defeat positively epistemically significant expert conversion, I don’t think it applied in the case 
of Rheticus. It is true that he was zealous, but the historical evidence suggests that what he was 
clear minded and rigorous in his reasons for thinking the Copernican system was true. Moreover, 
Rheticus had the checks and balances of his colleagues to make sure he wasn’t going completely 
off the rails, Additionally, since Rheticus was advocating the views of Copernicus at time in 
which the view was the minority position, he had even more checks on his zealousness.   
Objection 4 
Doesn’t the social calibration condition, specifically the same ontological schema 
condition, make progress in science impossible? Additionally, doesn’t virtually all conversion 
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Reply to Objection 4  
In reply to the first question, I don’t think that the requirement that a converting expert 
needs to be committed to the same ontological schema makes scientific progress impossible. One 
reason for thinking this is explained by the fact that scientists can be committed to the same 
ontological schema, i.e., the same empirical phenomena, yet vary in their metaphysical 
interpretation of the schema. Miller makes this point when discussing the social calibration 
condition, he writes: 
[S]cientists may vary in their beliefs about the reality of the objects such ontological 
schemes describe, while all using the schemes in their reasoning...I argue that such a joint 
commitment satisfies the social calibration condition, even if members of the consensus 
differ in their conceptual interpretations of these schemes.172  
 
Miller goes on to give an example of scientists who are committed to the same ontological 
schemas but vary in their interpretation of those schemes. He writes:  
For example, all interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g., the Copenhagen, many-
worlds, and hidden-variables interpretations are committed to using the same 
mathematical formalism that represents quantum state vectors in a Hilbert space. It is 
exactly this commitment that ensure that they are interpretations of the same theory, and 
latch on to the same empirical phenomena in the same way. At the same time, they 
significantly diverge in their metaphysical interpretations of these phenomena.173   
 
In a way that’s similar to what Miller says about the shared commitments condition that’s needed 
for knowledge-based consensus, my account of epistemically significant expert conversion also 
requires shared ontological commitments, but the interpretations of these commitments may 
vary. For example, young earth creationists arguably do not have a shared ontological 
commitment because young earth creationist don’t use the same sort of methodological 
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reasoning and evidential standards as evolutionary biologists. We’ve discussed this earlier in the 
chapter when looking at examples of epistemically insignificant conversion.  
Miller’s use of similar ontological commitments can be somewhat misleading. Miller’s 
main objective for the same ontological schema condition is more concerned about the 
methodology used in the reasoning process of scientific inquiry rather than what a particular 
scientist believes does or does not exist. For example, Miller gives the example of population 
genetics. He thinks that two scientists are working from the same ontological schema when they 
both use a ‘population of objects’ as an ontological category in their reasoning about population 
genetics. Both scientist’s commitment to using the concept of a ‘population’ allows them to 
being committed to the same ontological schema, even if they disagree about the actual ontology 
of a population. For example, maybe one scientist thinks that a population is composed of people 
whereas another scientist thinks that a population is composed of just atoms, nevertheless, each 
uses the concept of a ‘population’ in their reasoning process. I think distinguishing between 
shared methodological commitments (which include commitments to shared concepts) and the 
shared deep ontological commitments would help clarify the point Miller is making.  
 In response to the second question, I don’t think that all conversion involves adopting 
new ontological schemes, even if changes in metaphysical interpretations vary. Miller’s example 
of variance among interpretations of quantum mechanics is apt. I can convert from the 
Copenhagen interpretation to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and still be 
committed to the same ontological schemas generally speaking. Arguably, I can convert from a 
Newtonian model to a relativistic model and still be committed to the same ontological 
commitments, even if my metaphysical interpretation of space-time varies. Again, this is because 
Miller is understanding ontological schema’s more in terms of methodology rather than deep 






ontology. Miller and I both agree on the following claim: when there is controversy concerning 
the metaphysical interpretation of a shared formalism, then the scope of the knowledge-based 
consensus (Miller), or the scope of the epistemic significance of the converting expert testimony 
(Bennington), is limited to only the content which is shared between the disagreeing parties.  
8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have answered the central question of when expert conversion is 
epistemically significant. Epistemically significant expert conversion occurs when sensitivity to 
the evidence is the best explanation for the conversion. I provided a diagnostic for epistemically 
significant expert conversion and gave particular example of when an expert conversion was 
epistemically significant or not. 
Considering what I have argued for in this chapter concerning when expert conversion is 
epistemically significant, I’ll turn to the next chapter in order to answer the following question: 
how should the novice respond to conversion of experts, when the conversion is epistemically 
significant, or when the expert has reasoned in a biased manner?  
  






Chapter 4: How Should Novices Respond to Expert Conversion 
1   Introduction  
In this chapter, my goal is to answer the following question: how should the novice 
respond to the conversion of experts when the conversion is epistemically significant and how 
should the novice respond when the conversion is epistemically insignificant? Drawing from my 
account of the epistemic significance of expert conversion in chapter three, I will argue that what 
the novice ought to do depends on how epistemically significant the expert conversion is and 
whether the novice has overriding defeaters for trusting the converting expert.   
The structure of this chapter goes as follows. First, I will state the second question I seek 
to answer, that is, how a novice should respond to an epistemically significant expert conversion 
and discuss how it relates to my central question of the previous chapter, that is, when an expert 
conversion is epistemically significant. Second, I will discuss ways in which a novice can go 
wrong with respect to updating their beliefs in virtue of expert conversion. Third, I will discuss 
Melissa Lane’s (2014) view about what responsibilities novices have with respect to expert 
disagreement and biases. Fourth, I will follow Lane’s suggestion that novices should develop 
certain meta-cognitive skills and virtues for identifying experts. I will expand on this idea by 
detailing the account of self-reflective conscientiousness offered by Linda Zagzebski. By 
detailing the accounts of Lane and Zagzebski, I will give an account of how the novice can 
properly respond to expert conversion.  
2   The second question and how it relates to the central question  
In chapter two I claimed that expert conversion is a type of Goldman’s novice/2-expert 
problem. The novice/2-expert problem involves cases in which a novice must adjudicate between 
at least two experts who disagree with each other. The difficulty with situations like this, for the 






novice, is how they can discriminate between the testimony of the two experts without also 
becoming an expert themselves. In chapter two we saw how difficult the novice/2-expert 
problem can be when we discussed Hardwig’s blind trust account of epistemic dependence. The 
novice can never be an expert in every subject she takes herself to know. The amount of time and 
cognitive ability necessary for this is impossible.  
In a similar way, when an expert changes their mind, they are not only disagreeing with 
the consensus (at least in many cases), but they are also disagreeing with their previous selves. 
The difficulty for the novice is to know how to respond when this happens. To resolve this 
problem, we need to first determine when expert conversion is significant (chapter three), and 
how the novice should respond, depending on the answer to the first question.  
In answering this second question, let’s first look at how the novice should not respond to 
the conversion of an expert. There are at least four ways in which a novice can go wrong with 
respect to changing their beliefs in light of known expert conversion.174 First, the novice can 
ignore epistemically significant expert conversion and not update their beliefs according to the 
testimony of the converted expert. I call this the head-in-the-sand response. Second, they can see 
the expert who changes their mind as an instance of disagreement that undermines the authority 
of all expert testimony. I call this view cynicism. Third, the novice can succumb to an 
overconfidence bias in which the conversion is epistemically significant, but the degree of 
confidence that the novice places in the expert’s testimony is unjustified. I call this position 
overconfidence. Fourth, the expert conversion can be epistemically insignificant, yet the novice 
 
174 Tom Senor raises an important question about whether my account of expert conversion 
involves both known and unknown expert conversion. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will 
only focus on the epistemic significance of known expert conversion and what the novice ought 
to do when they are aware of an expert conversion. For discussion of cases of culpable ignorance 
see Sanford Goldberg (2017), “Should have known,” Synthese, 194 (8): 2863-2894. 






places trust in the expert anyway. I call this position gullible. Let’s look at each of these wrong 
turns that the novice can make in more detail.  
3   Ways the novice can go wrong with respect to expert conversion175  
 
Significant conversion Insignificant conversion  
Pessimism 
(head in the sand and 
pessimism)  
Head-in-the-sand 
Conversion is significant, but the 
pessimist distrusts converting 
expert.  
Cynicism 
Conversion is insignificant, 






Conversion is significant and 
optimist places too much trust in 
expert  
Gullible  
Conversion is insignificant and 
optimist places too much trust in 
experts.  
3.1 The Pessimistic responses: head-in-the-sand and cynicism responses  
 
The first way in which a novice should not respond to the epistemically significant 
conversion of an expert is to take the instance of expert disagreement (whether the disagreement 
is from the converting expert’s disagreement with the expert consensus on the issue or with 
disagreement with his previous beliefs, or both) as a sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the 
expert testimony.176 This kind of pessimistic response to expert disagreement in general, and 
 
175 The reason that I call these positions as either optimistic or pessimistic is because the former 
takes a broadly positive response to expert conversion while the latter takes a broadly negative 
response to expert conversion. Nothing essential about my argument hinges on this 
categorization. I find it as a helpful heuristic to categorize the many ways in which a novice can 
go wrong with respect to expert conversion. 
176 The stronger sort of disagreement is disagreement with the consensus. This is for two reasons: 
first, when an expert disagrees with the consensus, they have a great deal of counter-evidence to 
their position from the testimony of the experts who are part of the consensus. The second reason 
is that changing one’s mind does not necessarily mean that the person is epistemically unreliable. 
It could mean that the person is sensitive to changes of evidence and hence possibly more 
reliable than someone who has always held to the same position.  






expert conversion in particular, can take at least two general forms. The pessimism can take the 
form of what I’ll call head-in-the-sand ignorance and cynicism.  
The first kind of pessimism is characterized by the novice ignoring the testimony of the 
converting expert and not updating their beliefs in proportion to the evidence.177 The second kind 
of pessimism is characterized by the novice rejecting or being skeptical of all expert testimony. 
Later in this chapter, I’ll discuss some of the empirical literature that documents this type of 
biased reasoning.178  
Let’s consider first why the head-in-the-sand response is an epistemically inappropriate 
response to epistemically significant expert conversion. Suppose a novice, who is a geocentrist at 
the time of Rheticus, was confronted with the testimony of Rheticus concerning the truth of 
heliocentrism. Moreover, suppose that the novice doesn’t have any reason for thinking that 
Rheticus has converted for biased reasons. If the novice does not update his beliefs by decreasing 
his confidence in the truth of geocentrism, at least some, then the novice is not responding to the 
conversion of the epistemically significant conversion of an expert in an appropriate way.  
I think that the reason the head-in-the-sand response is the epistemically inappropriate 
way to respond can be understood in a variety of ways given one’s theory of epistemic 
justification (e.g., reliabilism, evidentialism, proper functionalism, virtue epistemology, etc.) I’ll 
provide an analysis of the epistemic inappropriateness of the response of the novice in terms of 
virtue epistemology, but I think any of the main theories of epistemic justification can explain 
 
177 Eric Funkhouser correctly points out that when the expert conversion is not epistemically 
significant the novice correctly responds by ignoring the converting experts’ testimony.  
178 See Stephen Lewandowsky et al (2013), “NASA faked the Moon Landing – Therefore, 
(Climate) Science is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science.” Psychological 
Science, 24 (5) 622–633.  






why the head-in-the-sand response is wrong. In sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, we will look at a 
virtue epistemology analysis of how novices should not respond to expert conversion.  
The second kind of pessimism is what I’ll call cynical response, or cynicism. The novice 
engages in a cynical response to expert conversion when a particular expert conversion is 
epistemically insignificant, but the novice dismisses all expert testimony. There is empirical 
literature that suggests that when people encounter disagreement among experts, they tend 
toward distrust of all expertise in the related field. We can use this data to demonstrate how 
people might be motivated to reject the testimony of all experts if they judge that a particular 
expert has converted for biased reasons.  
I think that this response by the novice to expert disagreement is also epistemically 
inappropriate. Stephen Lewandowsky et. al (2013) looked at the anatomy of motivated reasoning 
in the rejection of science. They hypothesized that the rejection of science was common among 
individuals who (1) endorsed of a free-market ideology and (2) had a disposition toward 
conspiratorial thinking. Further, they hypothesized that the conjunction of endorsing a free 
market ideology, a tendency toward conspiratorial thinking, and the internet, provided the 
mechanism for encouraging this kind of science denial.179 They interviewed a number of 
individuals who blog about climate change and looked for the following: (a) the blogger’s view 
on climate science; (b) whether they held to a free market ideology or endorsed various 
conspiracy theories, e.g. that the moon landing was faked; (c) whether the blogger believed that 
previous environmental problems had been resolved, e.g. that acid rain is no longer a threat to 
the environment and (d) and whether the blogger perceived that there was a scientific consensus 
among climate scientists concerning global warming. 
 
179 Lewandowski et. al (2013), 624.  






The results of the study are the following: First, endorsement of an unregulated free 
market is highly predictive of climate science denial.180 Second, endorsement of unregulated free 
market ideology also predicted the rejection of other propositions about science, e.g., that HIV 
causes AIDS, but to a lesser degree than the predictive power of rejecting climate science. Third, 
there were negative associations between conspiratorial thinking and acceptance of climate 
science and other scientific propositions. Fourth, there was a negative association between the 
belief that previous environmental problems had been resolved and the acceptance of climate 
science.  
What these results seem to indicate is that the endorsement of an unregulated free market 
is a large predictor of climate science denial. It is also a predictor of the denial of other scientific 
facts, e.g., HIV causes AIDS, but to a lesser degree. Additionally, the tendency towards 
endorsing conspiracy theories is a trait that is not unique to climate science denial, but rather is 
something which applies to a variety of scientific claims. Interestingly, according to the study, 
endorsement of an unregulated free-market ideology is a greater predictor of climate denial than 
a tendency toward conspiratorial thinking.  
 With Lewandowski’s study in hand, let us discuss a case that demonstrates the cynical 
response to expert disagreement in general and can be applied to expert conversion in particular. 
Consider the case of Dr. Little from the previous chapter. It’s discovered that he was essentially 
paid off by the Tobacco industry to testify that smoking causes cancer. A cynical response to this 
case of Dr. Little’s ‘conversion’ would be to reject the testimony of all medical experts as 
“capitalist cronies” who can easily be paid off by companies and it doesn’t matter what you do 
with respect to your health.  
 
180 Ibid., 628.  






The Lewandowsky paper demonstrates that despite the cautions to not reason this way, 
people often in fact do. What’s inappropriate in responding to this kind of biased reasoning by 
experts?  
The cynical response is epistemically inappropriate because they are committing the 
fallacy of hasty generalization. Just because there is reason to be suspicious of the credibility of 
some scientists, it doesn’t follow that we have grounds for doubting the claims of all scientists. 
Additionally, the cynical response ignores salient evidence, or engages in a kind of biased 
reasoning called selective evidence gathering. The novice may have evidence that this particular, 
or select group, of expert’s testimony is to not be trusted, but she doesn’t have evidence for 
thinking all of the scientists are untrustworthy. In particular, she has salient evidence that many 
of the scientists are telling the truth and hence cannot ignore this evidence.      
3.2 The Optimistic responses: Overconfident and Gullible    
 The second way in which a novice can go wrong with respect to updating their beliefs 
about the testimony of a converting expert is to either place too much confidence in the evidence 
from the testimony of the converting expert or to be too trusting in expert testimony generally. I 
call this response in the broad sense optimism. Optimism can take at least two general forms: 
overconfidence and gullibility. The first kind of epistemically inappropriate optimism is what I 
call overconfidence. Overconfidence is epistemically inappropriate because the evidence we 
have does not support our high degree of confidence. For example, we can be overconfident in 
the testimony of an expert, specifically in cases of conversion, and this can lead us into not being 
open to other sources of evidence and even forming an echo chamber in which we only 
encounter views that confirm our own position. One example of overconfidence might be if a 
novice were to place too much credence in the conversion of Rheticus to the Copernican model. 






The novice might fall into overconfidence with respect to the epistemically significant 
conversion of Rheticus in thinking that Rheticus’ testimony supports their belief more strongly 
than it in fact does. Suppose Rheticus’ conversion is epistemically significant as argued for in 
chapter three. Rheticus had peers who disagreed with him, e.g., Blunderville. If the novice were 
to place too much credence in Rheticus’ testimony, particularly in light of having a defeater from 
the contrary testimony of Blunderville, then the novice would succumb to the epistemically 
inappropriate problem of optimistic overconfidence. There isn’t a precise line where one’s 
credence is not supported by the testimony because it will need to be weighed in the context of 
comparing the degree of epistemic significance of the converting expert with the weight of the 
counter expert testimony.   
 The second kind of optimistic response that is epistemically inappropriate is what I call 
the gullible response. Gullibility occurs when an expert conversion is epistemically insignificant, 
and the novice is too trusting in the experts generally.  
 Consider a case in which a biologist converts from naturalism to some form of theism 
(Islam, Judaism, Christianity, etc.). Suppose this individual does not see how their particular 
interpretation of scripture can fit with what the scientific data suggests. In order to resolve the 
cognitive dissonance, the scientist looks for other hypotheses that can putatively resolve the 
conflict (e.g., scientific creationism). The scientist then also changes their mind concerning the 
viability of evolutionary theory as a robust explanation of the diversity of life because they can’t 
see how this is compatible with what they think is the only available scriptural interpretation of 
the book of Genesis (six-day literal creationism). Now the scientist endorses creationism, not on 
the basis of the science, but on the basis of the incompatibility of the scientific data and their 
interpretation of scripture. If a novice were to trust the expert in this case, I think it would be a 






case of gullibility.181 It should be noted that gullibility, like cynicism, comes in degrees. This is 
because the novice might not be able to tell whether the scientist in this case is discrediting 
evolutionary theory because of the perceived incompatibility with a particular scriptural 
interpretation or because there really are doubts about the theory as an adequate explanation of 
the data. The degree to which the novice succumbs to gullibility will depend on factors such as 
the cognitive capacities of the novice and how much investigation they’ve given to the subject of 
studying the science. For example, it’s possible that a novice who has an undergraduate degree in 
science would be in a better position to judge whether an expert has converted on the basis of 
evidence or due to motivational biases. This probably indicates the expertise comes in degrees 
and novices can be in better or worse positions in discriminating between experts.  
 We have detailed at least four ways in which the novice can fail to respond to the 
conversion of an expert appropriately. This is helpful because it provides the novice with a guide 
for ways in which they can reason inappropriately. By learning ways in which you can go wrong 
when reasoning in light of expert conversion we can help bridge the epistemic gap between 
experts and novices. It’s a helpful reminder for all epistemic agents, even if the details are 
obvious, because it is so easy for us to make mistakes.   
 
181 Tom Senor makes the good point that the case presented may not be so much gullibility, but a 
motivated reasoning based on believing something merely because you want it to be true. I think 
that in some cases this is correct, but I also think the case I present can be a genuine case of 
gullibility based on the amount of research and testimony that is received. For example, suppose 
the person has only been taught creation science and they hear the testimony of a biologist who 
has converted to Christianity and now believes in creationism but not because of the science but 
because of a literalistic interpretation of scripture. I think in this case the person is gullible and 
not as much only believing something because they want it to be true.  






In this next section, I’ll present an account that draws from both Melissa Lane and Linda 
Zagzebski in which I’ll analyze why each of the four responses are epistemically inappropriate 
and how the novice can respond appropriately.  
4   Lane’s moderate view concerning expert disagreement 
In this section, I will explain Melissa Lane’s moderate solution to the problem of 
disagreeing experts.182 I think Lane’s account offers a plausible way of explaining how the 
novice can appropriately respond to the conversion of an expert and avoid the pitfalls of 
pessimism as well as optimism. The novice avoids both of these pitfalls when they appropriately 
trust the experts. An expert is trustworthy when they are honest and transparent. A novice can 
develop certain skills, according to Lane, in order to discern whether the expert is honest and 
transparent, without having to become an expert in the field. The novice develops these skills of 
discernment by practicing certain epistemic habits and acquiring certain epistemic virtues.  
Lane argues that the novice should cultivate certain epistemic virtues in order to avoid 
certain biased thinking regarding the testimony of experts. These include ‘meta-cognitive skills’ 
that allows novices to appropriately judge experts without becoming experts themselves. Let’s 
see why Lane thinks these meta-cognitive skills are important for the novice to cultivate.   
In her paper, “When Experts are Uncertain: Scientific Knowledge and the Effects of 
Democratic Judgment,” Lane begins by asking whether ordinary citizens in a democracy can 
evaluate the claims of scientific experts.183 She notes that at least two broad camps have formed 
in answering this question. The first camp, whom Lane calls the skeptical camp, are those who 
 
182 See Melissa Lane (2014), “When Experts are Uncertain: Scientific Knowledge and the Ethics 
of Democratic Judgment”, Episteme, Vol. 11, 97-118. 
183 Ibid., 97. Lane focuses in on scientific experts. I’ll focus on discussing scientific expertise, 
but I think that my account may generalize to many types of expertise.   
 






generally answer no to the question concerning ordinary citizens’ ability to evaluate the claims of 
scientific experts. In contrast, Lane calls the other camp the optimistic camp, who generally 
answer yes to the question concerning ordinary citizens’ ability to evaluate the claims of 
scientific experts.184 
 Roughly, the skeptics think that the citizen’s or novice’s choice reduces to evaluating the 
credentials of the experts, but proper evaluation of credentials requires a level of expertise, in the 
relevant domain, not available to the novice. On the other hand, the optimists think that novices 
are in fact capable of evaluating the credentials of the relevant experts.  
 Lane goes on to discuss in detail why each camp gives their respective answers to the 
question. She mentions that the discussion is largely framed by Goldman’s discussion of the 
novice/2-expert problem. Recall that Goldman’s novice/2-expert problem involves a problem for 
the novice in identifying which of two disagreeing experts is the one that the novice ought to 
epistemically defer. Lane’s thinks most of the solutions to the novice/2-expert problem are 
mistaken. They are mistaken because the proposed solutions wrongly assume that the solution to 
the problem lies at the second-order level rather than at the first-order level. For example, a 
second-order solution to the problem is for the novice to look at the credentials of an expert 
(second-order evidence) rather than try to engage the first-order arguments of the expert. We will 
see that Lane’s view advocates for bridging the first-order epistemic gap between the novice and 
expert by educating the novices in the relevant E-domains.  
 Lane discusses the various positions that answer the question of whether novices can 
evaluate the claims of scientific experts. She focuses on two main views: skepticism or 
 
184 Ibid., 98.  






pessimism and optimism. Scott Brewer endorses skepticism and Elizabeth Anderson endorses 
optimism.185  
4.1 Brewer’s skepticism  
 Brewer’s position is that the non-expert (in this context it’s a judge or jury adjudicating 
between competing expert testimony) isn’t in a position to judge the credentials of disagreeing 
experts. 186 Hence, calling his position the ‘skeptical’ position. Brewer thinks the only solution to 
this problem is for the judge or jury to be an expert in the field.   
Lane’s assessment of Brewer’s position is that Brewer’s position reduces the novice/2-
expert framing of the problem to what she calls the novice/hired-gun framing of the problem. 
According to Lane, the novice/hired-gun frame of the problem essentially reduces to the novice 
being forced between choosing between two possible frauds and not knowing which or if either 
of the experts are in fact frauds. Lane points out that if Brewer’s skeptical account is correct, 
then it seems like there is a lot of knowledge or justified belief that is lost by the novice. The 
standard case that is given by Brewer is one in which two experts both give equally compelling 
cases for their positions. He thinks that the only things the novice really has to go on are 
credentials.187 Brewer goes on to argue that the novice is not in a position to assess competing 
credentials, hence, he is skeptical that the novice has any true ability to judge between two 
disagreeing experts. Brewer’s argument against the novice’s ability to judge between two 
disagreeing experts can be summarized as follows:  
 
185 Ibid., 100.  
186 See Scott Brewer (1997-98), “Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process.” 
Yale Law Journal, 107: 1535–679. 
187 Brewer (1997-98), 1538. cf. Lane (2014), 101.  






A person can assess the credentials of a putative expert only if one has a full 
understanding of the expertise it certifies. One has a full understanding of the expertise a 
credential certifies only if one has that credential. Therefore, a person can assess the credentials 
of a putative expert only if one has the credentials themselves. For example, Brewer argues that 
the only people who can evaluate the claims about physics of a physicist are other physicists. But 
a novice is not a physicist, so a novice cannot evaluate the claims about physics made by a 
physicist. From this argument, Brewer concludes by stating:  
[T]he nonexpert’s lack of epistemic competence threatens to deprive her of precisely the 
kind of understanding she would need to be able to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis 
about credentials and their capacity accurately to identify which experts are capable of 
producing KJB and which are not.188  
 
Brewer goes on to argue that what is necessary for the proper judgment between disagreeing 
experts to occur is that the person, the novice, must also be a cognitive expert. Brewer’s solution 
to the novice/2-expert problem isn’t a solution but rather a dissolution. In order to solve the 
novice/2-expert problem, the novice must become an expert. Suppose for example, a judge must 
decide between the testimony of two medical experts who disagree with each other concerning 
the severity of some personal injury case. Brewer thinks a judge could become competent 
enough through experience ‘on the bench’ to learn enough about human anatomy and common 
injuries that occur during motor vehicle accidents that over time he could make rationally 
warranted decisions about competing expert claims. Another example may be that an 
undergraduate degree in the hard sciences may be sufficient to render someone a kind of expert 
in assessing the claims of climate scientists. There is a tension here in Brewer’s account, which 
 
188 Ibid. 1669. cf. Lane (2014), 101. n.b. Lane points out that Brewer does not distinguish 
between knowledge and justified belief in his argument against the novice’s ability judge 
between two disagreeing experts.  






lies in the fact that he thinks only experts can assess expert statements, but he also thinks that a 
judge doesn’t need to be at the same level of expertise as the medical experts.   
 Lane diagnoses the problem with Brewer’s account in the following way. She thinks that 
Brewer conflates diverse levels and sources of expertise under “epistemic competence.”189 
Concerning the concept of epistemic competence and its connection to his solution to the 
novice/2-expert problem, Brewer writes:  
The only solution (actually, it is a family of solutions) I see requires that one and the 
same legal decision maker wear two hats, the hat of epistemic competence and the hat of 
practical legitimacy. That is, whether it is a scientifically trained judge or juror or agency 
administrator, the same person who has legal authority must also have epistemic 
competence in relevant scientific disciplines.190  
 
Brewer does not give specifics about what counts as epistemic competence, but it seems to be 
something in the realm of at least an undergraduate degree in the relevant discipline. For 
example, you’d need at least an undergraduate degree in biology, chemistry, or physics to be able 
to assess which experts to you ought to trust.  
Lane argues that Brewer’s account is problematic for at least two reasons. First, by 
positing that the novice (judge in Brewer’s example) must also be a cognitive expert, the judge 
no longer needs to assess the credentials of the disagreeing experts. Recall from chapter two that 
according to Goldman a cognitive expert is one who (1) possesses more true beliefs and/or fewer 
false beliefs within the E-domain compared to others. (2) has a capacity to deploy knowledge of 
that information in forming new beliefs in true answers to new questions and (3) possesses 
extensive knowledge of both primary and secondary questions and the answers to those 
questions within the E-domain.  
 
189 Lane (2014), 102.  
190 Brewer (1997-98), 1681. cf. Lane, 102.  






The novice (judge), according to Brewer, can simply enter into the first-order debate and 
not have to rely on second-order judgments concerning credentials.191 Hence, if Brewer’s 
solution works, it seems to render judgment of credentials otiose. Second, Brewer seems to have 
no non-arbitrary level of cognitive expertise that is necessary to render the novice (judge) 
competent. Brewer doesn’t think an M.D. or Ph.D. is necessary, but seems to settle with an 
undergraduate degree, in the relevant field, as a fitting level of cognitive expertise. For example, 
an undergraduate degree in life sciences would be sufficient for assessing expert claims about 
climate change. Lane remarks that even an undergraduate degree might not be enough because 
many times judgments must be assessed with respect to expertise in multiple disciplines. So, it 
seems like in order to count as “epistemically competent”, Brewer’s novice (judge) must possess 
however many undergraduate degrees are necessary in assessing the first-order disputed 
questions. Brewer’s solution is dubious and impractical.  
Why does Lane think Brewer’s solution to the novice/2-expert problem conflates the 
diverse levels and sources of expertise with respect to his concept of “epistemic competence”? 
Recall that for Lane and Goldman, expertise is something that comes in degrees. Additionally, 
there are different kinds of expertise. For example, Lane argues, following Collins and Evans 
(2007), that we can make a distinction between two kinds of expertise.192 The distinction is 
between contributing expertise and interactional expertise. Contributing expertise is what’s 
needed to participate in the activity and advance of the objectives of the relevant domain of 
expertise. In contrast, interactional expertise is an ability to talk about the activity and to 
understand the talk about it without being able to contribute to its being done or to teach anyone 
 
191 Lane (2014), 102.  
192 H.M. Collins and Evans, R. (2007), Rethinking Expertise, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.14, 35. cf. Lane, 101.  






else how to do it.193 This distinction between contributing expertise and interactional expertise is 
similar to Goldman’s distinction between strong expertise and weak expertise. Recall from 
chapter two that Goldman claims that strong expertise is knowledge of primary and secondary 
questions in the relevant E-domain. Weak expertise is knowledge only of secondary questions. 
Primary questions are principal questions of interest to researchers and students. On the other 
hand, secondary questions are the existing evidence and arguments that bear on the primary 
questions as well as knowledge of what other relevant experts think about the state of the 
evidence.  
An example that highlights the difference between contributory expertise might be 
something like the following. A contributory expert is a scientist who has a Ph.D. in the relevant 
expert domain and is an active and practicing scientist in the field. They publish in the top 
scientific journals and actively teach the next generation of scientists. In contrast, a science 
columnist who is relatively informed about the current issues in climate science and may have an 
undergraduate degree in biology or climate scientist but is not a practicing scientist nor 
competent to teach it at a collegiate level. This person might count as an interactional expert. The 
science columnist attends professional workshops and conferences put on by professional 
scientific organizations that has contributory experts, but they don’t contribute to the field 
through research projects and teaching.  
 According to Lane, Brewer makes too sharp a divide between expert and novice, and 
therefore conflates the diverse levels and sources of expertise. By doing this, Brewer rules out 
the possible conceptual resources (different levels of expertise), that might allow him to develop 
a more nuanced and practical solution to the novice/2-expert problem.  
 
193 Lane, 101.  






 Lane, citing Aristotle, believes that expertise runs along continuum and is more nuanced 
than Brewer’s account.194 In his Politics, Book III, chapter 11, Aristotle comments on three 
levels of expertise:  
But physicians are of three kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the 
physician of the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied the art: in 
all arts there is such a class; and we attribute the power of judging to them quite as much 
as to professors of the art.195 
 
Lane points out that each of the three levels of experts, according to Aristotle, count as a doctor. 
What these distinctions made by Aristotle amount to is that a person who has much less expertise 
relative to another expert can still rationally judge the most specialized expert. Hence, on 
Aristotle’s view (and Lane’s) a person need not acquire the most extensive and specialized 
training to rationally adjudicate between disagreeing experts. Moreover, the doctor at the lowest 
level of expertise can judge the doctor at the highest level of expertise. The general education of 
the lowest level of education, according to Aristotle, is quite broad. He seems to suggest that a 
mother who medically treats her child at home counts as a doctor in the lowest and general 
sense.196 So, contrary to Brewer, Aristotle doesn’t draw a sharp boundary between novices and 
experts and their respective epistemic competence. Aristotle thinks that expertise falls on a 
continuum and epistemic competence is not exclusive to specialists.   
4.2 Anderson’s Optimism  
Now that we have looked at Brewer’s skeptical account to the novice/2-expert problem, 
and also discussed Aristotle’s position, let’s now consider the other pole on the spectrum of 
 
194 Ibid. 103.  
195 See Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chapter 11, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Internet Classics 
Archive, www.classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html. See also Lane (2014), 103.  
196 Lane (2014), 103.  






solutions to the novice/2-expert problem: Elizabeth Anderson’s optimism.197 Lane argues that 
Anderson’s view also reduces to the novice/2-expert frame, like Brewer, but instead of reducing 
the problem between choosing between two possible frauds, Anderson reduces the novice/2-
expert position to what Lane calls the novice/crackpot-expert frame. 
To understand why Lane calls Anderson’s view of the novice/2-expert problem the 
novice/crackpot-expert frame, let us detail Anderson’s account. First, Anderson agrees with 
Brewer that the novice, qua novice, cannot enter the first-order substantive debate among the 
experts.198 But Anderson disagrees with Brewer on what second-order judgments are available to 
the novice. Contrary to Brewer’s claim that the novice can only judge credentials (and can’t 
really even do that on Brewer’s account), Anderson believes that the novice can make three 
kinds of second-order judgments: judgments about credentials, judgments about honesty, and 
judgments about epistemic responsibility. These three kinds of judgments are entirely second-
order on Anderson’s view. Novices need not understand the content of the arguments that the 
scientists are making. The novices can rely solely on their second-order judgments of credentials, 
honesty, and epistemic responsibility.199   
Anderson understands these three second-order judgments of trustworthiness as follows. 
To judge credentials means that the novice has the ability to “judge whether testifiers are in a 
position to know the claims in question – whether they have access to the evidence and the skills 
to evaluate it.”200 To judge the honesty of the expert the novice must be able to judge “whether 
testifiers are disposed to honestly communicate what they believe – not only to say what they 
 
197 See Elizabeth Anderson (2011), “Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of 
Scientific Testimony.” Episteme, 144–64. 
198 Lane (2014), 103. 
199 Anderson (2011), 145-146. Cf. Lane (2014), 103. 
200 Ibid. 145-146.  






believe, but to avoid misleading by reporting only selected beliefs, or beliefs liable to be 
misinterpreted without further explanation.”201 This is tested in practice by the absence of 
evidence of external conflict of interest and also misleading statements.202  Third, the novice 
must be able to judge whether “testifiers are responsive to evidence, reasoning, and arguments 
others raise against their beliefs.” This can take the form of the expert being willing to submit to 
external peer review and engage in the rules of proper argumentation.203 
Lane agrees with Anderson that honesty and epistemic responsibility are useful but thinks 
that Anderson’s position suffers from a crucial flaw: Anderson thinks that most if not all cases of 
novice/2-expert problems will be a lopsided battle between credible scientists and a few 
crackpots.204 A potential problem of assessing credentials is credential assessment may lead to an 
infinite regress. For example, the reason why you trust this expert is because they are 
credentialed by a particular group of other experts, but the reason you trust those experts is 
because they were credentialed by previous experts, ad infinitum. This is problematic because it 
seems like you only trust credentials because of credentials. Anderson seems untroubled by an 
infinite regress of assessing credentials because she seems to think that the credentialed scientists 
in most cases will all be one on side. Lane thinks this view is overly optimistic and that many 
instances of novice/2-expert problems will not be as obviously one-sided as Anderson seems to 
think.  
 Additionally, Anderson seems to ignore the problems of independence raised by 
Goldman (2001) with respect to the problem of gurus and their followers.205 Lane thinks that 
 
201 Ibid.  
202 Lane, 103.  
203 Ibid.  
204 Lane (2014), 104.  
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Anderson doesn’t seem to account for the alternative explanation as to why experts might 
converge on a view – because they aren’t epistemically independent and suffer from the 
guru/follower problem.206  
 Lane thinks that Anderson’s model might work for the climate science debate where 
there is overwhelming consensus from the experts, but in other cases of scientific disagreement, 
Lane is less confident that Anderson’s model will be a viable one when the consensus is not as 
overwhelming.  
 Lane argues that a fundamental problem with both Brewer’s and Anderson’s accounts is 
that they don’t really tell the novice how they ought to act upon the spectrum of revealed expert 
knowledge. The reason why Brewer’s and Anderson’s accounts don’t sufficiently provide 
answers to this how-question, according to Lane, is due to the fact that both views assume that 
novices are insulated from the first-order debate. Lane thinks that this assumption is mistaken.  
 Lane states that three things can be taken away in regard to her discussion of Brewer’s 
and Anderson’s views.207 First, the dominant framing of the problem of lay judgement (by 
Brewer and Anderson) focuses too heavily on the second-order judgments of the novice. The 
focus is too much on identifying experts over engaging with the experts by engaging with their 
claims and arguments. Second, Brewer’s skepticism suggests that novices ought to engage in the 
first-order debate by cultivating forms of judgments and knowledge at the first-order level. 
Third, Anderson’s optimism suggests that novices should engage in the first-order debate by not 
limiting judgments of expert trustworthiness to only second-order judgments of features, but 
 
206 Recall that the guru/follower problem is that if the followers of a guru are causally 
epistemically dependent on the guru, then the mere fact that there are plenty of followers of the 
guru does not add to the testimonial evidence of the guru himself.  
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rather the novice should develop a more robust understanding of epistemic responsibility and 
honesty that is grounded in the ability to make those judgments at the first-order level.208  
4.3 Lane’s Moderate Account209 
 As we discussed in the previous section, Lane thinks the central flaw of both Brewer’s 
and Anderson’s account is that they both assume that the first-order arguments made by experts 
is inaccessible to novices. Recall, the first-order level is the level of cognitive expertise, what 
Goldman calls the E-domain. Second-order judgments are judgements not about the E-domain 
content, but about the credentials or character of the expert. We will see later in this section that 
Lane calls Brewer’s and Anderson’s model the empty container model – because the flow of 
knowledge and information is solely from the experts to the novices. Lane’s position is that 
novices ought to engage experts at the first-order level. On Lane’s account, lay judgment of first-
order scientific claims is sometimes necessary.210 In order to explicate her account, Lane asks 
two questions: how is lay judgment of the first-order scientific claims possible and how can we 
enhance lay judgment of first-order scientific claims? Lane seeks to answer these two questions 
by looking at the ethical and epistemic norms necessary for successful lay judgment. Let’s look 
at her answers to each of these questions.  
 Drawing on the work of Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill, Lane offers an explication of 
 
208 Ibid., 104-105.  
209 I will refer to Lane’s account as a moderate one because it is neither skeptical (Brewer) nor 
optimistic (Anderson). Other moderate positions concerning solutions to the novice/2-expert 
problems include Socrates’ mildly pessimistic position and Goldman’s mildly optimistic 
position. I would characterize Lane’s position and my own closer to Goldman’s moderately 
optimistic position. Recall that the attitudes of skepticism, pessimism, and optimism concern the 
novice’s ability to accurately judge between two disagreeing experts.  
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her view based on Manson’s and O’Neill’s agency model of communication.211 This model isn’t 
specifically for the communication between scientific experts and laypersons, but a general 
model for communication. Briefly, the agency model of communication involves a robust 
interdependence of communication between the speaker and the hearer. Contrary to the container 
or conduit models of communication, Manson and O’Neill argue that the agency model of 
communication better captures the essence of communication than the container model - which 
involve the mere dumping of information from the expert to the novice. The reason the agency 
model better captures the essence of communication is because “communicating and informing 
are types of action and interaction, so depend on a normative framework against which such 
action succeeds or fails.”212 Manson and O’Neill further explain the agency model and what it 
means acts of informing (and communicating in general) to succeed. They write:  
Acts of informing (and communication more generally) only succeed within a rich 
practical and normative framework in which speaker and audience (a) have certain 
practical and cognitive commitments; (b) know something of each other’s cognitive and 
practical commitments; (c) adhere to, and act in accordance with, relevant 
communicative, epistemic, and ethical norms; and (d) assume that the other party is 
acting in accordance with such norms. The conduit and container metaphors hide, or 
radically downplay, these essential aspects of communicative activity.213  
 
Manson and O’Neill explain that these four conditions of successful informing can be captured 
by a list of concomitant epistemic and ethical norms. Manson and O’Neill’s list of epistemic and 
ethical norms include: (1) statements made by experts need to be intelligible and relevant to their 
audience and (2) statements need to be accurate and accessible (not lying, manipulating, 
deceiving, making the necessary caveats, etc.).214  
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 This agent model of communication is important for Lane’s account of trusting experts 
and my account of trusting experts who have converted.  
 Lane has her own list of epistemic and ethical norms by which she thinks successful 
informing and communicating depends. I’ll focus on Lane’s norms for the remainder of this 
chapter. Lane offers five epistemic and ethical norms that she thinks are necessary for successful 
informing and communicating between scientific experts and lay judges (policymakers).215 They 
include: (1) Honesty (2) Precision (3) Audience relevance (4) Process transparency and (5) 
specification of uncertainty about conclusions.  
 In her paper with Robert O. Keohane and Michael Oppenheimer, Lane (2014) argues that 
honesty from the experts is non-negotiable, but that the other four may come with sorts of trade-
offs for successful communication to occur. Following Lane, I’ll only focus on the non-
negotiable norm for experts: honesty.  
 Lane’s notion of honesty is similar to Anderson’s notion of epistemic responsibility. 
Experts must be willing to submit to external peer review and to engage in rational 
argumentative dialogue.216 Lane differs from Anderson insofar as Lane takes it that she is 
operating under an agent model of communication which occurs at the first-order level of the 
content and arguments of science and is a mutually iterative process between expert and novice 
whereas she sees Anderson’s model (and Brewer’s) operating under a container model of 
communication that is one directional and not mutually iterative.   
 Lane goes on to explain that each of the norms for the experts to abide by has a 
 
215 Robert O. Keohane, Melissa Lane, and Michael Oppenheimer (2014), “The ethics of 
scientific communication under uncertainty”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (4): 343-
368. For the purposes of my argument, we will assume what Lane says about lay judges and 
policy makers is applicable for novices generally.  
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corresponding set of norms for the novice to abide by. Moreover, the norms for the novices 
involve a set of epistemic (and ethical) virtues which are necessary to develop the ability and 
disposition to abide by the norm.217  
 In regard to the norm of honesty, honesty is more than, contra Anderson, the absence of 
evidence of external conflict of interest and the avoidance of misleading statements. Lane cites 
Linda Zagzebski, who writes concerning the virtue of honesty that it’s not sufficient for honesty 
that the person says what they believe is the truth, they must also be careful with the truth. 
Zagzebski writes:  
[I]t is not sufficient for honesty that a person tells whatever she happens to believe is the 
truth. An honest person is careful with the truth. She respects it and does her best to find 
it out, to preserve it, and to communicate it in a way that permits the hearer to believe the 
truth justifiably and with understanding.218  
 
With respect to the ethical dimension of this norm, Zagzebski thinks that honesty falls under the 
category of a moral virtue, yet she does think that in order to possess this moral virtue, the honest 
person must also possess a range of intellectual virtues. These intellectual virtues apply both to 
experts and novices. Zagzebski claims that the honest person, both the expert and the novice, 
“must be attentive, take the trouble to be thorough and careful in weighing evidence, be 
intellectually and perceptually acute, especially in important matters, and so on, for all the 
intellectual virtues”219  
 What are the corresponding norms for the norms of accuracy and process transparency? 
Lane argues that for speakers (usually the experts) accuracy and transparency, which are usually 
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more one-sided, must be gauged in relation to the need to be intelligible to their intended 
audiences.220  In order for this communication to be successful, experts have a responsibility to 
make clear their intended audience. At the same time, novices have a corresponding 
responsibility. According to Lane, the novice has a responsibility to consider the limitations and 
possible misconceptions of the speaker’s knowledge of their intended audience and to take care 
to observe any discrepancy between the speaker’s knowledge of their intended audience versus 
the actual audience.221  
 Lane notes that the responsibility of the novice in attending to the knowledge of the 
speaker’s intended audience is particularly important with respect to “overheard” or “over-the-
shoulder” instances of leaked information. For example, Lane cites the instances of leaked 
information concerning correspondence between climate scientists. The leaked information can 
be taken out of context by a lay person who is not doing their due diligence in taking into 
consideration the expert’s intended audience and therefore can distort the substantive content of 
the kind and severity of the uncertainty.222 For example, there were emails shared between 
climate scientists that were hacked and disseminated on the internet and picked up by climate 
skeptics. One climate scientist, Kevin Trenberth, wrote “"The fact is that we can’t account for 
the lack of warming at the moment, and it is a travesty that we can’t".223 This was picked up by 
climate skeptics and taken out of context to demonstrate that there was uncertainty among 
experts concerning climate change. Unfortunately for the climate skeptics, the quote, when read 
in context is referring to the need for better monitoring of the energy flows involved in short-
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term climate variability, not doubt concerning whether the climate in general is getting warmer.  
 What are these kinds of uncertainty and risk-assessment? Lane describes three. First, 
there is what Lane calls intrinsic uncertainty. Intrinsic uncertainty is uncertainty that arises from 
the scientific phenomenon itself. For example, there will always be some degree of uncertainty in 
any scientific model trying to predict the forecast given that nature seems to have an element of 
uncertainty “built in.” The second kind of uncertainty is what Lane calls conditional uncertainties 
– uncertainties that are conditional on the current scientific models.  Kinds of conditional 
uncertainties include model and parameter uncertainty. Model uncertainty is uncertainty about 
what scientific model to use and parameter uncertainty is about how to set the parameters of the 
models.224 The third kind of uncertainty mentioned by Lane is what she calls competitive 
uncertainty. Competitive uncertainty occurs when there are disagreements among different 
scientific teams working on the same problem, or disagreement among scientists in one 
discipline and scientists from a subfield. Lane thinks that competitive uncertainties arise from 
disagreements about intrinsic and conditional uncertainties.225  
 We can see that it’s possible, particularly for a novice who simply “overhears” the 
uncertainty expressed by a scientific expert to confuse or conflate the kind of uncertainty the 
expert was intending to express. For example, a novice can read a leaked email between two 
climate scientists in which one scientist expresses uncertainty about the parameter settings on a 
particular scientific model and the novice can interpret that as an intrinsic uncertainty about 
climate science models generally. This might lead the lay person, unjustifiably, to conclude that 
because there might be uncertainty concerning the parameters of a particular climate science 
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model that the intrinsic uncertainty of all climate models is very high and that climate science as 
a whole is dubious.  
 Novices can be vulnerable to biases when dealing with uncertainty, but so can experts. In 
particular, there is a problem for experts with respect to being vulnerable to an overconfidence 
bias. For example, Lane mentions the study done by J.D. Sterman (2011) that was discussed in 
chapter three. Recall Sterman’s study in which both experts and novices share a common 
tendency towards overconfidence bias. Sterman writes:  
We violate basic rules of probability and do not update our beliefs according to Bayes’ 
rule. We underestimate uncertainty (overconfidence bias), assess desirable outcomes as 
more likely than undesirable outcomes (wishful thinking), and believe we can influence 
the outcome of random events (the illusion of control). We make different decisions 
based on the way the data are presented (framing) and when exposed to irrelevant 
information (anchoring). We credit our personal experience and salient information too 
highly and underweight more reliable but less visceral data such as scientific studies 
(availability bias, base rate fallacy). We are swayed by a host of persuasion techniques 
that exploit our emotions and our desire to avoid cognitive dissonance, to be liked, and to 
go with the crowd…scientists and professionals, not only “ordinary” people, suffer from 
many of these judgmental biases.226 
 
There is more evidence that both experts and novices tend toward overconfidence when making 
judgments concerning uncertainty. For example, Lane cites a paper by Morgan and Mellon 
(2011) in which Morgan and Mellon state the following: “There is clear experimental evidence 
that both experts and laypeople are systematically overconfident when making judgments about, 
or in the presence of, uncertainty”227  
 What are Lane’s suggestions for improving the tendency toward bias on the part of both 
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the expert and the novice? What norms ought the experts and novices abide by? Lane suggests 
that both experts and novice should do the following. First, experts and novices should abide by 
the norms that “include the explicit recognition of uncertainty in speaking and in receiving 
communications about scientific knowledge, and explicit self-reflection as to whether one is 
responding to such uncertainty correctly”.228 Lane thinks that in light of potential bias had by 
experts and novices, the norms of accuracy and relevance might have trade-offs so that the full 
force of the argument is realized by the novices. For example, in order for an expert scientist to 
get their point across about the severity of the risk involved in climate change, they might have 
to sacrifice the norm of accuracy for the sake of successfully communicating. Lane cites McGeer 
and Pettit (2009) who emphasize that scientist might have a duty to not only make a good case 
for their view but to also persuade their audience so that the audience can “feel the force of what 
you have to say”.229 Put another way, the scientist needs to be able to assist the novice in 
evaluating the first-order content.230   
 In addition to experts developing their rhetorical skills, Lane suggests that in combating 
the tendency to discredit scientific research on the basis of uncertainty, an Aristotelian principle 
ought to be taught to experts and novices. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, chapter 3, 
Aristotle writes the following:  
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits 
of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the 
products of the crafts…it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each 
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish 
to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician 
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Here Aristotle is suggesting that levels of precision, or the degree of uncertainty that is a 
consequence of the nature of the discipline, will differ from discipline to discipline. So, when 
experts and novice are making judgments with respect to scientific fields, they ought to keep in 
mind that the nature of the discipline will entail degrees of uncertainty. That a scientific 
discipline, on the Aristotelian view, contains intrinsic and conditional uncertainties, isn’t reason 
to think that the scientists don’t know what they are doing, but rather, that they are actually 
practicing science correctly.232 This Aristotelian principle is important for both experts and 
novices to keep in mind so as not to conflate the three kinds of uncertainty discussed above.  
 There are other cognitive biases shared by both experts and novices. Recall that Sterman 
states that not only are experts and novices subject to overconfidence biases, but they are both 
also vulnerable to framing effects, anchoring effects, committing the base-rate fallacy, wishful-
thinking, availability biases, and host of other biases. This might tempt people to believe that 
nothing can be known and that we are doomed to skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 
world. Sterman thinks that there is a reason to hope that we aren’t all doomed to the 
epistemically pernicious effects of cognitive biases. Scientists, according to Sterman, can 
practice and cultivate thinking in terms of scientific methodology. The scientific methodology is 
an “iterative, interactive learning process” that can safeguard scientists against their cognitive 
biases. Sterman suggests that this is a primary difference between scientific experts and the 
novices who are reluctant to accept their testimony. The former is engaged in this kind of 
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iterative, interactive learning process while the latter are not.233  
 A solution for bridging this gap between the scientific experts who practice this process 
of scientific reasoning and the novices who do not is to create ways in which novices can, at least 
in part, partake in the research process of scientific study. Sterman suggests that novices can be 
allowed to partake in some of the research that goes on in the scientific study. By allowing 
novices to partake in “the context of discovery” of scientific research, by perhaps observing 
climate simulation models, this will have an effect on the receptivity of the testimony of the 
scientists in “the context of communication”.234 
 Lane thinks that by providing these sorts of opportunities to the lay public, scientists can 
train lay persons to cultivate the habits of mind necessary for recognizing and properly judging 
the kinds of uncertainty involved in scientific research. This is similar to Brewer’s suggestion 
that in order to solve the novice/2-expert problem, novices should become epistemically 
competent. Brewer’s suggestion was for the novice to obtain an undergraduate degree in the 
relevant domain. We mentioned earlier that this seems too demanding and impractical. Lane 
thinks that these kinds of educational opportunities for the lay public might be a means of 
cultivating the habits of mind in the novices in order to recognize and make informed judgments 
concerning scientific claims while not requiring the demands of an undergraduate degree in the 
relevant domain.  
 Goldman suggests a similar solution when he discusses how a novice might be able to 
judge the claims of disagreeing experts by evaluating their arguments in an indirect way. For 
example, Goldman writes the following concerning indirect argumentation and the sort of 
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justification it might confer on the novice:  
 The idea of indirect argumentative justification arises from the idea that 
one speaker in a debate may demonstrate dialectical superiority over the other, and this 
dialectical superiority might be a plausible indicator for N of greater expertise, even if it 
doesn’t render N directly justified in believing the superior speaker’s conclusion.235  
 
Goldman thinks that the novice might not be able to engage with the content of the arguments of 
the experts in a direct way, but they might be able to engage with the arguments of the experts in 
an indirect way by being attentive to certain plausible indicators of greater expertise. What are 
these indicators that Goldman thinks might provide the novice with at least indirect evidence that 
one expert might be closer to the truth than the other?  
 First, Goldman doesn’t think that debating ability is a good indicator that the expert 
possesses greater expertise and is hence more likely to be correct than the other disagreeing 
expert. The kinds of indicators that Goldman has in mind include (1) the ability to provide 
rebuttals and defeaters to the opponent’s arguments and (2) comparative intellectual quickness 
and smoothness with respect to responding to opponent’s arguments. With respect to (1), 
Goldman thinks, all things considered, if one expert is able to respond to their opponent’s 
arguments with what seem to be good rebuttals and defeaters and the other isn’t able to respond 
as well, then it is reasonable to think the former expert possess greater expertise. A similar line 
of reasoning is made by Goldman with respect to (2). All things considered, if one expert is 
comparatively more intellectually quick and smooth than their opponent, then this can provide 
some evidence that the former is a greater expert than the latter. Goldman emphasizes that this 
indirect sort of reasoning is to be understood as an inference to the best explanation or an 
explanatory inference as to which expert is greater and hence more likely to be correct.236  
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 Lane develops this idea of indirect assessment of experts by citing others who also think 
that novices have the potential to develop certain intellectual skills that allow them to judge 
experts in an indirect manner so that they need not become experts themselves.237 In particular, 
Lane discusses the work of Linda Zagzebski who thinks that there is higher-order intellectual 
virtue, cognitive integration, which is a consequence of good intellectual character, that is similar 
to Goldman’s discussion of indirect argumentation and the novice’s ability to recognize reliable 
indicators of expertise.238  
 Wrapping up Lane’s moderate view, she thinks three things can bridge the gap between 
experts and novices such that novices can engage with the content of the expert’s claims at the 
first-order substantive level (as opposed to only being able to make second-order judgements 
about first-order scientific claims as held by Brewer and Anderson). The three ways to bridge the 
first-order gap between experts and novices and hence to solve the novice/2-expert problem, 
according to Lane, are the following: (1) both parties need to develop a common self-awareness 
concerning the norms of communication. This involves carefully attending to the norms of 
effective communication on the parts of the experts (know your audience and be explicit about 
intended audience) and the novices (be attentive to the expert’s indented audience and actual 
audience). (2) engage in a common process of learning. Specifically, focus on providing 
opportunities for novices to practice thinking like scientific experts and cultivating the habits of 
mind of a scientist. (3) Develop a good intellectual character. Scientists should be attentive to the 
role rhetoric plays in communicating their ideas to others. Moreover, scientists should develop 
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the intellectual virtue of honesty. Novices ought to develop the cognitive virtue cognitive 
integration, which is a consequence of having a good intellectual character. The obligation is 
epistemic in nature. Failing to cultivate a good intellectual character, whether an expert or a 
novice is an epistemic failure. This kind of epistemic failure is a failure to be rational with 
respect to the beliefs one holds.239  
Lane doesn’t develop or discuss Zagzebski’s discussion of cognitive integration and good 
intellectual character in much detail. In the following section, I’ll discuss Zagzebski views 
concerning good intellectual character, specifically focusing on her discussion of intellectual 
self-conscientiousness. After detailing Zagzebski’s account, I’ll apply the Moderate Lane-
Zagzebski solution to the novice/2-expert problem to the more specific problem of converting 
experts in which I seek to answer the main question of this chapter: how ought novices 
appropriately respond to instances of expert conversion?  
  
 
239 Tom Senor raises the following objection: Does someone who withholds judgment when 
experts disagree fail in her epistemic duties? My response is it depends. First, withholding 
judgment when faced with expert disagreement can be justified, but sometimes pragmatic 
considerations may render an agnostic position epistemically irresponsible. For example, 
suppose there is expert disagreement concerning a particular treatment for a child who has a rare 
disease. To abstain from judgment concerning which treatment to use I think would be an 
unjustified position even if the risk of each treatment is very uncertain. Senor also asks whether 
the farm laborer fails in her epistemic duties if she fails to think like a scientist. Again, it 
depends. If the farm laborer is going to be voting for particular political candidates whose 
platform will affect policy concerning climate change then I do think the farm laborer bears 
some epistemic responsibility to cultivate her intellect to the best of her ability.   
 






5   Zagzebski on conscientiousness and an epistemology of trust     
Linda Zagzebski (2012) argues that trust in authority is rational.240 Her argument is 
detailed, but roughly, she argues as follows: Self-trust is rational, if self-trust is rational, then 
trust in others is rational. Therefore, trust in others is rational. In defense of this argument, she 
writes:  
The fact that someone has a belief p gives me a prima facie reason to believe p. The fact 
that someone whom I conscientiously believe is conscientious believes p gives me a 
stronger prima facie reason to believe p... What the principle of epistemic trust in others 
shows is that I cannot treat other persons as simply sources of evidence for me like a 
computer or a clock. If I choose to treat them that way, I must treat myself that way. But I 
cannot treat myself that way. Reflection on trust in my own faculties forces me to extend 
my trust to all those persons relevantly like myself. Trust is a first-person reason for 
belief.241 
 
Here, Zagzebski’s notion of self-trust entailing trust in others can be applied to Lane’s account in 
the following way: A novice, if they trust themselves, and possess a good intellectual character, 
ought to extend that trust to the experts whom they judge to be relevantly similar to themselves.  
How does Zagzebski understand trust? She writes:  
I think that a state of trust is a hybrid of epistemic, affective, and behavioral components. 
As a first approximation, I propose that when I trust x for purpose y, (1) I believe x will 
get me y, (2) I feel trusting towards x for that purpose, and (3) I treat x as if it will get me 
y. I do not claim that all three components of trust are necessary in every instance, but I 
think they are present in standard cases.242 
 
It’s important to note that, on Zagzebski’s model of trust, legitimate trust involves not only 
intellectual assent but also involves an affective and volitional dimension. This is significant 
because of the discussion of certain biases mentioned by Sterman, in particular, I am thinking of 
certain emotional biases and susceptibility to rhetorical tricks can have a pernicious effect on the 
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reasoning of novices. I think it’s important that the cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects of 
the human person are considered when discussing epistemic deference to others. Now that we 
have outlined Zagzebski’s views in more detail, let’s apply the Lane-Zagzebski solution to the 
novice/2-expert problem to the particular problem of disagreeing experts that I want to address: 
the problem of expert conversion and how novices ought to respond in an epistemically 
appropriate way.  
5.1 Applying the Lane-Zagzebski solution to the problem of expert conversion 
Recall that I’ve argued that the problem of expert conversion is a type of the novice/2-
expert problem. This is because when an expert converts, they are disagreeing with their 
previous selves, as well as often disagreeing with the expert consensus (although not always). I 
think that the Lane-Zagzebski solution to the novice/2-expert problem can provide helpful 
insight in what a novice ought to do when faced with this kind of expert disagreement. Recall 
Lane’s three takeaways with respect to bridging the gap between experts and novices. (1) Both 
are self-aware, (2) both are engaged in common learning and (3) both exhibit good intellectual 
character. How can we apply these three aspects of Lane’s solution to the problem of converting 
experts?  
5.1.1 Both converting expert and novice are engaged in self-awareness  
 Recall that for effective communication to occur between expert and novice, the expert 
needs to be attentive to their intended audience and be explicit about who their intended audience 
is when trying to communicate information. Additionally, the novice has the responsibility to 
recognize any discrepancies between the speaker’s knowledge of the intended audience and the 
actual audience.  






A particular example of communication failure, and failure of self-awareness, might be 
something like a scientist who has converted from atheism to Christianity who gives a talk to a 
small rural church. The scientist discusses reasons why he converted, some of which have to do 
with science, but most of which are more philosophical in nature. Suppose this scientist still 
believes that evolution is true yet is skeptical that evolution is possible without some sort of 
teleology that can only be grounded in the existence of God. It’s possible that the converting 
scientist may not possess enough self-awareness to clearly distinguish his philosophical reasons 
for converting from his scientific reasons (that don’t primarily bear on the reason for his 
conversion).  
 If a failure of this sort occurs, I do not think that the novice possesses any additional 
evidence in believing the proposition the expert is asserting, e.g., that God exists.243 
5.1.2 Both converting expert and novice are engaged in common learning  
What does it look like, in the context of expert conversion for both the expert and the 
novice to be engaged in common learning? First, I think something similar to what Lane suggests 
with respect to experts allowing novices to participate in the process of scientific research could 
apply to cases of expert conversion. The converting expert could take the time to develop a sort 
of simulation and model for why they converted and allow the novices to partake in this model. 
An example of this might be a computer simulated climate model that shows how climate 
changes over time. There needs to be some way that the expert and novice engage in common 
learning. This seems to be the case with Rheticus and Copernicus. Copernicus invited Rheticus 
 
243 The sort of novice I am focusing on in this example is a novice who already believes in God. 
If the novice does not already believe in God, then he may gain additional evidence for his belief 
that ‘there are no scientifically minded theists’ if he encounters the theist mentioned above. Tom 
Senor helped me see this point.  






to come and see his new model and to apprentice under Copernicus for both Copernicus and 
Rheticus to engage together in common learning. What followed from this mutual engagement in 
common learning is that Rheticus came away as a new convert to the heliocentric model.244  
A contemporary example of what this sort of model-based learning would look like might 
be something like the debate between astrophysicists concerning theories of the origin of the 
universe. For the past 50 years, Big Bang cosmology has been the paradigm theory for the origin 
of the universe. Yet the theory has its dissenters. Sir Roger Penrose proposes what is called a 
conformal cyclical cosmology that differs from big band cosmology in postulating an infinite 
series or cycles of big bang singularities and universes prior to the big bang of our universe.245 A 
way for novices to enter this debate may be for a model to be created in which the different 
theories of the universe are computer simulated and the professors take time to give presentations 
to college students arguing in favor of their model. This could also be made available to the 
public for those interested to come and participate in the event.  
5.1.3 Both converting expert and novice possess a good intellectual character  
 What would it mean for both the converting expert and the novice to possess good 
intellectual character? Let’s now turn to a more detailed account of good intellectual character in 
which I’ll develop Zagzebski’s account of trust in others and apply it to the particular problem of 
expert conversion. I’ll discuss under what conditions it’s legitimate for novices to trust experts 
 
244 Rheticus and Copernicus would both be considered experts, so the example isn’t completely 
analogous to an expert and novice engaging in common learning. Given that it has been argued 
that expertise comes in degrees, a model for expert/novice common learning can also apply to 
greater expert/lesser expert models as well.  
245 See Ethan Siegel (2020), “No, Roger Penrose, We See No Evidence Of A ‘Universe Before 
The Big Bang’,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/10/08/no-roger-
penrose-we-see-no-evidence-of-a-universe-before-the-big-bang/?sh=5adc60c97a0f.  






and under what conditions experts are worthy of trust. Let’s turn to Zagzebski’s account of when 
it is legitimate to trust in others.  
Earlier, it was argued that trust in others involves (1) believing that the testimony of the 
other person will get you to the truth (2) feeling like the testimony of the other person will get 
you closer to the truth and (3) acting as if trusting the other person will get you closer to the 
truth.246 When does Zagzebski think that it’s legitimate to defer to others? She thinks legitimate 
trust in others can occur when the person doing the trusting is conscientiously self-reflective. 
According to Zagzebski, epistemic conscientiousness is “...the quality of using our faculties to 
the best of our ability in order to get to the truth…”247 The reason conscientiousness is important 
is because we don’t think that we are equally trustworthy at all times. Moreover, we think there 
is a connection between trying our best at believing the truth and success in believing the truth. 
A reflective person, someone who believes that the full use of one’s reflective powers, that is, 
someone who cognitively tries their best at believing the truth, is more likely to be successful in 
believing the truth. For this reason, Zagzebski thinks that conscientious comes in degrees.248 
Most of us, according to Zagzebski, are conscientious to some degree most of the time, but high 
degrees of conscientiousness require a great deal of self-awareness and self-monitoring.249 
 
246 Zagzebski writes, “when I trust x for purpose y, (1) I believe x will get me y, (2) I feel trusting 
towards x for that purpose, and (3) I treat x as if it will get me y.” In this case, I have filled in y 
with ‘the testimony of the other person will get me closer to the truth’ and x with ‘the converting 
expert’.   
247 Zagzebski (2012), 48.  
248 This will prove useful when applying her account of conscientiousness to the problem of 
expert conversion. The more conscientious the converting expert, the more the novice will be 
able to recognize that the expert is trustworthy and the more conscientious the novice, the more 
they will be able to successfully recognize and defer to the correct expert.  
249 Zagzebski (2012), 48-49.  






Zagzebski argues that there are two levels of epistemic trust: a general trust in one’s 
faculties (this is a basic belief) and a particular trust that conscientious self-trust is the most apt 
at getting to truth.250 She notes that conscientious is the ground for the intellectual virtues 
because the reason we think the intellectual virtues are virtuous is because we think possessing 
those virtues render an epistemic agent most apt for successfully getting at the truth.  
 Here we can begin to see what it means for both an expert and novice to possess a good 
intellectual character. Both the expert and novice possess a good intellectual character when they 
are both epistemically conscientious.  
 Zagzebski goes on to argue that our conscientious self-reflection (these two levels of 
trust) is basic and that the only way to determine whether a belief is true is if it passes our future 
self-reflection. According to Zagzebski, conscientious self-reflection is the fundamental bedrock 
of our psychic economy.251 So, Zagzebski concludes, based on the previous reflections, that 
epistemic self-trust is rational. She writes:  
Epistemic self-trust is rational in the sense I have described, and it is more rational than 
alternatives in that it requires making the fewest adjustments in the prereflective self. 
Self-reflection is what a self-conscious being does, and a rational being does it carefully. 
However, it is possible to go on reflecting forever about whether x is trustworthy in 
respect to y. Trust ends the process of reflection, and it is rational because excessive 
reflection is not rational. Trust prevents excessive reflection, and in my view, it is an 
essential component of a rationally self-reflective being.252 
 
She goes on to argue that if self-trust is rational, then trust in others is rational. The reason is 
because rational self-trust can be the basis or reason for trust in others. Self-trust, according to 
Zagzebski, serves as a reason for trust in others because it is in virtue of self-trust that a 
conscientious agent takes to be reasons for believing p are truth-indicators. For example, I 
 
250 Ibid., 49-50.  
251 Zagzebski (2012), 50.  
252 Ibid., 45.  






believe that there is a laptop in front of me in virtue of my self-trust.253 Self-trust is a first-
personal reason for belief, that it, it is a reason that only I can have.254 Zagzebski argues that 
either self-trust counts as reasons for belief, or we don’t have any reasons. Self-trust is the 
foundation for rationality. Zagzebski extends her account of the epistemic rationality of self-trust 
to trust in others based on the following principle:  
The Principle of Epistemic Trust in Others 
In any case in which, by believing in a way I trust in myself, I am led to believe that 
others have the same property I trust in myself (to the same degree I have myself), I have 
a prima facie reason to trust them as much as I trust myself.255 
 
The most salient property that Zagzebski thinks is pertinent to extending trust in others is 
conscientiousness. Before discussing in more detail how Zagzebski connects the property of 
conscientiousness with epistemic trust in others, I’d like to explain what she says concerning two 
types of reasons and the kind of reason she thinks the principle of epistemic trust in others 
provides. The two kinds of reasons that Zagzebski discusses in this context are theoretical 
reasons and deliberative reasons. Theoretical reasons are third-personal “reasons for believing p 
which are facts that are logically or probabilistically connected to the truth of p.”256 They are 
facts about the world, not intrinsically connected to believing, can be shared with others, and 
what we normally think of when we think of ‘evidence’. In contrast, deliberative reasons are 
first-personal “reasons that have an essential connection to me and only me in my deliberations 
 
253 Eric Funkhouser states that he believes that the laptop is in front of him because he sees it. I 
take it that Zagzebski would agree with him on this point. For Zagzebski, self-trust is understood 
as trust in one’s faculties to arrive at the truth. In the case of seeing the laptop, Zagzebski and 
Funkhouser agree that they believe that there is a laptop in front of them because they ‘see it’ or 
believe that their cognitive faculties are trustworthy.  
254 Ibid., 51.  
255 Zagzebski (2012), 68.  
256 Ibid., 64.  






about whether p”.257 One of the primary differences between theoretical reasons and deliberative 
reasons is that the former connect facts about the world to the truth of p, the latter connects the 
epistemic agent to the truth of p in a first-person sort of way.258 One example that Zagzebski 
gives that distinguishes theoretical and deliberative reasons is from the nature of having an 
experience. She thinks that the fact that person A has an experience can count as a theoretical 
reason for B because A can tell be about their experience. But the experience can only count as a 
deliberative reason for A because A was the person who had the experience. Moreover, the 
experience will have a rational, emotional, and behavioral responses in A that won’t occur in 
B.259  
 Zagzebski argues that self-trust is a state that provides deliberative reasons to believe. 
This is because it is a first-person reason and epistemically relevant only to the person who has 
it. Moreover, trust in others is also a state that provides deliberative reasons to believe rather than 
theoretical reasons to believe some proposition P because person A’s reason is based on the 
similarity of person B to person A and person A’s trust in himself. This is not a reason that others 
can use in determining whether P.260 
 Now that we have an account of trust, an explanation of the rationality of self-trust, how 
self-trust extends to trust in others, and the kind of first-person deliberative reasons to believe 
that trust in others provides, we can see how Zagzebski connects her account of trust in others 
with what she has already said concerning the intellectual virtue of conscientious self-reflection. 
 
257 Ibid.  
258 Zagzebski (2012), 64.  
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid., 65.  






Concerning conscientious self-reflection and how it connects to trust in others and the kind of 
reasons to believe that this trust provides, Zagzebski writes the following:  
When a subject is conscientious the subject will recognize that the fact that someone else 
believes p give them a prima facie reason to believe p and they have a stronger reason to 
believe p if the person conscientiously judges that the other person has the same qualities 
he trusts in himself...I argued in chapter 3 only that the fact that another person believes p 
counts in favor of the credibility of p.261 
 
Here, we see that a person A may defer to another person B when A conscientiously judges that 
B has similar trustworthy qualities that A recognizes in himself. Put another way, according to 
Zagzebski, the fact that B believes P is sufficient for A to believe P if A and B are similarly 
conscientiously self-reflective. What are examples in which A conscientiously judges that B is 
relevantly similar to himself and thereby may have prima facie reason to believe P? Zagzebski 
writes:  
When the subject judges that the other person is just as conscientious as the subject is and 
the other person’s faculties are just as good, and so the other person’s reasons are just as 
good as the subject’s would be if the subject had any reasons, and the other person’s 
reasons are pretty good.262  
 
An example may be when I defer to a friend about the plausibility of a political policy 
that I don’t have any firm view on. I judge my friend to be reasonably conscientious and his 
reasons seem pretty good. I trust his judgment because I judge him more or less equally 
conscientious. An example that would not be appropriate is if I deferred to a five-year-old who 
also happens to have an opinion on the same political policy (maybe she’s parroting her 
conspiracy theory uncle). Generally speaking, five-year-olds aren’t as conscientious as I am with 
respect to political policy judgments.   
 
261 Ibid., 103-104.  
262 Ibid., 104.  






Here we see the kinds of things novices ought to be looking for when attempting to 
conscientiously judge between competing experts. The novice should look at the faculties of the 
experts. Here we see a connection with Goldman’s suggestion of looking at the intellectual 
argumentation of the experts. Intellectual traits such as the ability to respond to objections and 
supply rebuttals to one’s opponent as well as intellectual agility and finesse can all be ways a 
novice can recognize good cognitive faculties in another.   
Yet, the kinds of cases Zagzebski is really interested in, and the kinds of cases which I 
take to be most salient to our discussion of expert conversion and the conscientiously self-
reflective judgment of the novice involves cases in which person A (a novice) has reason to 
believe that person B (an expert) is more likely to get to the truth than A would by using their 
direct use of their faculties.263  
 Zagzebski elucidates on cases in which one person is more likely to get to the truth than 
another person when she writes the following:  
I may conscientiously believe that another person is doing a better job of what I am trying 
to do when I am conscientious, that is, when I am trying to get the truth in some domain. 
The domain might be very narrow. Maybe I am an accomplished cook, but I trust the 
people who test bakeware for the Cook’s Illustrated more than myself on the issue. It is 
my attempt to get the truth about baking that leads me to believe that they are doing a 
better job of it in this area. The domain can also be much broader. If I am not a cook, I 
might trust everything Cook’s illustrated says about cooking equipment more than 
myself. And the domain can be broader still. Scientific disciplines like biology and 
physics are large domains whose practitioners are not equally expert at all subfields 
within the discipline, but I might reasonably judge that they are more likely to get the 
truth about anything in the discipline than I am.264 
 
I’d like to point out a few connections between what Zagzebski says in this passage and what has 
been discussed above concerning the engagement in common self-awareness and common 
 
263 Zagzebski (2012), 104.  
264 Ibid., 105 emphasis added.  






learning by both expert and novice. First, the degree to which both expert and novice are both 
self-aware concerning their respective epistemic responsibilities in successful communication 
will affect the amount of trust that is possible between them. What this means is that the expert 
and the novice will be epistemically closer, i.e., that epistemic gulf between expert and novice 
will be bridged to the extent that their self-awareness renders their communication more 
successful and thereby rendering their greater degree of trust to occur. Successful 
communication is essential for trust.  
 Second, to the extent that the expert and novice participate in common learning. by the 
expert allowing the novice to partake in the kind of reasoning process that the expert herself 
engages in, even if in an inferior way, the expert will allow the novice to grow in learning and 
knowledge of what the expert is trying to communicate. Hence, successful communication is 
made more likely if there is greater knowledge and understanding between the expert and novice. 
Truth is essential for trust.  
 Third, the more the first two occur (common self-awareness and common learning occur) 
the more the novice is able to engage in conscientious self-reflection and accurately judge who 
the competent experts are. This is because the more chances there are for successful 
communication and engagement in common learning, the novice will be in a better position to 
judge which experts are more likely than themselves (or even which experts are more likely than 
other experts to be in a position to get at the truth.)  
Let’s apply Zagzebski’s account of trust with instances of expert conversion. Consider 
the following principle:  
Legitimate trust in converting expert (LTCE): A novice, n, legitimately trusts in a 
converting expert, e, for the purpose of obtaining truth, t, when (1) n believes e will get 
them to t, (2) n feels trusting towards e for that purpose, and (3) n treats e as if it will get 
them to t and (4) e is trustworthy and (5) n is a conscientiously self-reflective person.  







Like Zagzebski, I don’t take these five conditions as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
However, I think that at least sufficient conditions can be provided to guide the novice on how 
they ought to respond when they encounter an instance of expert conversion.   
 I think the most significant aspects of LTCE are (4) and (5). Let’s consider what it means 
for an expert to be trustworthy. Consider the following principle: 
Converting Expert trustworthiness (CET): A converting expert, e, is trustworthy, 
when e’s conversion is: (1) epistemically significant and (2) (a) e abides by the epistemic 
norms of communication, (b) engages in common learning, (c) and has a good 
intellectual character (is conscientious himself).  
 
Concerning (1), recall in chapter three where I gave an account of when an expert’s 
conversion is epistemically significant. Briefly, an expert’s conversion is epistemically 
significant when the following is the best explanation of the expert’s conversion: that the expert 
seemed to convert based on evidence and not based on bias.265  
Concerning (2a), I’ve argued, by drawing from Lane and Zagzebski, that an expert abides 
by the norms of successful communication when they are self-aware and attentive to the norms 
of communication. These norms involve an epistemic responsibility on behalf of the expert to be 
honest. In particular, this means he should know who his intended audience is and make his 
intended audience explicit.  
Concerning (2b), the expert is trustworthy if they invite novices to participate in a mutual 
learning experience in which the expert mentors and guides the novice in the kinds of expert 
reason and research that the expert herself engages in. This doesn’t entail that experts that don’t 
 
265 Also remember that my account is a diagnostic rather than a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  






participate in mutual learning aren’t trustworthy it just means that experts who do engage in 
mutual learning can be trusted.  
Concerning (2c), the expert is conscientious. This means that the expert exhibits 
intellectual character traits such as intellectual humility. For example, the expert is conscientious 
when they do not overstep their bounds of expertise. Other intellectual virtues that an expert may 
have on the basis of being conscientious is that they are attentive to their audiences, they 
welcome constructive criticism of their work, and exhibit a willingness to help and engage with 
conscientious novices.  
 Let’s also explain (5) in more detail. What does it mean for a novice to be a reflectively 
self-conscientious person? It means that they are conscientiously self-reflective themselves. They 
possess the particular intellectual virtues being attentive to the expert’s intended audience, are 
humble in their recognition of their intellectual limitations, and desire in a healthy way to learn 
from the experts in a common engagement of mutual learning.  
The principle of legitimate trust in experts can shed light on how the novice ought to 
respond to expert conversion. If the novice doesn’t trust the expert, or the expert isn’t 
trustworthy, or the novice is not a conscientiously self-reflective person, then these can all have 
effects on the epistemic appropriateness of legitimately deferring to significant expert 
conversion.  
5.2 Practical examples of my account 
Now that we have the principles of my account in hand, let’s look at applying them to 
practical cases. In this first example, let’s consider when things go well and in the second 
example, let’s look at when things go bad.   
Good Cases  






Case 1  
 A novice would legitimately defer to a converting expert in a case in which the expert 
changes their mind concerning the danger of aerosol spread rather than just droplet spread. 
Suppose the expert works for a government agency that initially said that a virus only spreads via 
droplets. Later, the data suggests that the virus spreads not just via droplets but via aerosols 
(much smaller than droplets). The expert working for the government agency changes his mind 
and the novice legitimately trusts the expert. The expert has an incentive to not change their 
mind for non-evidential reasons in this case. The government agency that they work for is 
placing pressure on their experts to give an answer that this expert now believes is contrary to 
what the evidence supports.      
Case 2  
 Another good case is one about public policy. Suppose an expert originally believed that 
the best public health policy with respect to controlling a viral pandemic was to allow for the 
virus to run through a population and to allow the population to achieve herd immunity by a fast 
burn of viral spread. Suppose further that the expert recognizes that this strategy is actually 
ineffective in the long-run and will actually lead to more deaths long-term. In this case, the 
novice would legitimately trust the expert in this case. This expert is pressured to support the fast 
herd-immunity strategy by political figures in her field, yet she sticks to her convictions about 
what she believes the evidence supports.   
Bad Cases  
Case 3 
 Suppose that an expert changes their mind concerning the efficacy of a vaccine. 
Previously, the expert believed that the vaccine was safe and efficacious in preventing disease. 






Now, the expert claims that the vaccine has severe side effects that outweigh the benefits of the 
vaccine. Suppose further that you learn that the expert now has their own alternative therapy for 
treating the disease that isn’t a vaccine. Upon a quick investigation, you can tell that the expert 
owns a very large and wealthy company that produces these alternative products. In this case, a 
novice would not legitimately defer to a converting expert.  
Case 4  
 Suppose an expert says that a certain vaccine is immoral because it was derived from 
aborted fetal cells. The expert didn’t previously believe that receiving a vaccine derived from 
aborted fetal cells was illicit and they don’t say that it’s illicit to receive other vaccines that are 
derived from aborted fetal cells. But for this particular vaccine, they believe it’s illicit because it 
was derived from aborted fetal cells. In this case, the expert is holding to a double standard 
concerning the morality of vaccines and the novice would not legitimately defer to their change 
of mind.  
5.2 Why, according to my account, the good cases are good, and the bad cases are bad.  
 My account properly diagnoses good cases as good and bad cases as bad for the 
following reasons. In the good cases, it seems to the novice that the expert has converted for 
evidential reasons and that there is a seeming absence of defeaters (biases or motivated 
reasoning) on behalf of the expert. According to my account, if it seems to the novice that the 
expert converts for evidential reasons and there’s an absence of defeaters, then the novice 
legitimately defers to the testimony of the expert. This is because the best explanation of the 
expert’s conversion, as it seems to the novice, is that the expert converted for evidential reasons.  
 On the other hand, in the bad cases, it seems to the novice that the expert has converted 
for either non-evidential reasons or for biased/motivated reasons. The expert either doesn’t 






seems to have evidential reasons for their conversion or they do have defeaters for their 
conversion. In these cases, the novice does not legitimately defer to the converting expert. This is 
because the best explanation for the expert’s conversion is not evidential reasons but rather 
motivated or biased reasons.  
 In the good cases, the novice can take the expert to be trustworthy and self-conscientious 
and hence lead the novice into truth. In the bad cases, the novice judges the expert to not be 
trustworthy and self-conscientious and hence the expert would not likely lead to novice into 
truth.  
6   Conclusion  
 In this chapter I answered how a novice should respond in an epistemically appropriate 
way. I detailed the ways in which it would be epistemically inappropriate for the novice to 
respond to instances of expert conversion. I gave a moderate account of an appropriate epistemic 
response to expert conversion that avoids the pitfalls of both extreme pessimism and extreme 
optimism. I developed my positive account based on Lane’s moderate view concerning what to 
do when experts disagree and further developed the account based on principles from Zagzebski 
regarding the intellectual character trait of self-conscientiousness.   
  







The main thesis of this dissertation is to give an account of when expert conversion is 
epistemically significant for a novice and how the novice ought to respond to the converting 
expert. By looking at the structure of conversions in general and the nature of expert testimony, I 
provided a useful background for answering the question of when an expert conversion is 
epistemically significant.  
My account of when expert conversion is epistemically significant and how the novice 
ought to respond can be summarized by the diagnostic tool and epistemic principles below, First, 
for determining when an expert conversion is epistemically significant, the novice can look for 
the following:  
Let EC stand for an expert conversion, ES stand for epistemically significant, and EB 
stand for evidence based.  
 An EC is ES iff:  
(1) The EC is EB.  
An EC is EB if:  
(2a) Social calibration condition – when the expert converts, they are committed to using 
the same evidential standards, formalisms, and ontological schemes as the other experts 
in the debate. 
(2b) Appearance of evidence – the expert seems to be converting on the basis of 
evidence.  
(2c) Absence of cognitive biases – the expert doesn’t seem to have any cognitive biases 
that would better explain the conversion. 
(2d) The expert makes reliably successful predictions and successful track-record –  the 
converting expert makes successful novel predictions based on their new view and has 
been reliable in the past.  
 
Second, with respect to how the novice ought to rationally defer to a converting expert I offered 
the following principles:  






Legitimate trust in converting expert (LTCE): A novice, n, legitimately trusts in a 
converting expert, e, for the purpose of obtaining truth, t, when (1) n believes e will get 
them to t, (2) n feels trusting towards e for that purpose, and (3) n treats e as if it will get 
them to t and (4) e is trustworthy and (5) n is a conscientiously self-reflective person.  
 
Converting Expert trustworthiness (CET): A converting expert, e, is trustworthy, 
when e’s conversion is: (1) epistemically significant and (2) (a) e abides by the epistemic 
norms of communication, (b) engages in common learning, (c) and has a good 
intellectual character (is conscientious himself).  
 
When a novice applies these two principles then she rationally defers to a converting expert.  
 My account of identifying when expert conversion is epistemically significant and how a 
novice ought to respond matters for the following reasons. First, there has been much literature 
devoted to the epistemological significance of expertise, expert testimony, and expert 
disagreement, but there has been much discussion about expert conversion in general and how 
expert conversion relates to expert testimony and expert disagreement. I think my account of 
expert conversion addresses problems in this area of social epistemology that are either not 
discussed or underdeveloped.  
 Another reason why my account of the epistemic significance of expert conversion 
matters is due to the practical applicability of my topic. My account is intended to be a true 
diagnostic tool that anyone can use to help them navigate difficult yet very common epistemic 
problems they encounter in their daily lives. Anecdotally, whenever I’ve discussed the topic of 
my dissertation with non-philosophers virtually all of them where immediately able to see how 
important and relevant the topic is for themselves.  
 A final reason, which is related to the previous reason, that my dissertation topic matters 
is because the topic has implications for many other disciplines. For example, my account can be 
applied to areas in science, medicine, technology, public health, nutrition, and possibly, politics, 
morality, and religion.  






 I think for future projects I’d like to see how my account could be applied to multiple 
expert conversions that occur in one direction. For example, suppose that a certain scientific 
position is held be fifty percent of experts. But further suppose that the split was closer to 
seventy-five to twenty-five but overtime there were a number of conversions to one side of the 
debate, but hardly any conversions to the other side of the debate. Does the fact that there is an 
asymmetry in conversion give us any additional reason to think the position is true over and 
above the fact that the expert testimony on each side is roughly fifty percent? I think my account 
on the epistemic significance might be able to shed light on this question.  
 A second interesting implication of my topic is asking whether my account can be 
applied politics, morality, and religion. First, we’d have to discuss whether there are experts in 
these fields and whether there is transmission of knowledge to novices who rationally defer to 
them. If there are political, moral, or religious experts, and transmission of knowledge to novices 
is possible, then my account of the epistemic significance of expert conversion may have 
interesting implications for this area as well.  
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